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FOREWORD BY THE GOVERNOR
Luis M. Linde
In 2017 the recovery in the Spanish economy continued for the fourth year running. GDP 
grew by 3.1%, only marginally down on the rates for the two previous years. This expansion 
in output, which amounts to 13% in cumulative terms since the start of the upturn in 2014, 
is providing for rapid growth in employment and a significant reduction in the unemployment 
rate which, however, still remains at very high levels. The increase in GDP in 2017 exceeded, 
as has been the case throughout the recovery, the expectations at the start of the year, 
which was mainly due in this instance to more favourable than expected developments in 
the global economy and in international trade, particularly as regards the euro area. Further, 
for the third year running, output in the Spanish economy expanded at a significantly 
higher rate than that of the euro area countries as a whole, and this difference was even 
more marked in terms of job creation. 
The recovery is benefiting from the correction of the Spanish economy’s imbalances, a 
correction particularly patent in terms of the gains in external competitiveness and the 
reduction in private agents’ overindebtedness, and discernible in the reduction in the debtor 
position vis-à-vis the rest of the world. These positive features of the current recovery are 
fuelling expectations that the expansion will be durable. At the same time, despite the 
above-mentioned headway, progress remains limited in other areas, notably so as regards 
any reduction in the high level of public debt. This means that, in the medium term, the 
Spanish economy will continue to evidence a notable degree of vulnerability to potential 
shocks, especially in a setting in which demand-side policies are expected to provide an 
increasingly smaller stimulus to growth. The challenges ahead are more considerable over 
a longer time horizon, in which structural policies will be called on to play a more active role 
to ensure a sustained increase in our economy’s growth capacity and levels of well-being. 
Chapter 1 of this Report plots a course between the achievements of the Spanish economy 
to date, on one hand, and, on the other, the challenges ahead, to which I shall refer later. 
The world economy had been posting modest growth in recent years, and showed signs 
of greater dynamism in 2017, when global GDP recorded its highest rate of increase since 
2011. Moreover, international trade appeared to emerge last year from the slackness of the 
preceding years, which was partly associated with the momentum of investment, an 
expenditure component that is highly intensive in trade flows. Underpinning these 
favourable developments was the expansionary stance of economic policies and, in 
particular, of monetary policy. The gradual firming of the pick-up in activity and the incipient 
signs that inflation might be embarking on a rising path are beginning to prompt, in some 
geographical regions, a gradual withdrawal of monetary stimuli, a process not free from 
risks, as shown by the bout of increased volatility on financial markets at the start of 2018. 
In the euro area economies, the head of steam of the recovery was across the board. On 
available estimates, the increase in activity is estimated to have enabled the negative 
output gap that gave rise to the crisis to be absorbed in late 2017. Inflation, however, 
remains at very low levels, meaning that unlike the United States, where the Federal 
Reserve has already initiated a monetary policy normalisation process, in the euro area it 
has been necessary to prolong its expansionary stance.
The monetary stimuli have enabled financial conditions to be kept very easy in Spain, with 
bank lending rates at levels close to all-time lows and rises in flows of new lending, which 
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are compatible with the ongoing deleveraging by private agents. Among the main GDP 
components, consumption slowed in 2017, albeit to a lesser extent than household 
disposable income, meaning that the rate of decline by the saving rate marking recent 
years increased. Investment, whose trend over the course of the recovery is analysed in 
detail in Chapter 3 of this Report, continued to expand against a background in which the 
course of final demand gave rise to further increases in capacity utilisation. Finally, exports 
reflected the greater buoyancy of foreign markets, despite the brake on gains in 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area and of the appreciation of the effective 
exchange rate against the rest of the world. 
There are positive aspects to the provisional assessment of the recovery, whose roots lie 
in the economic policies implemented since the recession. Although many measures 
addressing highly diverse areas have been adopted, the significance of some in explaining 
the current recovery may be highlighted. 
Notable on the domestic front is the role played by the labour market reforms (which have 
contributed to restoring the competitiveness lost during the previous expansionary phase), 
and the recapitalisation and restructuring of credit institutions; and in the European arena, 
the launching of the Banking Union, along with the European Central Bank’s monetary 
policy, has provided for the correction of the euro area’s fragmented financial markets.
As a result of all these measures, the current recovery evidences characteristics that may 
be considered to be very favourable. The buoyancy of activity is being accompanied by 
notably robust employment creation, a typical feature of expansionary phases in the 
Spanish economy which, in the current cycle, is being bolstered by wage moderation and 
a greater degree of flexibility in the use of the labour factor. Moreover, the gradual absorption 
of idle resources in the economy has been no obstacle to maintaining an external surplus.
Undoubted progress has been made. But the collective effort Spanish society at large 
must make to embed and build on what has been achieved is also significant. On one 
hand, the economy continues to be somewhat vulnerable to potential external shocks. On 
the other, the expansion has been underpinned by certain factors whose effects will tend 
to gradually fade, which includes monetary and fiscal policies. As the momentum of these 
levers progressively tails off, greater store should be set by the measures aimed at 
promoting a greater degree of productive factor use, fomenting a more efficient functioning 
of factor and product markets, and raising our economy’s long-term growth capacity. 
Several of the sources of fragility of our economy remain significant: the net debtor position 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, which remains high; the public debt ratio is close to its 
historical high; and, as detailed in Chapter 2 of this Report, the financial system still has 
major challenges to address. In all these areas, moreover, the uneven progress observed 
rests partly on the very improvement in the business cycle, which spells a warning about 
the possible fragility of some of the achievements attained in the face of any future downturn. 
Prominent among the challenges ahead is the correction of the imbalance in public 
finances. This is a pressing task, given the adverse consequences that maintaining a level 
of general government debt as high as that at present entail. In particular, a high level of 
public debt tends to tighten the financing conditions for private agents, negatively affecting 
productive investment, and to diminish the headroom available to budgetary policy to 
counter adverse shocks. Additionally, assigning a high volume of funds to meet the interest 
burden means that such funds are not available for other productive spending. 
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The structural correction of the public finances imbalance should, moreover, be compatible 
with a greater contribution of public finances to the growth of the economy. On the 
expenditure side, there is room to raise the efficiency of public spending and to tilt its 
composition more towards those items with a greater bearing on productivity. On the 
revenue side, a revision and definition of the tax basket should be considered, moving 
towards structures more favourable to medium-term growth. In the case of regional and 
local government, which are responsible for more than 40% of public spending, financing 
arrangements should be reformed with the aim of adapting revenues to expenditure needs, 
ensuring their transparent distribution and increasing the degree of fiscal co-responsibility. 
As regards the pensions system, whose initial starting point is one of deficit and will be 
pressured by the effect of population ageing, a reform strategy would be desirable that 
increased the transparency of the system, strengthened the relationship between 
contributions and benefits, and, in particular, maintained an automatic adjustment 
mechanism ensuring its sustainability. 
Despite the progress observed in recent years, the ongoing transformation of the Spanish 
credit system should continue over the coming years in order to ensure that it efficiently 
performs its task of intermediating financial flows. In particular, banks should continue 
striving to reduce the volume of non-performing loans and foreclosures on their balance 
sheets. Moreover, credit institutions must be proactive when addressing the effects of 
regulatory changes and technological progress. Lastly, the sector should complete the 
downsizing process, adapting its size to foreseeable future business volumes, which will 
be substantially lower than before the crisis. 
From a longer-term perspective, in order to raise levels of well-being, the potential growth 
rate – which on available estimates is somewhat lower than 1.5% – must be increased. 
Several causes are constraining long-term growth, adversely affecting the degree of use 
of the labour factor, the level of productivity, or both simultaneously. The obstacles to 
growth most closely related to the low level of use of the labour factor include high 
structural unemployment and population ageing which, among other effects, restricts the 
labour participation rate. Other barriers to long-term growth, such as the high degree of 
labour market duality, regulations that restrict competition and prevent the efficient 
reallocation of resources, and human and technological capital shortcomings, all act as a 
drag on productivity growth. 
One particularly pressing challenge is the necessary reduction of unemployment. 
Joblessness is particularly high and persistent among specific groups, such as the 
youngest and oldest cohorts, and the least skilled. Here, public policy should be geared to 
preventing these workers from remaining unemployed for long spells, with the subsequent 
loss of skills. Indeed, reducing unemployment, and in particular long-term unemployment, 
is one of the main levers for promoting socially sustainable growth, thereby fomenting the 
distribution of the benefits of the economic recovery amongst the greatest possible 
number of population segments. In this respect, a recent study by several Banco de 
España experts (whose publication is forthcoming)1 highlights the fact that the strong 
deterioration in the labour market during the initial phases of the crisis was the main 
catalyst for the rise in inequality in per capita income at that time. Symmetrically, it is 
expected that the dynamism of employment creation during the current upturn, and the 
subsequent decline in unemployment, will have enabled the previous worsening in 
inequality indices to be corrected in recent years.
1  Occasional Paper “Income, consumption and wealth inequality in Spain”, forthcoming.
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One aspect on which employment dynamics and the distribution of income, wealth and 
household consumption capacity are largely conditional are demographic trends. The 
latest such trends, in particular, entail various adverse effects in respect of the use of the 
labour factor and, therefore, of the economy’s potential output. These are manifest, on one 
hand, in a dip in the total working-age population, which calls for the implementation of 
policies that promote a life-work balance and therefore foment a higher birth rate, and a 
migratory policy in step with labour market needs. Further, population ageing negatively 
affects participation and employment rates. To alleviate these effects, measures are 
needed to promote the participation in the labour market of the elderly population groups.
Turning to productivity gains, the high degree of labour market segmentation must be 
tackled. The current recovery is once again evidencing a characteristic feature of upturns 
in the Spanish economy, involving a rise in the rate of temporary employment contracts, 
accompanied by a reduction in contract duration and an increase in unwanted part-time 
employment. These developments have adverse consequences for long-term growth, 
insofar as they discourage investment in human capital. 
In the current upturn we are witnessing something of a rise in the rate of increase of total 
factor productivity. However, its growth remains limited, highlighting the need to raise 
investment in both human and technological capital. In the first of these two areas, there 
has been some perceptible progress since the crisis broke, such as the extension of 
training periods for the young, which is conducive to human capital accumulation. 
Evidently, however, lengthening training periods is not, in itself, sufficient; the quality of 
education must also be raised. In particular, skills acquired must be geared to a greater 
extent to face the challenges arising from technological progress and globalisation. 
As regards technological capital, an increase has been observed since the start of the 
crisis in the distance separating Spain from the other European economies in terms of 
R&D spending, especially in the private sector. Closing this gap and promoting innovation 
by companies calls for action in many different areas, ranging from an increase in the 
allocation of public funds for research and development to the promotion of financing for 
innovative activities, and improving human capital endowment. Moreover, actions that 
improve levels of competition are a powerful stimulus to innovation. In this respect, the 
fact that the gains in competitiveness in recent years vis-à-vis the euro area as a whole 
should have borne above all on the correction of unit labour costs, while unit operating 
surpluses remained practically stable, suggests the need to introduce competition-
enhancing measures into different goods and services markets.
The low rates of total factor productivity growth may also be associated with the presence of 
regulatory obstacles which, in particular, might be hampering business start-ups or hindering 
their growth. The delays in rolling out the Law on Market Unity or the restrictions to companies 
growing above certain thresholds due to certain legislative provisions are examples of 
regulations that may be generating inefficiencies, and that therefore require revision. 
Lastly, I should mention that progress has been limited in the construction of the euro area’s 
institutional architecture. Here, the priority continues to be the completion of the Banking 
Union, with the creation of a common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund, a 
European deposit guarantee scheme, and further headway with the capital markets union. 
Moreover, the governance of public finances must also be reformed, with the dual aim, first, 
of promoting healthier public finances and, second, of setting in place the basic building 
blocks needed to develop a fiscal stabilisation capacity at the overall euro area level. 
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1  THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES 
AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
During 2017 the expansionary phase of the Spanish economy continued, with GDP 
growth exceeding the forecasts in place at the start of the year. Specifically, output in 
the economy increased by 3.1%, slightly down on the figure observed for the two previous 
years. The continuation of a high rate of expansion of activity, which has held up in the 
opening months of 2018, has helped the unemployment rate to continue declining rapidly, 
although at the end of Q1 this year it still remained at a very high level (16.7%).
The greater increase in activity in Spain compared with previous expectations was 
largely due to the favourable behaviour of external markets. The acceleration in the 
pace of growth of the global economy came about against a background of highly 
favourable financial conditions, higher business and consumer confidence, and a rise in 
commodities prices. Notable among the advanced economies was the dynamism of the 
euro area, which experienced robust growth that spread across the board to all its 
members. Despite the buoyancy of activity, euro area inflation held at very moderate rates. 
The recovery in Spain evidences features that should contribute to its prolongation 
over time. The current expansion is proving compatible with the running of an external 
surplus. Beyond the contribution of certain transitory factors, such as the low levels of oil 
prices and of interest rates, the positive external balance is largely due to the gains in 
competitiveness recorded since the crisis. As a result, and unlike the expansion that 
preceded the crisis, the current upturn is more balanced in terms of domestic and external 
demand, and it has been compatible with private-sector deleveraging in the economy.
However, the economy continues to show elements of vulnerability, compounded by 
an external environment in which pockets of risk and instability persist. Despite the 
headway in reducing the budget deficit, the structural budgetary imbalance remains 
pronounced and the correction of the sector’s high debt has, to date, been but very 
modest. Also, the positive external balance since 2013 has not prevented the net debtor 
position vis-à-vis the rest of the world from continuing to be high. In place alongside these 
accumulated imbalances are certain inefficiencies in the functioning of the markets for 
labour and for goods and services, which detract from the quality of the recovery. 
Population ageing is, moreover, a primordial challenge for economic growth and the 
sustainability of public finances. In the external environment, while expansionary inertia 
may be expected to continue in the short term, certain risks persist. These are associated 
with re-pricing on international financial markets, with uncertainty over the negotiations as 
to the shape of the new arrangements between the EU and the United Kingdom, and with 
the changes under way in respect of US trade policy, which point to increased constraints 
on global trade. 
The medium- and long-term challenges should be tackled by a far-reaching reform 
agenda, both domestically and at the European level. Demand-side policies – both 
fiscal and, especially, monetary policy – have set in place conditions favourable to 
economic growth in recent years. In future, however, budgetary policy should be geared to 
reducing the high public debt. As the recovery takes root in the euro area as a whole, the 
increase in the degree of capacity utilisation will foreseeably translate into a rise in inflation 
and, therefore, open the way for a less expansionary monetary policy stance. Against this 
background, sustained and inclusive economic growth requires reforms that provide for 
1  Introduction
Screen, 1st Annual Research Conference.
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the replacement of the cyclical impulse of demand-side policies. The necessary reform 
momentum should take advantage of the exceptional macroeconomic bonanza to resolve 
the Spanish economy’s outstanding structural problems. Momentum is also necessary at 
the European level to reinforce the Economic and Monetary Union project, which requires 
combining a greater degree of solidarity and risk-sharing among Member States.
The global economy raised its growth rate in 2017 to a greater extent than expected. 
Global GDP grew by 3.8% last year, around 0.5 pp up on 2016 (see Chart 1.1.1). Moreover, 
for the first time since the end of the global financial crisis, growth outperformed the 
expectations set at the beginning of the year. This acceleration in activity, which was fairly 
widespread geographically, was more marked in the case of the advanced economies, 
whose growth increased by 0.6 pp to 2.3%. Among the main countries in this group, the 
United Kingdom was the sole exception in respect of the greater dynamism shown. The 
pace of output in the emerging economies increased by 0.4 pp to 4.8%, partly as a result 
of the emergence by Brazil and Russia from recession.
The greater robustness of the global economy was mainly due to cyclical factors 
and, in the case of the advanced economies, the momentum of investment was the 
most notable reason. The improvement in activity came about against a background of 
continuing highly favourable financial conditions, a predominantly accommodative 
macroeconomic policy stance, greater business and consumer confidence, and a pick-up 
in commodities prices, which eased the delicate situation of the commodities-exporting 
economies. Moreover, following a prolonged period of weak investment in the main 
advanced economies, this component rebounded, assisted by the high level of plant 
capacity utilisation and by the sound behaviour of business profits (see Chart 1.1.2).1
International trade rose appreciably in 2017, following its marked slackness in 2015 
and 2016. Trade growth during 2017 was 4.9%, the best figure since 2011. The intensity 
of the various factors behind such growth and its geographical scope changed progressively 
during the year. In early 2017 Chinese trade activity was highly dynamic, related partly to 
the fiscal stimuli activated in order to check the slowdown in the Chinese economy, which 
would have fed through to other Asian economies through the regional value chains. In the 
second half of the year, the thrust of trade resided to a greater extent on the strength of the 
euro area and other advanced economies, and was associated with the reactivation of 
business investment, the domestic expenditure component to which trade is most 
sensitive.
Global inflation in 2017 remained contained despite the rise in oil prices. Oil has 
become significantly dearer over the course of 2017 and in 2018 to date, chiefly in response 
to the widespread recovery in global demand and, to a lesser extent, to the extension of 
the agreement of the OPEC countries and other producers to cut production throughout 
the year, to episodes of geopolitical tension in the Middle East and to the depreciation of 
the dollar (see Chart 1.1.3). In the advanced economies, consumer price inflation rose 
significantly to 1.7%, after having posted a figure of 0.8% in 2016. This reflected, above 
all, the rise in oil prices, whose impact was mainly felt in the first half of the year (see 
Chart 1.1.4). Conversely, in the emerging economies inflation fell by 0.3 pp to 4%, in some 
cases as the effects of the past depreciations of their currencies petered out. Beyond the 
energy component, core consumer price inflation has held at moderate levels and, in most 
advanced economies, below central bank targets. 
2  Towards an improved 
external outlook
2.1  A SHARPER AND MORE 
DIVERSIFIED GLOBAL 
RECOVERY 
1  In this respect see Chapter 3 of this Report.
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SOURCES: WEO (World Economic Outlook) and Datastream.
a Forecasts from IMF World Economic Outlook Update, January 2017.
b Aggregate of United States, euro area, United Kingdom and Japan.
The global economy recorded a higher than expected rate of growth in 2017. This greater dynamism of the global economy was reflected in strong 
investment momentum and in the recovery of global trade. However, despite the renewed strength of global demand and the rise in oil prices, inflation 
remained contained in the main geographical areas. As the economic cycle progressed in advanced economies, the Federal Reserve tightened its 
monetary policy and expectations of rate rises by other advanced economy central banks were factored in, against a backdrop of high risk appetite and 
low volatility.
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Monetary policy in the United States and the United Kingdom has progressively 
tilted towards a less easy stance. In the United States, where the economy is relatively 
ahead in the cycle, the Federal Reserve raised its policy rate by 25 bp on three occasions 
during 2017 and once again in March 2018, placing it in a range between 1.5% and 1.75% 
(see Chart 1.1.5). Moreover, in October it began gradually to reduce its balance sheet, 
following the plans announced before the summer. These movements took place in a 
setting in which the Federal Reserve has had to address the dilemma of adopting decisions 
in an economy with moderate inflationary pressures but with a very low unemployment 
level and with signs of overvaluation in certain financial market segments. The Bank of 
England, for its part, raised its policy rate by 25 bp in November, the first rise in 11 years, 
after noting that inflation was holding above target in its forecasting horizon. 
The current US Administration announced some significant changes in its economic 
policies. On the fiscal front, a tax reform was approved in late 2017 and, into 2018, a 
budgetary agreement was reached to raise the expenditure ceiling and an infrastructure 
investment plan was announced. Although the fiscal reform was of a more limited scope 
than that contained in the electoral programme, the set of measures adopted has entailed 
a significant raising of the US growth forecast in the short term, with growth estimated to 
stand at around 3% and 2.5% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. As regards trade policy, the 
negotiations on the reform of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
began in mid-2017, have seen scarcely any progress. Moreover, the tariff rises announced 
by the US Administration in the opening months of 2018 on specific products from a broad 
range of countries confirm the feared turn towards protectionist positions. These measures, 
along with the responses by the authorities of the countries concerned, may ultimately 
result in a trade war, which could weigh down trade and economic activity globally. The 
historical evidence available shows that protectionism is harmful to well-being and global 
growth. Trade barriers distort the allocation of resources in the short term, prompting 
losses in efficiency. In the medium and long term, they have an adverse bearing on total 
factor productivity, chiefly as a result of the downturn in innovation and in the adoption and 
dissemination of new technologies, and lower managerial quality.2
In the emerging economies, macroeconomic policies have been fairly heterogeneous, 
differing in terms of the cyclical position and of the imbalances accumulated. In the 
monetary policy sphere, the moderation in inflation has provided for the prolongation of 
the cycle of easing in the main Latin American economies (with the exception of Mexico) 
and in Russia, in contrast to the muted rises in policy rates agreed by some central banks 
in other emerging areas. In particular, in China, the economic authorities have continued to 
pursue an economic policy course that has had as its dual objectives the lessening of 
financial risks and support for growth. With regard to the goal of safeguarding financial 
stability, the central bank adopted, over the course of the year, small-scale rises in interest 
rates, while the government approved the launch of the fiscal stimulus package ahead of 
the signs of a slowdown in activity.
The international financial markets saw a continuing appetite for risk and low 
volatility. This behaviour can be attributed to an environment of favourable economic 
activity figures, contained inflation and abundant liquidity built up after several years of 
highly expansionary monetary policies. Against this backdrop, investors’ search for yield 
2  See the box entitled “The possible effects of a reversal of globalisation” in Annual Report 2016, Banco de España 
and the analytical article “Situation of and outlook for the global economy at the start of 2018”, Economic 
Bulletin, 2/2018, Banco de España.
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remained intense, materialising in increases in the prices of numerous assets. Hence the 
main stock market indices, for developed and emerging economies alike, increased in 
2017, with a notable rise of close to 20% in the United States to a new all-time high (see 
Chart 1.1.6). Moreover, emerging economies’ sovereign debt spreads and those on the 
worst-rated corporate bonds were squeezed significantly during the year. As a result of 
these equity and bond market trends, and of the depreciation of the dollar, US financial 
conditions tended to ease, despite the tightening of monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, in the opening months of 2018, there was a bout of notable volatility on 
the financial markets. At the start of the year, coinciding with a further improvement in 
the outlook for economic activity and with an increase in inflation expectations, the rise in 
US 10-year government bond yields that began in September 2017 steepened. In February 
this year, moreover, there was a significant correction of share prices on the main 
international markets, following the sudden signs of an increase in wage inflation in the 
United States which were interpreted as indicative of an inflationary rise and, therefore, of 
the fact that the pace of policy interest rate rises might accelerate relative to what had 
hitherto been anticipated. This episode of price corrections and rising volatility, which was 
amplified by certain market practices, spread to other international stock markets, but 
scarcely influenced bond markets.3
The global outlook remains complex despite the recent robustness of the world 
economy. The recent improvement in activity is predominantly rooted in the economic 
cycle, without significant increases in potential growth having apparently been recorded. 
Against this backdrop, the rate of increase of output in the advanced economies will 
foreseeably resume more moderate levels in the medium term and the increases in output 
above the potential rate may be expected to ultimately feed through to prices, leading 
inflation to converge on central bank targets. In the case of the emerging economies, 
expected growth would, on average, be around its potential rate, although there is notable 
heterogeneity across countries and regions. 
Notable among the main risks to global growth are the potential correction of values 
on certain international financial market segments and the increase in protectionism. 
While additional positive surprises cannot be ruled out in the short term, in the medium 
term several significant risks persist. A hypothetical adjustment of asset prices might 
come about as a result of geopolitical events or in the face of unanticipated economic 
policy measures which, in some cases, might trigger sharp rises in financing costs and 
sudden capital switching, which would be particularly harmful for the economies most 
exposed to external financing. Also, the negotiations on the new shape of the EU-UK 
economic relationship, along with the protectionist slant adopted by the United States in 
its trade policy, remain areas of risk insofar as they point to an increase in the restrictions 
on global trade. 
The euro area economy expanded robustly in 2017, across all its members, and, as 
in other regions, the upturn was greater than forecast at the end of the previous 
year. Following several years of moderate growth, GDP adjusted for calendar effects 
increased by 2.5% in 2017, one of the highest rates observed since the launch of the euro 
(see Chart 1.2.1), set against the Eurosystem’s December 2016 forecast of 1.7%. The 
buoyancy of domestic demand – in terms both of private consumption and investment – 
2.2  ROBUST EURO AREA 
GROWTH 
3  See the box “Global stock market correction and volatility episode” in the Quarterly Report on the Spanish 
Economy, March 2018, Banco de España.
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SOURCES: Banco de España, ECB and Eurostat.
a Unweighted standard deviation of year-on-year rates of change of euro area countries' GDP.
b The unemployment rate is the quarterly average of the monthly rates. The expanded unemployment rate takes into account individuals who are unemployed, 
underemployed, available for but not seeking work and unavailable for work. It is calculated by including in the denominator, in addition to the labour force, workers 
who are available for but not seeking work and those who are unavailable for work. See the influence of these factors on alternative measures of unemployment 
in "Quarterly report on the Spanish economy", Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
c Year-on-year rate of change.
d NEER-38 is the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro against the currencies of the 38 most important trading partners of the euro area.
e The FCI is a weighted aggregation of changes in financial variables: 3-month Euribor (with a weighting of 0.18), the euro area 10-year interest rate (0.23), the 
NEER (0.10) and the EURO STOXX (0.012). It is expressed normalised by the weighting of short-term interest rates.
Widespread robust economic growth, with a lower level of dispersion in terms of GDP growth between the different countries. Inflation remained at 
moderate levels, despite the dynamic growth in activity which was accompanied by intense job creation. The unemployment rate continued to fall, 
although complementary indicators suggest that there is still a high degree of labour market slack, and wages climbed moderately. Financial conditions 
remain very favourable, despite the appreciation of the euro.
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combined with the strength of exports to drive this acceleration in activity. Moreover, the 
growth in the economy helped lead, on the estimates available, to the practical 
disappearance in late 2017 of the negative output gap that arose further to the crisis. The 
favourable economic situation was extensive to both sectors and countries, as shown by 
the dispersion indicators, which are at historically low levels. 
The expansion in activity is proving intense in terms of employment generation. In 
2017, numbers employed grew by 1.6%. The strength of job creation, which has benefited 
from the labour reforms undertaken in certain member countries and from a moderate rise 
in real wages, allowed for continuing reductions in the unemployment rate, which stood at 
the end of the year at 8.6%, still 1.3 pp above its pre-crisis level (see Chart 1.2.4). However, 
this aggregate figure masks substantial cross-country differences, which range from an 
unemployment rate below 4% in Germany to 20% in Greece and 16.5% in Spain. 
Easy financial conditions prevailed in 2017, fundamentally reflecting the maintenance 
of a highly accommodative monetary policy. Money and debt market yields held at low 
levels, with sovereign spreads over the German Bund narrowing, especially in some of the 
countries that had been most affected by the crisis, such as Portugal and Greece. This 
narrowing has continued in 2018 to date and has spread to Spain, against a background 
of perceived improvements in its debt ratings, reflected also in upgrades by several 
agencies.4 Share prices also rose notably in 2017 (the Eurostoxx index was up 10%), as a 
result of the improvement in expected profits. Private sector financing costs also held at 
historically low levels, while lending standards did not undergo significant changes during 
the year, thereby supporting the recovering trajectory of loans granted to households and 
firms. Nonetheless, the favourable course of these variables was offset by the notable 
appreciation of the euro (up 14% against the dollar over the year as a whole; see 
Chart 1.2.5), meaning that, for the purposes of the financial conditions indicator, standards 
tightened slightly in the second half of 2017 and somewhat more in early 2018 as a result 
of the stock market correction (see Chart 1.2.6). 
The favourable financial conditions, the sound performance of employment and, 
consequently, the growth of income have all supported private demand. Of note 
under the private demand heading is the improvement in business investment, further 
spurred by the increase in confidence, profits growth and the sound behaviour of final 
demand. Specifically, investment in equipment increased by 4.9%, rising at end-2017 
close to its pre-crisis level. 
Exports, boosted by the improvement in world trade, have contributed to the 
momentum of activity, despite the notable appreciation of the euro. The strength of 
exports, which increased by over 5%, was practically extensive to all the euro area 
countries, with German and Italian sales standing out. In terms of geographical destinations, 
goods exports increased within the euro area as did those targeted on China and the 
United States, despite the adverse impact of the appreciation of the euro observed in 
2017, whereby the euro area’s share in overall global trade was hardly affected. 
Following the consolidation process in the previous years, fiscal policy maintained a 
practically neutral stance in 2017. The budgetary policy stance took the form of the 
maintenance of the cyclically adjusted primary balance at approximately its 2016 level. 
4  Specifically, for the Spanish case, the revisions were as follows: in January, Fitch changed its rating to A-; in 
March, S&P, also to A-; and in April, DBRS to A and Moody’s to Baa1.
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The favourable cyclical juncture and lower interest payments led, in the area as a whole, to 
a reduction in the budget deficit to 0.9% of GDP and to a further reduction in the public 
debt/GDP ratio to 86.7%, although this variable remains at notably higher levels in some 
countries. 
Despite the buoyancy of activity, inflation has held at very moderate rates. Following 
the rise in the opening months of 2017, associated mainly with base effects of the energy 
component, overall consumer price inflation resumed a lower rate, standing in March 2018 
at 1.3% (see Chart 1.2.2). Core inflation, too, which excludes the most volatile components 
from the overall index, has held at very stable levels – at around 1% – for most of the period, 
despite the narrowing of the output gap and the impact stemming from higher oil prices. 
Such price behaviour is in response to the confluence of different factors that have also 
affected other developed economies. These factors include some of a more structural type, 
such as the increase in competition arising from globalisation or the less inflationary 
dynamics linked to technological progress, along with others which, though more transitory 
in nature, have exerted very persistent effects, such as the low levels of oil prices and other 
commodities in past years. Moreover, in the case of the euro area, the easing in inflation 
may also have been due in part to predominantly domestic factors, such as the appreciation 
of the euro and the moderate increase in margins and in unit labour costs (ULCs). Wages 
grew by 1.6%, rising somewhat at the end of the year. Behind this wage moderation are 
various factors: low productivity growth, the existence of indexing mechanisms that take as 
a reference the past behaviour of inflation and the persistence of a certain slackness in the 
labour market the degree of which exceeds what may be inferred from the more traditional 
measures of unemployment, owing above all to the presence of a high number of part-time 
workers who would wish to extend the duration of their working day (see Chart 1.2.3).5
The moderate inflation outlook determined the accommodative stance of monetary 
policy in 2017. The monetary stimulus continued to rest on the operation of a broad set of 
monetary policy instruments, as has been the case since 2014, in the absence of clear 
signs of a sustained increase in inflation towards rates consistent with the price stability 
definition.6 The financial indicators of inflation expectations pointed in early 2017 to the 
prospect of very slow convergence by the rate of change of consumer prices towards 
levels close to 2%, although they also noted that the risks of deflation had been dispelled 
(see Chart 1.3.1). In this scenario, policy interest rates held at very low levels, namely 0% 
on the main refinancing operations and -0.40% on the deposit facility rate (see Chart 1.3.2). 
The Eurosystem, for its part, continued to inject liquidity through its large-scale private and 
public asset purchase programmes (APP).7 Net public and private bond purchases totalled 
€780 billion in 2017, meaning that at the end of the year the APP portfolio amounted to 
almost €2.3 trillion (see Chart 1.3.3). Gross purchases were higher, since the maturing 
securities acquired in prior years were reinvested, a policy that will continue for a long 
period after net purchases have finalised. In a complementary fashion, to reinforce 
monetary transmission through the credit channel, the last targeted longer-term refinancing 
operation (TLTRO-II) was conducted in March 2017. There was exceptional demand for 
funds, and the operation concluded with a net injection of almost €217 billion, raising the 
financing granted under the TLTRO programmes to over €760 billion. Lastly, the ECB 
5  These factors are analysed in detail in Box 1.3 “Wage growth in the euro area”, ”Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco de España.
6  Section 4.2 of this chapter describes the actions undertaken during this phase by the ECB, while Box 1.3 
assesses their impact on activity and prices.
7  The private securities are asset-backed bonds, covered bonds (“cédulas hipotecarias” in Spain) and corporate 
bonds, acquired respectively under the ABSPP, CBPP-3 and CSPP programmes.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
continued to resort to forward guidance in respect both of its policy rates and the APP in 
order to underscore expectations that monetary policy will retain an accommodative 
stance over a prolonged period (see Chart 1.3.4). 
The expansion of activity in the euro area as a whole progressively firmed, leading to 
some adjustments in monetary policy instruments. In June 2017, the improved 
economic outlook and the easing in downside risks for inflation led the ECB to withdraw 
the accommodative bias still present in its indications as to policy interest rates, eliminating 
the reference to the possibility of such rates being lowered from those then prevailing. 
Months later, in October, the temporary extension of the APP until at least September 2018 
was announced, along with the reduction in the pace of net monthly purchases from 
€60 billion to €30 billion as from January 2018 (see Chart 1.3.3).8 The improved outlook has 
led more recently, in March 2018, to the elimination of the reference whereby, faced with a 
SOURCES: ECB, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters.
The ECB's monetary policy maintained its expansionary stance as there were no clear signs of a sustained rise in inflation towards levels consistent with 
the reference value, against a backdrop of a small climb in medium-term inflation expectations. Monetary stimulus continued to be based on historically 
low official interest rates, asset purchases and the communication policy. Interest rate expectations remain low.
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8  See the box “Monetary policy decisions adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB in October”, in “Quarterly 
report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España.
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potential deterioration in the economic situation or in financial conditions to levels not 
consistent with achieving the inflation objective, the Council would stand ready to increase 
the size and/or the duration of the purchase programme. Nonetheless, the progress 
observed in the convergence of inflation towards rates more compatible with the monetary 
policy medium-term objective is still insufficient, which warrants monetary policy remaining 
geared to continuing easy financial conditions.
Available forecasts suggest continuity in the medium term of the current upturn and 
gradual convergence by the inflation rate on the price stability objective. The 
information received in 2018 to date points to the maintenance of the economic expansion, 
albeit at a lesser pace than that recorded at end-2017. As regards prices, the widening of 
the positive output gap is expected to translate into a gradual increase in core inflation. 
Over a longer time horizon, there is room for improvement in the use of productive 
factors so that they may contribute to the continuity of the expansionary phase. High 
youth and long-term unemployment, along with the high percentage of employees 
involuntarily working part-time and the moderate recovery in total hours worked, suggest 
that, despite the significant reduction in the unemployment rate, the degree of 
underutilisation of the labour factor is still high (see Charts 1.2.3 and 1.2.4). Also, following 
the low levels of private investment in past years, in an environment of corporate and 
household deleveraging, a strengthening in the rate of investment may be expected for the 
coming years, underpinned by the observed improvement in its determinants and 
supported by the restored health of bank balance sheets. A rebound in public investment 
is likewise desirable, especially in those countries with greater budgetary headroom, which 
would contribute to the correction of current account imbalances in the euro area falling 
more evenly between surplus- and deficit-running countries.9 Moreover, greater dynamism 
in aggregate investment would help correct the persistence of the high current account 
surplus in the euro area as a whole and raise the potential growth rate.
The expansionary trajectory of the Spanish economy continued into 2017, with GDP 
growth once again exceeding 3% for the third year running. Specifically, output 
increased by 3.1%, 0.2 pp down on the previous year (see Table 1.1 and Chart 1.4.1). The 
contribution of national demand to the increase in GDP was 2.8 pp, 0.3 pp up on 2016, 
with the contribution of investment increasing somewhat (see Charts 1.4.2 and 1.4.3). Net 
external demand made a positive contribution of 0.3 pp, less than that in 2016, when it 
amounted to 0.7 pp. Also for the third year running, the increase in output clearly outpaced 
that in the euro area as a whole (see Charts 1.4.1 and 1.4.4).
Growth slowed slightly towards the end of 2017. The rising path of GDP scarcely varied 
in the course of last year, posting quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.8%, on average, a similar 
rate to that observed since mid-2014, with a slight downturn at the end of last year. As a 
result, the increase in political uncertainty in the second half of the year, as a result of the 
situation in the Catalonia region (see Box 1.1), is estimated to have had a moderate impact 
on GDP growth for the Spanish economy as a whole, which will moreover have been offset 
by the improved external setting.10 The expansion has continued at a similar pace to date 
3  The prolongation of the 
upturn in the Spanish 
economy in 2017 
 9  See Chapter 4 “Fiscal policy in the euro area”, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España. 
10  Box 3 of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España reviews 
the effects observed in the final stretch of 2017 as a result of the uncertainty associated with the political 
situation in Catalonia. In turn, Box 1.1 of the ”Financial Stabilty Report”, 11/2017, Banco de España describes 
the possible medium-term effects under different hypothetical scenarios relating to the scale and persistence 
of the rise in uncertainty.
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SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a Spanish National Accounts data, base year 2010.
b Volume indices. Annual rates of change.
c Rates of change, except the unemployment rate which is a level.
d Employment rate (16-64 age group).
e Levels as a percentage of GDP.
f Annual average levels for the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, interest rates and exchange rates, and rates of change for financial liabilities.
g 1999 Q1 = 100.
h 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
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in 2018, giving rise to a positive cyclical gap which is expected to carry on increasing in 
the coming years.11
As in previous years, the rate of increase of activity once again exceeded prior 
expectations at the start of the year. Specifically, the Banco de España projected in 
December 2016 that growth in 2017 would be 2.5%, 0.6 pp down on the figure finally 
observed. In general, all the final demand components increased by more than expected, 
with exports and investment notably strong compared with the projections.
The positive surprise is mainly attributable to external markets performing more 
favourably than envisaged before the start of the year. The formulation of macroeconomic 
forecasts usually rests on a set of technical assumptions about various variables upon which 
the projection is conditional. The gap between the forecast and the actual GDP growth figure 
observed in 2017 would largely be because there was a significant deviation in the behaviour 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
Once again the rate of growth of GDP exceeded 3%, with a relatively uniform time profile throughout the year. The expansionary behaviour of domestic 
demand was favoured by accommodative financial conditions. The net external demand contribution was positive again, albeit somewhat less so than 
in 2016, against a backdrop of higher exports and, particularly, higher imports.
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11  See Box 6 “The cyclical position of the Spanish economy” in “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, 
Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de España.
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of foreign markets, which proved more favourable than was expected at end-2016. The 
deviations in the rest of the technical assumptions (interest rates, stock market prices, oil 
prices, etc.) are estimated, overall, to have had a much lesser impact. To reach this conclusion 
the 2017 GDP growth projections formulated in December 2016, using the MTBE (Quarterly 
Macroeconomic Model of the Banco de España) with the set of assumptions then prevailing, 
have been compared with those that would have been formulated had the finally observed 
figures for the assumptions then been known.12 The fact that the actual growth of 3.1% 
should have exceeded the MTBE forecast by 0.2 pp, once the assumptions upon which the 
projection is conditional were known, suggests that factors other than those captured by the 
historical relationships estimated in the model may have been operating in a positive direction.
Prices and costs in the economy once again grew very moderately. Consumer prices 
increased on average by 2% in 2017, but this increase was influenced by the higher level, 
in annual average terms, of oil prices; as a result, the rate of increase of the indicator that 
excludes the energy component was far lower, at 1.2%. The GDP deflator, which proxies 
the prices of domestically produced goods, posted a similar (1%) increase for the latter 
figure, as a result of very modest growth in labour costs per unit of value added, which 
increased in the market economy by 0.2%, while the rise in the unit operating surplus, 
including taxes, was close to 2.5%.
In 2017, Spanish households’ financial conditions remained very easy. The maintenance 
of the expansionary monetary policy stance is allowing the average interest rates on bank 
financing to hold at low levels, close to their historical lows (see Chart 1.5.1). Further, the 
Bank Lending Survey (BLS) registered a slight improvement in access to lending during 
the year as a whole, which has helped lending activity continue to recover (see Chart 
1.5.2). The increase in new lending business has translated into an easing in the rate of 
decline of the outstanding balance of household debt (from 1.3% in December 2016 to 
0.8% one year later). By end-use, the outcome was a lesser contraction in lending for 
house purchases and greater dynamism in consumer credit and other lending. 
As has been the case since the crisis broke, the low level of financing costs has 
continued to be a factor supporting household income. It is thus estimated that the 
cumulative decline in interest rates from 2008 to 2017 has contributed, in net terms, to 
raising household disposable income in 2017 by around 1 pp.13
Households’ financial situation continued to strengthen during 2017, which also 
contributed to boosting expenditure in the sector. Household debt fell to below 100% 
of its gross disposable income (GDI) and 61% of GDP, ratios still somewhat higher than – 
though now very close to – average euro area ratios. Net wealth in this sector has also 
been boosted by increased asset values, especially property, with a rise in house prices of 
7.2% in 2017 (see Chart 1.6.1). 
3.1  THE ROBUSTNESS OF 
ACTIVITY WAS EXTENSIVE 
TO MOST DEMAND 
COMPONENTS 
12  Specifically, the model’s projections before the introduction of the experts’ opinions would, in each case, have 
been 2.5% and 2.9%, respectively. Three-quarters of the difference of 0.4 pp between these two figures would 
be due to the fact that external markets fared better than projected, with the remainder attributable to the 
surprises in the remaining assumptions as a whole. See New version of the Quarterly Model of Banco de 
España (MTBE), Documento Ocasional, no. 1709, Banco de España for a description both of the model’s main 
mechanisms and of the simulations of the effects of the errors in the assumptions on those upon which the 
projection is conditional.
13  This reduction in interest rates has affected both asset-side and liabilities-side operations, with a highly 
heterogeneous impact on the income of different households, depending on the sign and magnitude of their net 
assets, as illustrated by the fact that the figures relating to the cumulative effect of the fall in interest rates from 
2008 to 2017 on disposable income for this latter year through interest received and paid were, respectively, 
negative of the order of 2.9 pp and 3.9 pp.
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From 2014 to 2017, real wages grew by 0.4% in cumulative terms. These overall 
developments mask very different sub-periods, with a 2.4 pp increase in real wages from 
2014 to 2015, stabilisation in 2016 and a 2 pp loss in purchasing power in 2017, linked to 
the rise in the inflation energy component. 
The slowdown in real household income led, given the lesser scale of the loss of 
momentum in consumption, to a steepening of the decline in the saving rate. 
Household income grew by 2% in nominal terms in 2017, a similar rate to that observed a 
year earlier. Nonetheless, the inflationary rise due to the energy component of consumer 
prices meant that, in real terms, the increase in income was only 0.2% (1.8 pp down on the 
previous year) (see Chart 1.7). The magnitude of the slowdown in private consumption in 
real terms was far less (0.6 pp, to 2.4%), whereby the compression of household income 
gave rise to a 2 pp reduction in the household saving rate, to 5.7% of disposable income, 
its lowest level since the creation of the monetary union. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a This indicator reflects the proportion of firms to which any of the following apply: loan application rejected; loan approved only partially; loan approved at what firm 
considered to be a very high cost; and loan not requested because firm did not expect it to be approved (fear of rejection).
b Cumulative 3-month flow.
Households' and NFCs' financing conditions remained very favourable, with financing costs continuing at historically low levels. In addition, access to 
bank credit continued to improve for these sectors, especially for SMEs. In this setting, credit activity continued to recover.
CHART 1.5THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S FINANCING CONDITIONS REMAIN HIGHLY FAVOURABLE
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The reduction in the saving rate in 2017 entails the prolongation of a downtrend 
under way over the past eight years. In Spain, the fluctuations in the saving rate since 
the onset of the crisis have been much greater than in the core euro area countries, since 
the oscillations in consumption and income have also been greater. The Spanish household 
saving rate increased at the start of the crisis to a level of over 13% of disposable income 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Cumulative four-quarter data.
b Estimate based on estimated change in housing stock, average floor area of housing and price per m2.
c Interest-bearing borrowing.
d Seasonally and calendar-adjusted series.
In 2017 the financial position of Spanish households and non-financial corporations continued to strengthen, with further reductions in their indebtedness 
ratios and, in the case of households, increases in their net wealth also, mainly thanks to rising house prices. The lower indebtedness ratios, along with 
the decline in the average cost of liabilities, led to a reduction in the degree of financial pressure.
CHART 1.6THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS CONTINUED 
TO STRENGTHEN
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The continued decline in the saving rate in recent years is probably linked to factors such as diminished uncertainty and satisfaction of the demand, 
especially for durable goods, that built up during the crisis. In 2017 household income continued to grow at a fast pace in nominal terms. However, higher 
inflation meant that, in real terms, there was a significant slowdown in income. Given that households reduced their consumption to a lesser extent, the 
decline in the saving rate intensified.
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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at end-2009.14 Since then, until end-2017, the rate has gradually fallen (by over 7 pp in 
cumulative terms). The causes of this decline have varied over time. During the recession, 
the reduction in the saving rate was linked to the need to maintain spending on essential 
goods and services against the background of a heavy decline in household income. 
Greater uncertainty led households to defer a substantial portion of their consumption 
decisions, but not those taken to meet their most basic needs.15
Several aspects of the recovery are estimated to have prompted a sustained 
reduction in household saving. Specifically, the improved labour market situation has 
contributed to diminishing the need for precautionary saving. Set against the increase in 
employment and income, and the reduction in uncertainty, households have stepped up 
their purchases of consumer goods and services and, in particular, they have satisfied the 
spending decisions they deferred during the crisis, which has led to a progressive 
absorption of pent-up demand.16 Moreover, the low level of interest rates may have 
lessened saving incentives, and the favourable financial conditions have boosted debt-
fuelled consumption. Finally, the recovery has coincided with an increase in the share of 
labour income in total income, a factor that is estimated to have likewise contributed to 
spurring a reduction in the saving rate, given that the marginal propensity to consume of 
labour income is greater than in the case of the remaining sources of income.17
Looking ahead, the room for households to further reduce their saving appears to be 
limited. Following the cumulative declines, the current level of the saving rate stands 
somewhat below the pre-crisis level. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
significant decline in household debt has lessened the portion of saving earmarked for 
repaying this debt and that it may now be allocated to current spending. For these 
purposes, an alternative definition may be considered of the saving rate that discounts 
therefrom an estimate of the payments made by households under the heading of debt 
repayment. Under this definition, the saving rate would still be 2 pp above its 2008 low, 
reflecting the deleveraging undertaken by the sector in the period since. 
Households posted a net borrowing requirement in 2017, after having recorded a net 
lending capacity since 2009 Q2, against the background of a significant rise in residential 
investment. Investment in housing increased by 8.3% last year (3.9 pp up on a year earlier), 
assisted by the strength of employment creation and propitious financial conditions. Moreover, 
the momentum of demand from abroad continued, since the fall-off in British buyers was 
offset by the acquisitions made by residents of other countries. The rise in residential 
investment, in the above-mentioned setting of diminished saving, led households to cease to 
be net lenders to the other sectors in the economy. Specifically, households’ net borrowing 
requirements amounted to 0.3% of GDP in 2017, in contrast to the net lending capacity of 
1.6% at end-2016 or the average of over 3% in the two years spanning 2014 and 2015. 
14  Ó. Arce, E. Prades and A. Urtasun (2013), “Changes in household saving and consumption in Spain during the 
crisis”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de España find as a possible cause of the decline in the saving 
rate since 2010 the existence of minimum consumption thresholds for certain goods.
15  See the Analytical Article “The recovery of private consumption in Spain by product type and household”, 
Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España. J. González Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2015), “Consumption 
dynamics in Spain by product type”, Economic Bulletin, September, Banco de España, document the differential 
impact of the crisis on various categories of goods and services, finding that durable goods and non-essential 
goods and services underwent notably sharper falls in the crisis (and likewise far higher increases in the 
recovery) than other staple products or products whose consumption it is not possible to adjust (e.g. owing to 
the existence of contractual obligations). 
16  See Box 4 of ”Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España.
17  G. de Bondt, A. Gieseck and Z. Zekaite (2018), “Forecasting euro area private consumption using thick 
modelling”, ECB, mimeo.
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The favourable trend of business profits has continued to spur investment by non-
financial corporations (NFCs). On National Accounts data, the sector’s gross operating 
surplus is estimated to have retained its forceful dynamism in 2017, increasing by 5.5%, a 
slightly lesser pace than that of the previous year (see Chart 1.8.1). In terms of gross 
corporate saving, the slowdown was greater, dipping from 10.8% to 5.6%, which is due 
both to the rise in dividends paid and to the impact of the changes in corporate income 
tax.18
As in the case of households, the financing conditions of NFCs, both in terms of the 
cost and availability of funds, remains supportive of spending decisions. The cost of 
borrowed funds has held at historically low levels, with a further slight decline in the case 
of loans of less than €1 million, the segment in which operations with SMEs are concentrated 
(see Chart 1.5.1). The Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) evidences a 
further improvement in access to credit by small companies, such that the percentage of 
Spanish SMEs reporting themselves to be financially constrained stands below 9%, in line 
with the euro area average (see Chart 1.5.3). 
This context has been conducive to the continued expansion of new borrowing 
business. The pick-up in activity in the credit market was particularly pronounced in the 
segment encompassing SMEs (see Chart 1.5.4). In terms of stocks, the increase in the 
volume of new business has led the rate at which credit to resident NFCs was slipping to 
ease slightly over the course of 2017 (from 1.1% at end-2016 to 0.6% a year later).19 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Includes net capital transfers.
The benign financial conditions and the improved financial position of NFCs were conducive to growth in business investment, against a backdrop of 
strong final demand. High income generation in the sector meant that, despite the investment momentum, net lending remained high.
FINAL DEMAND AND FAVOURABLE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS CONTINUED TO DRIVE INVESTMENT 
BY NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
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18  The information from the Central Balance Sheet Data Office likewise points to a dynamic behaviour of profits 
for the case of large corporations, with ordinary profit growth of 7.4%. See the Analytical Article “Results of 
non-financial corporations to 2017 Q4: preliminary year-end data”.
19  In June 2017, a credit institution conducted an intra-group operation under which the loans granted to a real 
estate subsidiary were converted into parent company equity holdings. As a result, there was a 1.6% decline in 
the outstanding balance of credit to NFCs. Had this operation not taken place, the year-on-year growth rate of 
credit extended to NFCs in December 2017 would have been 1.6 pp higher.
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Fixed-income financing was notably buoyant, particularly in the first half of 2017, 
contributing to making the flow of external financing (credit from resident institutions, 
fixed-income securities and external loans), in the year as a whole, positive for the first 
time since 2010. As a result, the weight of fixed-income financing in the total has increased, 
thereby providing continuity to the bank disintermediation initiated further to the crisis 
which, in the most recent period, has been boosted by, inter alia, the ECB’s Corporate 
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) launched in June 2016.20
Another significant factor of support for non-financial corporations’ investment 
decisions has been the strengthening of their financial position. The sector’s aggregate 
debt ratio continued to fall in 2017, standing at year-end at 78% of GDP, similar to the euro 
area average, when it was almost 40 pp above this level in mid-2010. This reduction in 
debt, combined with a slight decrease in the average cost of its outstanding balance, 
translated into a further reduction in the debt burden ratio which, set against the figure of 
6% in early 2009, stood below 2% of GDP. This historically low level, along with the decline 
in debt, explains the low degree of financial pressure borne by the sector as a whole (see 
Chart 1.6.2). 
The favourable financial conditions and the improvement in corporate balance 
sheets were conducive to investment by non-financial corporations increasing in 
2017 by around 5% in real terms.21 This rate of increase, while high, was slightly below 
the average for the first three years of the recovery. As has been the case throughout this 
period, the buoyancy of business investment spending has continued to be underpinned 
by the momentum of final demand, whose growth, at 3.3%, was once again very similar to 
that averaged during the previous three years (see Chapter 3 of this Report).22 The increase 
in investment once again significantly exceeded fixed-capital consumption; however, 
capacity utilisation continued to increase throughout the year on the back of the strength 
of demand. As a result, the sector continued to show a notable lending capacity, of 2.9% 
of GDP (see Chart 1.8.2), reflecting the ongoing balance sheet restructuring at non-
financial corporations as a whole.
Exports accelerated slightly in 2017, albeit to a lesser extent than their end-markets. 
Goods and services exports increased by 5% over the year as a whole (see Chart 1.9.1). This 
rate, 0.2 pp up on the previous year, was slightly lower than that posted by external markets. 
These developments were in contrast to 2016, when exports to the rest of the world outgrew 
end-markets by more than 2 pp. The pattern of diminished relative buoyancy of exports 
compared with their scale variable is shared when regard is had to the breakdown between 
the euro area and the rest of the world; that suggests that several factors other than the 
appreciation of the exchange rate recorded last year may be at play, an appreciation which, 
vis-à-vis the non-euro area developed countries, was 2.4% in nominal effective terms.23
20  O. Arce, R. Gimeno and S. Mayordomo (2017), “Making room for the needy: the credit reallocation effects of the 
ECB’s corporate QE”, Documento de Trabajo, no. 1743, Banco de España, document the effects of the CSPP 
on the financing of Spanish firms. In particular, the announcement of the programme led large corporations to 
replace bank loans with debt issues. In turn, the fall in these corporations’ demand for credit enabled an 
increase in that granted to smaller firms, which do not usually have the capacity to gain access to primary 
corporate debt markets.
21  This rate is an in-house estimate, since National Accounts offer this magnitude solely in nominal terms.
22  Chapter 3 of this Annual Report analyses in detail the trend of investment in equipment and intangibles during 
the current recovery phase. The determinants of the sound behaviour of these variables include most notably 
the easing of financial conditions, the availability of own funds, diminished uncertainty and the fact the business 
sector was more export-oriented.
23  Analysis of contributions to export growth by the various explanatory variables suggest that the factors not 
included in the equations made a zero contribution to the increase in sales abroad, unlike 2016, when they had 
contributed 3 pp (see Chart 1.9.2).
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Goods exports were the sole foreign sales component that accelerated. Specifically, 
goods exports to the rest of the world grew by 5%, 1.9 pp up on 2016 (see Chart 1.9.3). In 
2017 the base of firms that started exporting expanded significantly, although there was 
some easing in the rise in the number of regular exporters (understood to be those that 
have been exporting for at least four years; see Chart 1.9.4). In any event, the increase 
recorded since the onset of the crisis in the number of companies that regularly export 
provides structural support to sales abroad. In particular, the empirical evidence suggests 
that firms generally begin to export on a small scale, increasing the volume subsequently, 
once they see that their products are successful in end-markets.24 This mechanism would 
account for growth in the volume of exports by companies already established in foreign 
markets, even though the enlargement of the export base were to be checked.
As in 2016, the tourism services component of exports was notable for its greater 
dynamism. These services grew by 8.5%, 1.2 pp down on the previous year. The 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Using the export equation of the Banco de España's satellite model for the foreign sector.
b Regular exporters are those that have exported in the year concerned and in each of the three immediately preceding years.
Export growth was slightly higher than in 2016. However, the rate of growth was lower than that of the external markets. By component, tourism services 
remained particularly robust, while by contrast other services weakened significantly. The continuing increase in the number of exporting firms had a 
positive impact on goods exports.
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24  See C. Arkolakis, T. Papageorgiou and O. Timoshenko (2018), “Firm Learning and Growth”, Review of Economic 
Dynamics, forthcoming.
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continuing strength of this variable was underpinned, on the demand side, by the improved 
economic situation in the euro area countries and the increase in the proportion of tourists 
from other regions (whose average daily expenditure is higher) and, on the supply side, by 
the quality improvements to the services provided, which helps lure higher-spending 
visitors.25 Conversely, the depreciation of sterling would not seem to have exerted any 
significant impact on arrivals of British tourists, who are Spain’s main market.26 That said, 
since the final stretch of 2017, some weakening in tourist exports has been observed, 
linked possibly to the August terrorist attacks in Barcelona, to the subsequent period of 
uncertainty in Catalonia, and to the incipient recovery of competing destinations in the 
Mediterranean.27 This latter factor, along with the strength of the euro and dearer oil prices, 
suggests a more moderate growth outlook. Finally, the pace of exports of other services 
eased notably following their exceptional performance in 2016, centred on business 
services.28
Generally, the impact of Brexit on the Spanish economy in terms of trade flows 
appears so far to have been limited. In particular, exports to the United Kingdom do not 
appear to have suffered from the dearer prices caused by the depreciation of sterling, 
since they have not behaved differently to those whose end-destination is the EU as a 
whole, except as regards consumer goods sales, especially of cars.29
The pace of imports accelerated in 2017. Purchases abroad rose to a rate of 4.7% 
(1.2 pp up on 2016), partly in response to the fact that the growth rate of final demand was 
somewhat higher, but above all to an increase in the elasticity observed between both 
variables compared with previous years. In any event, the elasticity observed stood below 
its average historical value (see Chart 1.10.1), in keeping with the microeconomic evidence 
suggesting the existence of signs of an incipient process involving the replacement of 
imported inputs by domestically produced ones.30 In turn, the rise in the elasticity of 
imports to final demand during 2017 might be partly attributable to the fact that the 
composition of this latter aggregate was skewed to a greater extent towards more import 
content-intensive variables, such as investment in capital goods and in intangible assets, 
and exports. 
The lending capacity of the economy as a whole declined slightly to 2% of GDP (see 
Chart 1.11.1). Maintaining positive balances vis-à-vis the rest of the world over a prolonged 
period is an unavoidable requisite for reducing the Spanish economy’s high external debt. 
In this respect, the fact that the sharp expansion in domestic demand throughout the 
recovery phase is proving compatible with relatively high external surpluses is a positive 
feature of the current expansionary cycle.31 In 2017, the merchandise trade deficit widened 
25  For a classification of the tourist offer, see “The Travel &Tourism Competitiveness Report 2017”, World Economic 
Forum (2017). For greater details about the recent course of the tourism export determinants, see Box 7 
“Dynamism of non-resident tourism in 2016 and its determinants”, in the “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España.
26  See Box 3 in the ”Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
27  There were significant increases in 2017 in tourist arrivals in North Africa and the Middle East, with year-on-year 
rates climbing by around 8 pp. For an assessment of the impact of the changes in tourist flows towards Spain as a 
result of the trend in these alternative destinations, see Box 7 “Dynamism of non-resident tourism in 2016 and its 
determinants”, in the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España. 
28  See Box 7 “Net exports of non-tourism services in Spain since 2008” “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de España.
29  See Analytical Article, “Un análisis de la expansión comercial de las empresas españolas en el Reino Unido”, 
Boletín Económico, Banco de España, forthcoming.
30  See Chapter 3 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España.
31  Chapter 3 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España, contains an estimate of the structural component of 
the external balance.
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by 0.3 pp to 1.9% of GDP, which chiefly reflected the worsening of the real terms of trade 
(affecting energy products, in step with dearer oil, and non-energy products alike), while 
the non-energy balance improved significantly in real terms, for the first time since 2013 
(see Chart 1.11.2). This fall in the merchandise balance was partly countered by an 
improvement in the surplus on services – linked above all to the increase in tourism exports 
– and by a further slight reduction in the deficit on the income balance, assisted by the 
environment of low interest rates. 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Using the import equation of the Banco de España's satellite model for the foreign sector.
Following the unusually low value observed in 2016, the elasticity of imports to final demand rose in 2017. However, it remains low compared with 
historical values, tending to confirm that the competitive gains achieved by the economy are giving rise to a certain degree of import substitution.
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
The current account surplus was very similar to that of 2016, against a backdrop of worsening real terms of trade but with an improving real non-energy 
balance. As for the sectoral balances, both the disappearance of household net lending and the decline in the general government deficit are notable, 
while non-financial corporations again recorded high net lending.
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From a sectoral perspective, the strength of activity was across the board. Among 
the main sectors, value added grew most in construction, by 4.9%, the highest rate since 
2001. From a more medium-term standpoint, value added in services as a whole was 
almost 9% higher than its pre-crisis level at end-2017, while in construction it is 40% 
lower, posting a very similar performance in industry (see Chart 1.12). Compared 
internationally, this pattern is in contrast to that in countries such as Germany, where value 
added in industry and construction is significantly higher than that observed in 2008. 
Job creation remained robust. Numbers employed increased by 2.8% in 2017 (see 
Chart 1.13.1), meaning that, since the end-2013 low, more than 1.9 million jobs have been 
created. However, the current level is still 10.4% down on that prevailing in early 2008, 
when the historical high in occupation was recorded. This intense job creation process has 
contributed to reducing the high unemployment significantly. Specifically, at end-2017, the 
unemployment rate stood at 16.5%, more than 10 pp below its early-2013 peak (see 
Chart 1.13.2), but still some distance off the euro area average (8.6%). The reduction in 
unemployment has also been assisted by the changes in the working population, where 
the declining trend of recent years continued in 2017. This chiefly reflected an increase in 
the weight of the oldest population groups, against a background of progressive population 
ageing, alleviated partly by the rise in the participation rate of the oldest groups. The 
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
CONSTRUCTION AND INDUSTRY MORE EXPANSIONARY THAN SERVICES IN 2017 CHART 1.12
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1  VALUE ADDED. TOTAL ECONOMY
2008 Q3 = 100
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110
112
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2  VALUE ADDED. SERVICES
2008 Q3 = 100
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
3  VALUE ADDED. INDUSTRY
2008 Q3 = 100
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
4  VALUE ADDED. CONSTRUCTION
2008 Q3 = 100
 SPAIN  GERMANY  FRANCE  ITALY
In 2017 industry value added was similar to the pre-crisis level, whereas services value added was 10% higher and construction value added was 40% 
lower. In terms of international comparison, since the start of the downturn the rate of growth of the services sector has been very similar to that observed 
in Germany or France. There are larger differences in industry, where Spain has underperformed in comparison with both Germany and France, and 
especially in construction, reflecting the sharp correction observed in Spain.
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
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incidence of long-term unemployment (i.e. the definition that considers those individuals 
who have been seeking a job for more than one year) declined to 50.4% at end-2017, a 
rate which, after the cumulative reduction over the past three years of over 10 pp, is very 
similar to the euro area average (see Chart 1.13.3). Nonetheless, the incidence of long-
term unemployment remains very high among certain groups, in particular among the least 
skilled (56.3%). 
Employment generation was sharper in some of the sectors that had experienced 
greater destruction at the onset of the crisis. Thus, according to the EPA (Spanish 
Labour Force Survey), employment grew by over 5% in construction and by around 3% 
both in industry and in market services, while in non-market services it increased by 
scarcely more than 1%. Moreover, some slowing was observed in some of the services 
activities that had been most buoyant in previous years, such as hotels and restaurants, 
transport and distribution. Overall, however, if the structure of employment by productive 
sector at end-2017 is compared with that prevailing pre-crisis, the weight of services can 
be seen to have gained 9 pp, equally distributed between market and non-market services, 
at the expense of industry (-2 pp) and construction (-7 pp).
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As has been the case since the start of the recovery, productivity growth was very low. Thanks to job creation and the decline in the labour force, the 
unemployment rate continued to fall, although to a lesser extent among workers with longer spells of unemployment. The percentage of employees with 
temporary contracts continued to increase, and the percentage of those working shorter than usual hours continued to decline.
SOURCE: INE.
a Employment as per Quarterly National Accounts. Full-time equivalent jobs.
b Long-term unemployed: persons who have been unemployed for a year or more. Incidence: proportion of total unemployed who have been unemployed for a 
year or more.
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Strong job creation has moved in step with a very modest increase in wage 
remuneration throughout the recovery phase. During the 2014-2017 period, the annual 
growth of economy-wide compensation per employee averaged 0.4% (see Chart 1.14.1). 
In 2017 this rate was 0.1 %. The increase in the market sectors, the scale of which was 
0.1 pp higher, was the outcome of the opposite behaviour of the two main components. 
On one hand, wages negotiated under collective bargaining agreements grew by 1.4% 
(0.4 pp up on 2016).32 On the other, these increases were offset by the portion of wage 
growth not attributable to collective bargaining, i.e. the component known as wage drift, 
whose contribution to the growth of compensation per employee was -1.5 pp, of a similar 
magnitude to that estimated for 2016.
The negative contribution of wage drift mainly reflects composition effects in the flow 
of employment generation. Negative drift is occurring in an environment of very low rates 
of increase in apparent labour productivity. From the standpoint of workers’ individual 
characteristics, one factor simultaneously limiting aggregate wage increases and 
productivity would appear to be the increase in the weight of new entries in the total 
numbers employed, given that the more limited job tenure of the former is associated with 
a lower-than-average wage level (and presumably productivity level). Specifically, on 
information from Social Security records, available to 2016, it is estimated that the greater 
weight of newcomers has contributed to reducing average compensation by somewhat 
more than 0.5 pp in each of the three years of the 2014-2016 period (see Chart 1.14.2). This 
effect is estimated to have been partly countered by other changes in the characteristics of 
workers that operate in the opposite direction, such as the rise in the average age of the 
working population or the increase in the average level of educational attainment. In 
addition, there is some evidence that, given the characteristics of the job and of the person 
employed, the wage difference between those who have been in the job for respectively 
more and less than one year has increased since the crisis (see Chart 1.14.3).33
Set against the significance of individual characteristics, the changes in the sectoral 
composition of employment creation appear to play a secondary role when explaining 
the low increases in aggregate wages and productivity. Employment creation is falling 
more than proportionately in sectors where the level of productivity is lower. However, the 
magnitude of this effect on wages is small. Specifically, the estimated contribution of the 
change in the sectoral composition of employment to the growth of compensation per 
employee in the market economy in cumulative terms from 2014 to 2017 was 0.4 pp.
In early 2017, an 8% rise in the minimum wage was approved, followed by a further 
increase of 4% in 2018. The increase approved for 2017, which directly affected somewhat 
more than 3% of wage-earners, is estimated to be exerting a limited aggregate effect both 
on employment and on wages.34 Nonetheless, on the evidence available for other, past 
increases in the minimum wage, the impact on the probability of job loss might be 
significant for certain specific groups of workers, such as youths and the elderly, insofar as 
3.2  COSTS AND PRICES 
CONTINUED TO EVIDENCE 
LOW RATES OF INCREASE
32  Specifically, wage settlements were higher in newly signed agreements (1.8%) than in revised agreements, 
which usually react more slowly to the changes in wage determinants and which on this occasion, too, reflected 
to a lesser extent the labour market improvement and the rise in consumer prices.
33  See the Economic Note «La evolución del empleo y del paro en el primer trimestre de 2017, según la Encuesta 
de Población Activa”, Boletín Económico, 2/2017, Banco de España. Specifically, the wage gap, once controlled 
for by the differences in observable characteristics, between workers already present in the labour market and 
new entries, rose from approximately 9% in 2008 to 15.3% in 2016. This gap has widened, in part owing to the 
drop in the number of hours worked per employee.
34  See Box 5 “The effects of the recent rise in the minimum wage on employment and wages” in the “Quarterly 
report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España.
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they may have, on average, a lower level of productivity. These effects may be exacerbated 
in future given that, in addition to the minimum-wage increases that have already been 
introduced, a path of additional rises has been agreed to raise the minimum wage by 2020 
to an amount comprising 14 payments per annum of €850.35
The low rate of increase in wages and productivity translated into a virtual stability 
of unit labour costs (ULCs), albeit on a rising profile over the course of the year. ULCs 
increased by 0.2% in annual average terms in the market economy. However, this variable 
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The unconditional pay gap is defined as the percentage wage difference between a worker with length of service of less than one year and all other workers. The 
conditional pay gap is estimated using a wage equation that controls for differences between both groups of workers by sex, age, level of education, nationality, 
sector of activity and firm size.
b Nominal wage is the compensation per employee according to Quarterly National Accounts. The nominal wage deflator is the CPI.
Negotiated wages accelerated moderately, but wage drift again made a highly negative contribution to growth in compensation per employee, reflecting, 
among other factors, the lower pay levels of new labour market entrants. In addition, the difference between wage levels of individuals with respective job 
tenure of more or less than one year has increased since the crisis.
35  In each of the two years covering the period 2019-2020, these increases are conditional upon real GDP growth 
being higher than 2.5%, and increases in average Social Security registrations exceeding 450,000 people. 
Should these increases materialise, there would be a 20% rise in the minimum wage from €707 in 2017 to €850 
in 2020 (in both cases in 14 payments per annum).
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has been rising since mid-2016, reflecting a modest acceleration in wages, which in turn 
might be related to the reduction in the degree of cyclical slack and, in particular, to the 
ongoing decline in unemployment. Looking ahead, it seems likely that composition effects 
will continue to give rise to negative drift and to low increases in productivity. However, the 
gradual improvement in the labour market might continue to exert upward pressure on 
wage settlements, which would translate into some acceleration in compensation per 
employee and, therefore, in ULCs.
Domestic prices increased at moderate rates, albeit higher than the previous year, 
which is consistent with the gradual reduction in cyclical slack. Specifically, the 
value-added deflator in the market economy, which is a measure of domestic inflationary 
pressures, continued to quicken moderately during 2017, extending the trend observed 
in the final stretch of 2016 (see Chart 1.15.1). In annual average terms, the rate of 
change of the value-added deflator in the market economy increased by 0.9 pp to 1.2% 
in 2017, a movement to which, as indicated, the rising path of ULC growth contributed. 
But the acceleration in domestic prices was in response, moreover, to the higher growth 
of the gross operating surplus per unit of value added, which rose by 2.4%. Reflecting 
these developments was the increase in mark-ups, which grew by 1% when measured 
by the difference between the respective rates of change of the value-added deflator 
and of ULCs (for the market economy), which points to the advisability of exploring 
possible avenues for raising the degree of competition in some goods and services 
markets, as discussed in Box 1.2 and in Section 5.2 in this Chapter, and in Box 3.4 of 
Chapter 3.
The acceleration in final demand prices over the year as a whole was more 
pronounced, given the rise in the contribution of the external component. The imports 
deflator quickened by somewhat less than 6 pp to a growth rate of 4.4% (see Chart 1.15.2). 
This largely reflected significantly dearer oil and other commodities on international 
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The value added deflator of the market economy again recorded a low rate of growth, although with an increasing profile throughout the year, thanks to 
the contribution both of ULCs and the unit surplus. The final demand deflator accelerated in annual average terms, but with a decreasing profile, owing 
to the deceleration in the import deflator.
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markets, which was countered only marginally by the exchange rate appreciation. That 
said, the  annual average increase in commodities – 24% in the case of crude oil measured 
in dollars – masks a strongly diminishing profile over the course of the year, which explains 
why the imports deflator slowed from 6.4% in Q1 to 2.8% in Q4. 
Given the course of domestic and external inflationary pressures described, the final 
demand deflator accelerated from -0.2% in 2016 to 1.8% in 2017, with a similar 
trajectory to consumer prices. Specifically, the CPI grew at an annual average rate of 
2%, compared with the declines of several tenths of a percentage point in each of the 
three previous years (see Chart 1.16.1). Nonetheless, the year 2017 as a whole masks a 
clearly declining annual profile, from 3% in January to 0.6% in the same month in 2018, 
following which something of a rise began. This trajectory was, as in the case of the 
imports deflator, much determined by the energy component. Indeed, the strong rise in the 
overall inflation rate at the start of 2017 was due mainly to the comparison effect resulting 
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After climbing markedly at the beginning of 2017, consumer prices decelerated, owing especially to the energy component and, to a lesser extent, to the 
core component. The differential vis-à-vis the euro area narrowed but remained positive for most of the year, reflecting the performance of the energy 
component. In the case of the core indicator, the differential oscillated around zero.
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from the notable fall in oil prices just one year earlier.36 But, despite the rise in oil prices, 
the persistence of the high inflation of the energy component was limited, owing to the 
comparison effect of the opposite sign derived from the rises observed as from February 
2016.
Core inflation continued to post very moderate figures. The rate of change of core-
component consumer prices (encompassing non-energy industrial goods, services and 
processed food) remained very low. While over the year as a whole the growth of the CPI 
excluding unprocessed food and energy was 0.3 pp up on 2016, at 1.1%, it moved on a 
declining course in the second half of the year, ending 2017 at 0.8% (see Chart 1.16.2). 
This slowdown, which was more marked in the case of non-energy industrial goods than 
it was for services, contrasts with the reduction in the degree of slack in the economy, 
which a priori should have prompted a heightening of domestic inflationary pressures. It is 
estimated that this factor has been dominated by another two factors of the opposite sign: 
the appreciation of the exchange rate – which might continue contributing to upholding 
very moderate inflationary pressures in the short term, given the lagged transmission of 
exchange rate movements – and some pass-through to domestic producer prices of the 
lower external inflationary pressures stemming from the slowdown in oil prices. 
The consumer price inflation differential with the euro area narrowed during the 
year as the energy component slowed. The rise in the energy component at the start of 
2017 was much sharper in Spain, which was due both to the fact that the oscillations in oil 
prices have a greater impact in our country on final fuel prices (given the lesser weight of 
ad valorem taxation) and to the rise in the cost of electricity in early 2017 (see Chart 1.16.3).37 
The differential in terms of the indicator that excludes energy prices was slightly positive 
throughout most of the year (at around 0.1 pp), but changed sign in December (-0.1 pp) 
(see Chart 1.16.4). In March 2018 the differential was zero.
The Spanish economy has completed a growth phase of more than four years. Since 
late 201338, GDP has grown by almost 13% in cumulative terms, exceeding the pre-crisis 
level since mid-2017. In per capita terms, end-2017 GDP was almost 1% above the 2007 
level, recouping a portion of the cumulative loss vis-à-vis the average for the euro area 
countries during the crisis. 
The share of the domestic and external components of demand in output is 
proving more balanced than in previous expansionary phases. One positive 
characteristic of the Spanish economy during this period has been the fact that the 
absorption of the economy’s idle resources, which is still under way, is proving 
compatible with a high external balance. Initially, the improvement in activity was 
export-led, thanks to the recovery of the competitiveness lost in the previous upturn, 
with the various domestic demand components subsequently joining the expansionary 
process (see Figure 1.1).39
4  A provisional 
assessment of the 
recovery: 
achievements and 
limits 
4.1  A PROLONGED AND 
BALANCED RECOVERY 
PHASE 
36  For an explanation of the comparison effect, see Box 3 of the ”Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, 
Economic Bulletin, December 2016, Banco de España.
37  See the Analytical Article “The effect of oil price fluctuations on Spanish inflation”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, 
Banco de España.
38  The “Spanish Business Cycle Dating Committee of the Spanish Economic Association” (see http://asesec.org/
CFCweb/) dates the end of the Spanish economy’s double-dip recession at 2013 Q2, one quarter later than the 
end of the recession in the euro area, dated in turn by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
39  Chapter 2 of the Annual Report, 2015, Banco de España contains an account of the sequence whereby the 
various demand components joined the recovery in the economy.
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Output growth is proving more job creation-intensive. The strong employment creation 
in the current upturn is in step with the usual pattern of other expansionary phases of the 
Spanish economy, although on this occasion the dynamism of this variable has also been 
assisted by the wage moderation observed following the crisis and the effects of the 
labour reforms. Another difference with previous recovery phases is a sectoral composition 
more tilted towards the services sector.
The structural reforms set in train during the recession contributed to laying the 
foundations of the recovery. Overall, the various measures adopted allowed national and 
foreign agents to regain their confidence in the Spanish economy. Notable among the main 
reforms are those involving the labour market, which added further flexibility to the possibilities 
of adjusting firms’ labour costs in contractionary periods, and the recapitalisation and restructuring 
of credit institutions. Other significant structural changes were the successive reforms to the 
pension system, progress in ongoing fiscal consolidation and the new national framework of 
fiscal rules. In the European arena, the various institutional measures and advances in recent 
years, which notably include the start-up of the Banking Union, have also contributed to shoring 
up confidence in the common euro project, which has been propitious to the normalisation of 
financing conditions within the euro area and the correction of its fragmented financial markets. 
Moreover, a series of more transitory – though persistent – factors also contributed 
to the dynamism of the recovery. These factors include most notably the role played by 
the ECB’s monetary policy and, in 2015 and 2016, the application of an expansionary 
fiscal policy, joined by the significant reduction in oil prices from mid-2014 to early 2016 
and, more recently, the improvement in foreign markets.40
Overall, notable progress has been made in recent years in correcting some of the 
Spanish economy’s disequilibria. These imbalances built up in the previous expansionary 
period, in terms of private-sector debt, dependence on external financing and losses in 
competitiveness.41 In addition to the above-mentioned reduction in the unemployment 
rate, the current cyclical phase has been underpinned by, and in turn has boosted, the 
ongoing recovery of the losses in competitiveness accumulated in terms of labour costs, 
the running of current account surpluses and the reduction in high private-sector debt. 
Progress, however, has been less in other areas, meaning that the economy still has 
elements of vulnerability. As set out in Section 5.1, there has been less headway in correcting 
other imbalances, including in particular high public indebtedness and the still-high net debtor 
position of the nation, despite the recent current account surpluses. Also, significant structural 
dysfunctions persist in the labour market and a pattern of growth more forcefully conducive 
to high-productivity and high-added-value activities has not yet taken root. And this against 
a background in which population ageing will significantly reduce the economy’s potential 
growth at the same time as it is posing far-reaching challenges regarding public pensions. 
Tackling these matters requires resolute reforms, as is detailed in Section 5.2.
The pick-up in the Spanish economy has been accompanied by a highly expansionary 
monetary policy stance. When, in mid-2014, the difficulties in fulfilling the medium-term 
price stability objective began to become discernible, the ECB Governing Council set 
about launching a broad range of measures aimed at ensuring the proper anchoring of 
4.2  TOWARDS A SCENARIO 
WITH A MORE LIMITED 
ROLE FOR MONETARY 
POLICY 
40  See Box 1.2 “The effect of temporary factors on recent developments in the Spanish economy: a comparison 
with the euro area”, in Chapter 1 of Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
41  See “Report on the financial and banking crisis in Spain, 2008-2014”, Banco de España.
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inflation expectations around values consistent with the central bank’s objective and, more 
generally, at avoiding the adverse consequences of the prolongation over time of 
excessively low inflation.
The monetary stimuli have been underpinned by the joint action of conventional and 
unconventional instruments. The measures pursued since 2014 have included the use 
of tools other than policy interest rates, given the limited effectiveness of this instrument 
as a result of the proximity to its effective lower bound. Specifically, monetary measures 
have been pursued along four avenues: the setting of a negative interest rate for the 
deposit facility; communication policy and forward guidance; the application of specific 
programmes geared to making the transmission channel running through bank credit more 
fluid; and, finally, the implementation of the APP.
Monetary policy transmission to financial conditions and to demand has proven 
effective, reversing downward inflation expectations. Both negative interest rates 
and the injection of liquidity have provided for the maintenance of easy financial 
conditions, acting as a stimulus to credit and to household and corporate expenditure. 
Further, forward guidance has enabled the ECB to emphasise the continuity of its 
expansionary stance, increasing its effectiveness through the additional stimulus 
provided by the anchoring of agents’ expectations and the reduction in so-called 
interest rate term premia. This has been the case for policy rates, which will hold at 
current levels over a period that will stretch substantially beyond the conclusion of net 
asset purchases, for which there is no defined date. Moreover, the large size of the 
portfolio acquired under the APP42 and the reinvestment commitment over a long period 
after the conclusion of the net asset purchases are elements that also shape the 
expansionary stance of monetary policy, under whose influence the downside risks of 
the inflation projections have begun to be balanced out, as reflected by the rise since 
summer 2017 by the inflation expectations indicators based on financial market 
information.43
Monetary policy conduct has been a determining factor in the current economic 
expansionary phase, both in the euro area as a whole and in Spain. The measures 
adopted have significantly eased financial conditions. And, as illustrated in the estimates 
presented in Box 1.3, monetary policy has contributed notably to the growth of real GDP 
and of the CPI, both in the euro area and in Spain. 
Foreseeably, however, in the future monetary policy will begin to progressively play 
a more limited role. In the euro area, the gradual overcoming of the legacies of the crisis 
and a position further ahead in the cycle, with an output gap which, on available estimates, 
is expected to be positive as from 2018, will lead, according to the ECB forecasts, to a 
progressive recovery in inflation to levels compatible with medium-term price stability 
(which the monetary authority for the area establishes as an inflation rate lower than but 
close to 2%).44 As this normalisation of euro area price dynamics takes shape, it is to be 
expected that the exceptionally expansionary stance of monetary policy at present will 
gradually be tightened. 
42  Specifically, after three and a half years of uninterrupted purchases, the APP portfolio will amount to almost 
€2.6 trillion in September 2018, equivalent to 23% of euro area GDP. 
43  See the Analytical Article, “Euro area inflation expectations”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de España.
44  Specifically, according to the “March 2018 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area”, the HICP 
for the area as a whole will grow by 1.7%, on average, in 2020 (and by 1.8% in terms of the indicator that 
excludes the fresh food and energy component). 
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Fiscal policy temporarily stimulated growth in the 2015-2016 period, with a clearly 
expansionary stance. Having regard to the standard values of the fiscal multipliers, 
almost 1 pp of economic growth in 2015-2016 could be attributed to the impulse of 
budgetary policy,45 given that in those two years the structural primary budget deficit, 
which measures the budgetary policy stance, worsened – according to the European 
Commission’s latest estimates – by 2.5 pp. Despite this expansionary stance, the 
favourable cyclical conditions allowed for the continuation of the declining path of the 
budget deficit/GDP ratio (see Chart 1.17.1).
The fiscal policy stance in 2017 turned broadly neutral, following the approval and 
delayed entry into force of the budgetary plans. The reduction in the deficit was due to 
4.3  THE FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATION PROCESS 
SHOULD CONTINUE IN THE 
COMING YEARS 
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In 2015-16 fiscal policy remained clearly expansionary, before becoming almost neutral in 2017, but strong economic growth allowed the fiscal 
consolidation process that had begun in 2013 to continue, albeit at a much slower pace, and permitted a slight reduction in public debt. In 2017 the 
deficit target was met, thanks to modest growth in public revenue and, above all, to the moderation in expenditure. However, the structural deficit is still 
one of the highest in the euro area and debt is very far from the 60% of GDP target.
45  See Chapter 4 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España.
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the cyclical improvement in the economy and to the fall-off in interest expenditure, while 
the structural primary balance held broadly stable, according to the latest European 
Commission estimates. The high rate of increase of nominal output allowed the effects of 
the still-high public debt/GDP ratio to be more than offset, meaning that the ratio once 
again posted a slight reduction to 98.3%, 0.7 pp less than in 2016 (see Chart 1.17.2). The 
budget deficit stood last year at 3.1% of GDP, a rate matching the objective set under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The reduction 
in the aggregate deficit was extensive to the different tiers of government, whereby Central 
Government, the Social Security System and Regional Government posted deficits of 
1.9%, 1.5% and 0.3% of GDP, respectively, while Local Government once again recorded 
a surplus in 2017, at 0.6 pp, similar to that of the previous year.
Over the recovery phase as a whole, fiscal policy has been supported by the 
significant reduction in financing costs associated, inter alia, with the ECB’s 
monetary policy measures. In particular, it is estimated for Spain’s case that the reduction 
in financing costs will have had a direct impact on sovereign debt interest payments in the 
2014-2016 period that could be quantified at around 0.9 pp of GDP. Moreover, the positive 
macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policy on economic growth and 
inflation are expected to have indirectly affected the cyclical revenue and expenditure 
items of the public budget, entailing an additional reduction in the budget deficit during 
this period of around 0.9 pp.46
In the coming years fiscal policy should resume the reduction of the structural 
deficit. The European Commission has recommended a return to the neutral fiscal stance 
for the euro area as a whole in 2018, differing across Member States in terms of their fiscal 
room for manoeuvre. In Spain’s case, both the public debt/GDP ratio and the structural 
budget deficit are holding at levels some distance off the limits set in the SGP, which will 
require continuing with the fiscal consolidation process in the coming years (see Box 1.4). 
The positive assessment of the current recovery phase should not lead to the 
challenges outstanding being forgotten. As noted, the strength of the expansion has 
been underpinned, in part, by factors that will tend progressively to fade, particularly as 
regards demand-side (monetary and fiscal) policies. As these latter policies lose momentum, 
the measures aimed at improving the use and quality of productive factors and the efficient 
functioning of the markets for goods and factors should gain in prominence as a factor for 
shoring up medium- and long-term growth. There is consensus in the economic literature 
about the positive effects of reforms in periods of expansion, as the resistance and 
adjustment costs that such reforms entail can be better tackled.47 Also, in a monetary union 
with interest rates close to zero, the positive impact of the structural reforms undertaken in 
the peripheral countries may be amplified by an expansionary monetary policy.48
The economy maintains factors of vulnerability. While there has been substantial 
progress in the correction of some of the imbalances built up in the previous expansionary 
cycle, the economy remains exposed to specific shocks owing to the confluence of various 
4.4  THE LIMITS ON DEMAND-
SIDE POLICIES EVIDENCE 
THE NEED TO MAKE 
PROGRESS IN REDUCING 
VULNERABILITIES AND IN 
STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
46  See the Analytical Article “The impact of unconventional monetary policy on euro area public finances”, 
Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco de España.
47  See “Structural policies in the euro area”, forthcoming as an ECB Occasional Paper, which contains a detailed 
discussion on the relationship between the cyclical position and reform costs.
48  See O. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2016), “Policy Spillovers and Synergies in a Monetary Union”, 
International Journal of Central Banking, September, and “Reducing income inequality while boosting economic 
growth: can it be done?”, Economic Policy Reforms, 2012, OECD.
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factors. Hence, although the high net external liabilities position has declined by 17 pp of 
GDP from its 2014 peak, public debt remains at towering levels and household and 
corporate debt are at high levels from a historical perspective despite the fact the available 
estimates point to the deleveraging needs for these sectors being already very low49 
following the significant progress made in recent years. The banking system continues to 
face significant challenges (as is described in detail in Chapter 2), and unemployment 
remains very high, while the quality of jobs created is, in many cases, improvable, given 
the high ratio of temporary to total employment, the maintenance of a high rate of unwanted 
part-time employment and the limited duration of employment contracts, while there are 
no appreciable changes in the wage-setting mechanism towards a greater sensitivity to 
firm-and sectoral-level conditions. Likewise, although inflationary pressures are proving 
moderate, such that gains in competitiveness continued to be achieved, the widening of 
business mark-ups suggests a potentially insufficient degree of competition in some 
sectors (see Box 1.2).
However, there are few initiatives to resolve the economy’s structural problems. A 
divided Parliament means it is currently difficult to set far-reaching legislative initiatives in 
train. It should be borne in mind that many of the tasks outstanding in the Spanish economy 
require courses of action in the medium and long term extending beyond the usual political 
cycle and, therefore, they need launching without delay and with extensive and lasting 
political backing behind them.
Furthermore, the experience of the crisis has evidenced the need for resolute headway 
in completing the Economic and Monetary Union, a pivotal aspect of the sustainability 
and stability of the growth of the Member States. In addition to correcting the still-
persisting macroeconomic imbalances, it is necessary to complete the Banking Union, to 
promote the creation of a true single market for capitals, to introduce budgetary mechanisms 
geared to aggregate stabilisation and to simplify the governance of fiscal rules.
After almost five years of strong growth, the persistently high level of external and 
public debt is a source of vulnerability. The intensity and nature of the economic 
expansion have corrected these imbalances to some extent. First, the aggregate 
expenditure of economic agents has been lower than their income, which has helped to 
contain net external debt. Second, the cyclical strength has helped to correct the budget 
deficit and, therefore, to check the growth of public debt. The low interest rates have been 
conducive to these adjustments. However, despite such favourable conditions, progress 
in reducing external and, especially, public debt remains modest.
The two imbalances are closely interrelated. At end-2017, the negative net international 
investment position (IIP) of the Spanish economy stood at 80.8% of GDP, 17 pp below the 
5  Challenges ahead
5.1  PERSISTENT EXTERNAL 
AND FISCAL IMBALANCES
49  In  its 2016 report for Spain the European Commission, in accordance with various alternative methodologies, 
estimated that household deleveraging needs stood at between 10-20 pp as at mid-2015, and those of firms, 
at less than 10 pp. However, it should be borne in mind that, between that date and end-2017, debt ratios fell 
by 10 pp in the case of households and by 12 pp in that of firms, meaning that deleveraging needs as at the 
latter date would foreseeably be much lower than the initial estimates. Moreover, applying the experience of 
past episodes of deleveraging, which shows that during these phases two-thirds of the previous increase in the 
corporate debt ratio and practically 100% of the household debt ratio were corrected, on average [see F. 
Bornhorst and M. A. Ruiz-Arranz (2013), “Indebtedness and Deleveraging in the Euro Area”, 2013 Article IV 
Consultation on Euro Area Polices: Selected Issues Paper, Chapter  3, IMF Country Report No. 13/206, 
Washington], and taking as the starting point the deleveraging process in 2002 Q3, which is when the average 
euro area levels were obtained, the outcome would be that deleveraging needs at the end of last year would be 
11 pp for households and zero for firms. In any event, these results should be viewed with caution given that 
the various methodologies used in these calculations are subject to certain constraints. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
2014 peak (see Chart 1.18.1). This level, which is very high by international standards, 
means that Spanish agents’ income and financial position are more sensitive to changes 
in global financial conditions. The breakdown of the IIP by sector shows how, since the 
onset of the crisis, the general government’s net liability position has increased significantly, 
while that of financial institutions, firms and households has decreased. In recent years, 
vulnerability has been mitigated in part by the structural adjustment of the current account 
balance and the increase in the financial position of resident issuers50 (see Chart 1.18.2).
The continuation of high public debt levels over a prolonged period may have adverse 
effects on economic growth. These effects arise insofar as public debt absorbs funds 
that could be used for more productive purposes and alters the overall financing conditions 
of the economy, distorting private investment decisions. Moreover, in a setting of high 
public debt, fiscal policy may be subject to constraints owing to the need to support 
substantial primary deficits that require higher levels of taxation or lower levels of productive 
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The negative net international investment position (IIP) has fallen to 80.8% of GDP, although it is still high by international standards. Since the onset of the 
crisis, the net debtor position of firms, households and financial institutions has decreased, while the general government contribution has increased.
50  A combination of factors have helped to reduce this vulnerability in recent years (see Chapter 3 of Banco de 
España Annual Report, 2016, and Ó. Arce (2017), “La posición de inversión internacional de la economía 
española: Tendencias, análisis y evaluación”, in «¿Es la economía española financieramente vulnerable?”, 
Documento de Trabajo nº 13, Fundación de Estudios Financieros. On the one hand, the structural adjustment 
of the current account balance in recent years, along with the return to normal in the financial markets and the 
restructuring of liabilities, have helped to temper the external vulnerability of the economy. On the other, 
valuation effects, which in recent years have reflected an improvement in the financial position of resident 
issuers, have limited the correction of the book value of the negative external position. Specifically, the 
improvement since 2012 in the solvency and prospective earnings of resident issuers has given rise to a 
revaluation of their liabilities, although, in terms of the IIP, this has negative valuation effects that increase the 
negative external balance.
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expenditure. At the same time, the countercyclical room for manoeuvre in fiscal policy to 
address adverse macroeconomic shocks may be significantly reduced in a high-debt 
scenario. In addition, this produces greater vulnerability to changes in investor (market) 
sentiment.51
Complying with European and national tax rules will require continued fiscal 
consolidation. Since 2013, Spain’s general government agencies have been subject to an 
EDP, in the framework of the corrective arm of the SGP. In August 2016 the EU Council 
updated the conditions for exit from the EDP in 2018. In particular, the general government 
deficit must be no higher than 2.2% of GDP in 2018 and the structural effort between 2016 
and 2018 at least 0.6 pp of GDP. Although it is very likely that Spanish general government 
agencies’ deficits will be below 3% in 2018, there is greater uncertainty regarding strict 
compliance with the degree of reduction required of the structural government deficit, 
which according to the European Commission would still be high (3.3% of potential GDP 
in 2018), the largest of the 19 euro area countries. Exiting the EDP would entail redefining 
the path of fiscal adjustment, to adapt to the requirements of the preventive arm of the 
SGP. These requirements include reducing the structural deficit at an annual rate of 0.5 pp 
in normal circumstances, until the medium-term equilibrium target is reached,52 and 
reducing the general government debt to GDP ratio per annum by one-twentieth of the 
distance from the medium-term benchmark of 60% (see Box 1.4).
Population ageing is a key challenge for the sustainability of public finances. The 
most recent estimates of the impact of population ageing on public expenditure on 
pensions, health care and long-term care show that it would increase expenditure over the 
next three decades, by a maximum of some 3.5 pp of GDP by around 2050.53 In the case 
of the pension system, in a favourable macroeconomic scenario, application of the 
sustainability factor, which links starting pension to the increase in life expectancy, and 
especially application of the annual pension revaluation index, which links increases in 
pension to the balance between the revenue and expenditure of the system, would 
gradually reduce the pension system’s current deficit (1.8% of GDP in 2018) and would 
significantly counter the effect of the expected rise in the dependency ratio in the long 
term. In the absence of additional increases in revenue, the adjustment would come mainly 
from a decrease in the replacement rate of public pensions, which could amount to 20 pp 
between 2013 and 2060.54 Looking forward, the key is to limit the replacement rates of the 
Spanish public pension system, in step with social preferences, to adapt them to revenues 
so as to ensure sustainability. The conclusion that may be drawn from the analyses 
available is that maintaining the present replacement rates, which are high by international 
standards, would require a very significant increase in pension system revenues. In any 
event, any reform strategy chosen should heighten the system’s transparency, strengthen 
the contributory principle, that is, the relationship between contributions and benefits, 
51  See P. Hernández de Cos, D. López-Rodríguez and J. J. Pérez (2018), “The challenges of public deleveraging”, 
Banco de España Occasional Paper 1803.
52  In the European tax framework, convergence towards the medium-term target is strengthened by application of 
the “expenditure rule”, which determines that public expenditure growth, after deducting extraordinary 
revenues, cannot exceed the medium-term potential GDP growth of the economy. For an overview of the 
European tax framework, see P. García-Perea and E. Gordo (2016), “Los mecanismos de supervisión 
presupuestaria de la UEM”, Economic Bulletin, March, Banco de España.
53  See The 2015 Ageing Report, European Commission, and Actualización del Programa de Estabilidad del Reino 
de España 2018-2021.
54  See R. Ramos (2014), “The new revaluation and sustainability factor of the Spanish pension system”, Economic 
Bulletin, July-August, Banco de España, and P. Hernández de Cos, J. F. Jimeno and R. Ramos (2017), “ The 
Spanish public pension system: current situation, challenges and reform alternatives”, Banco de España 
Occasional Paper 1701.
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and, in particular, maintain an automatic adjustment mechanism that ensures the 
sustainability of future pensions.
The fiscal consolidation process should be compatible with an improvement in the 
quality of public finances. The adjustment pending should be anchored to a medium-
term programme setting out the detailed measures that would allow the budgetary 
objectives to be met, and to a prudent macroeconomic and public revenue projection. In 
addition, the composition of the adjustment is particularly important, as it should seek to 
ensure that public finances make a greater contribution to the potential growth of the 
economy. On the expenditure side, according to the detailed analyses performed in some 
European economies, including Spain,55 there seems to be scope for further progress in 
increasing the efficiency of public expenditure and redirecting its composition towards 
those items that have a greater impact on the accumulation of physical, technological and 
human capital and, in consequence, on total factor productivity and economic growth in 
the long term.56 
On the revenue side, there is scope to consider an overhaul and redefinition of the 
basket of taxes, with a shift towards structures more conducive to potential growth. 
These structures should be underpinned by taxes that produce less distortion in the 
behaviour of economic agents and that allow sufficient revenue to be obtained, in a stable 
and efficient manner, to fund the desired level of public expenditure. It should be noted 
that taxation of consumption in Spain is lower as a proportion of GDP than the EU average, 
reflected in the lower revenues obtained from both VAT and excise duties (especially on 
hydrocarbons, transport and alcohol). Environmental taxation is also lower. Revenue from 
taxation on employment in Spain is similar to the EU average as a proportion of GDP, 
although the weight of social security contributions is higher, especially firms’ contributions. 
In turn, the weight of revenue from taxation on capital is higher than the EU average, as the 
taxation of wealth is higher in Spain, while the weight of taxation on firms and on unearned 
income is similar. In this context, however, the available evidence57 shows that the tax 
rates of Spain’s main taxes (VAT, personal income tax, corporate income tax) are generally 
equal to or higher than the EU average, although the effect of exemptions, tax credits and 
special reduced rates tends to generate revenue losses, in addition to possible distortions 
in the efficiency and fairness of the tax system.
The regional government financing system should be reviewed. In an administrative 
structure with such a high level of decentralisation as Spain’s, where regional and local 
government are responsible for more than 40% of public expenditure decisions, their 
cooperation is essential to ensure budgetary stability. In this respect, the general consensus 
is that there should be an overhaul of the financing system of these administrations, based 
on an objective estimate of their expenditure needs, to adapt the revenue at their disposal 
to those needs, ensure transparent distribution between the regional governments and 
55  See, among others, C. Vandierendonck (2014), Public Spending Reviews: design, conduct, implementation, 
European Economy, Economic Papers, no.  525. For the case of Spain, see OECD (2015), Spain: From 
Administrative Reform to Continuous Improvement, OECD Public Governance reviews, Paris.
56  In this context, on 2 June 2017 the Spanish government commissioned the AIReF to undertake a public 
expenditure review, comprising a detailed analysis to assess the quality of public policies. This is an ongoing 
arrangement, including an initial agreement for three years and the results of a first phase assessing expenditure 
on subsidies, to be presented before end-2018. In general, expenditure policy reviews can reveal fiscal scope 
to improve the allocation of public funds. 
57  See, among others, the Informe de la Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma del Sistema Tributario Español 
(2014); and P. Hernández de Cos and D. López Rodríguez (2014), Tax structure and revenue-raising capacity in 
Spain: A comparative analysis with the EU, Banco de España Occasional Papers 1406.
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increase the degree of fiscal co-responsibility.58 In addition, capital market access by 
regional governments should be resumed as a fundamental way to finance their fiscal 
imbalances, making use of the various State funds rolled out during the crisis only in 
exceptional circumstances. In any event, while these arrangements remain operational, 
there must be strict application of their explicit conditions relating to the budgetary 
activities of the administrations concerned to avoid incentivising inappropriate budgetary 
policies.59
The Spanish economy projects relatively modest future potential growth. On the 
estimates available, the potential growth of the Spanish economy – which measures its 
ability to grow in a sustainable and balanced manner in the medium term – is less than 
1.5%, close to the level for the euro area but below that of other developed economies 
such as the United States (see Chart 1.19). Among the main structural factors limiting the 
potential growth of the Spanish economy the following stand out: high structural 
unemployment, population ageing, the lower rate of growth of the labour force participation 
rate owing to demographic change and low productivity as a result of excessive labour 
market duality, regulations that restrict competition and the efficient reallocation of 
resources, and the human and technological capital deficit.60 By contrast, the available 
estimates for potential GDP are possibly not fully factoring in the positive impact on the 
long-term growth of the economy of the past structural reforms in Spain. 
Cutting the persistently high level of unemployment, especially among certain 
groups, is a priority. The employment recovery is weakest among the unemployed with a 
lower level of education. Specifically, in 2017, the unemployment rate among persons with 
a low educational level was more than 30%, affecting in particular the youngest and the 
oldest age groups (see Chart 1.20.4).61 In consequence, public policy should be directed 
at ensuring the employability of these groups, preventing hysteresis effects that hinder 
further reductions in the unemployment rate.
During the last economic crisis there was a notable increase in inequality both in terms 
of per capita income, a pattern which is estimated to have begun to reverse during the 
upturn. The main determinant of this turnaround has been the decline in the unemployment 
rate. Looking forward, further reductions in the income inequality indicators will depend on 
unemployment continuing to decline, which requires improvements to the employability of 
the least skilled, along with an increase in the hours actually worked by employees with lower 
wages. In any event, the causes behind the dynamics of inequality and their effects are 
complex, and learning about them will require an in-depth analysis of the various relevant 
dimensions (wages, household income, consumption and wealth, inter alia), as a prerequisite 
for the design of public policies that promote socially sustainable growth.62
5.2  FACTORS LIMITING 
SPANISH ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN THE LONG 
TERM
58  See the Informe de la Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma del modelo de financiación autonómica (2017) and 
P. Hernández de Cos and J. J. Pérez (2018), “Regional government financing: options and challenges”, Banco 
de España Occasional Paper, forthcoming.
59  See P. Hernández de Cos and J. J. Pérez (2015), “Reglas fiscales, disciplina presupuestaria y corresponsabilidad 
fiscal”, Papeles de Economía Española, 143, pp. 174-184, and M. Delgado, J.  J. Pérez and C.  I. González 
(2016), “Regional government access to market funding: international experience and recent developments”, 
Economic Bulletin, February, Banco de España.
60  Moreover, R. Gordon (2016), “The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The US standard of living since the Civil 
War”, Princeton University Press, documents other factors common to the majority of developed economies 
that limit productivity, such as tertiarisation, lower competition or the exhaustion of educational gains.
61  See Box 1.2 on the persistence of unemployment in Spain, in Annual Report, 2015, Banco de España.
62  In this respect, the forthcoming Occasional Paper, “Income, consumption and wealth inequality in Spain”, 
analyses in detail the level of and changes in inequality in Spain during the economic crisis and, insofar as the 
available information allows, in the initial phases of the recovery. 
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Demographic patterns will have negative effects on the potential growth of the 
economy. According to INE population projections, the dependency ratio (defined as the 
ratio between the over-65s and those in the 16-64 age group) will grow from 29% at 
present to 65% over the next five decades (up to 2065).63 This population ageing has a 
negative impact on the working age population and pushes down both the labour force 
participation rate and the employment rate.
The challenge posed by demographic change requires that a strategy be defined to 
mitigate its long-term economic impact. In particular, policies that boost the labour 
force participation rate become especially important, given that, if the present participation 
rates by sex and age and the demographic trends towards a larger proportion of older 
population cohorts are maintained, the overall labour force participation rate would fall 
significantly (by approximately 2 pp over the next decade). To counter this effect, policies 
that encourage workers – especially older ones – to join the labour force are required, such 
as, for example, making collecting a pension compatible with working. In addition, 
migration policy restrictions should be reviewed periodically, seeking to adapt them to 
labour market needs, and measures should be taken to encourage a higher birth rate, to 
bring it closer to those in other European countries, encouraging a better work-life balance 
and reducing job instability for women of child-bearing age.
High labour market segmentation hampers productivity gains. In the present recovery 
phase, as was the case before the crisis, temporary employment has continued to grow at 
a faster pace than permanent employment (see Chart 1.20.1). Thus, at end-2017, the ratio 
of temporary to total employment was 26.7%, 0.2 pp above the end-2016 level and 3 pp 
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The potential growth of the Spanish economy has fallen from almost 3% pre-crisis to 1%-1.5% in 2017-22. This modest potential growth is attributable 
to the lower working-age population, the lower labour force participation rate, the lower accumulation of capital and low total factor productivity (TFP). 
This potential growth is similar to that of the euro area but is lower than that estimated for the United States.
63  See «Población y fenómenos demográficos proyectados», INE. On these projections, over the next 50 years the 
Spanish population will fall from the present 46 million to 41 million, even in a scenario of net inflows of 
immigrants of between 50,000 and 100,000 per annum. In any event, demographic projections rely heavily on 
fertility rate and migration balance assumptions. Indeed, using different assumptions for these two variables, 
Eurostat projects an increase in population up to almost 50 million (Population on 1st January by age, sex and 
type of projection, Eurostat).
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above the cyclical low recorded in 2013. It was, however, still some distance from the pre-
crisis levels (33.8% at end-2006).64 This ratio is still the highest among the euro area 
countries, where it stood at 16.2% at end-2017. Moreover there is some evidence that 
new temporary contracts have recently become shorter, increasing labour turnover and 
hindering human capital accumulation (see Chart 1.20.2). In addition, although the part-
time employment rate is 1 pp below the peak observed in 2014 and is below that of other 
European countries, its present level (16.0% at end-2017) is substantially higher than its 
pre-crisis level (12%) and, moreover, there is a high percentage of non-voluntary part-time 
work (see Chart 1.20.3).65 As a result of all the above, the number of hours actually worked 
has fallen, affecting not only average productivity but also wage income inequality.
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The unemployment rate among workers with lower educational levels remains very high. In addition, in the recovery the ratio of temporary to total employ-
ment has risen, temporary contracts have become shorter and there is a high proportion of non-voluntary part-time work.
SOURCES: SPEE, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, INE and Banco de España.
a Including domestic service contracts only since October 2012.
b Calculated using MCVL (Social Security administrative labour records) data.
c Employed persons who say they are working part-time because they were unable to find full-time work.
d Low: no or only primary education, or having failed to complete, or to successfully complete, lower secondary education. High: tertiary education.
64  Excluding general government, the ratio of temporary to total employment was 27.3% in 2017, similar to the 
figure for 2016 and 2.7 pp higher than at end-2013.
65  See the influence of these factors on alternative measures of unemployment in “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 61 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 1. THE RECOVERY IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY: THE LIMITS OF DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
In general, when facing difficulties, firms continue to prefer to use temporary 
employment to adjust. The latest annual Labour Force Survey available, for 2016, 
confirms that among firms that would cut their labour costs in response to a negative 
demand shock, 54.4% would opt to reduce their temporary workforce, whereas 21.1% 
would opt to cut the number of hours worked. By contrast, only 1.8% of firms would opt 
to cut the fixed portion of wages and 8.8% the variable portion. The most noteworthy 
difference compared with the previous survey available, for 2008, previous to the 2012 
labour market reform, is the increase in the percentage of firms that would opt to cut the 
number of hours worked, from just 5% before the crisis. This change may be attributable 
to the internal flexibility measures in terms of working hours and the changes to 
employment contracts according to the hours worked introduced in the 2012 labour 
market reform and to the regulatory changes made to part-time contracts. That said, 
the latest figures show that regulatory friction persists, relating to the hiring framework 
and to the limited level of representativeness at firm level of the present wage bargaining 
system, hindering a reduction in the high employee turnover rate that characterises the 
Spanish economy.
Improving potential growth requires improving productivity dynamics. Labour 
productivity has barely risen during the present recovery phase. This is similar to the case 
of the last upturn, although then labour productivity was based on growth in the capital-
labour ratio which offset the increase in the proportion of firms with lower total factor 
productivity, whereas since 2014 genuine efficiency gains are being achieved, countered 
by a less intensive use of capital compared with labour. Even so, total factor productivity 
growth remains low.
In this setting, investment in human and technological capital becomes especially 
important. The available evidence shows that during the crisis young people remained in 
education longer, postponing their entry into the labour market, and this pattern has 
continued in the recovery. Thus, the labour force participation rate of young people aged 
16-19 in Spain has fallen from 30% to 15%, parallel to an increase in the percentage of 
young people in formal education or undertaking some form of training, narrowing the 
gap between Spain and other European countries in this respect (see Chart 1.21).66 In any 
event, reform of the Spanish education system is needed in order to close the gap with 
other developed countries in terms of education quality indicators and address the 
challenges posed by globalisation, technological progress and automation, which require 
a re-think of the apprenticeship system and of curriculum content. Furthermore, the 
technological capital gap between Spain and its European partners widened during the 
crisis, owing to lower R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the public sector and, 
especially, in the private sector where the differences are greater. In addition to the 
structural characteristics that limit firms’ ability to innovate (in terms of human capital, 
business capacity, productive structure and financing), and the design of the public R&D 
system which is susceptible to improvement, there are other more temporary cyclical 
aspects, such as the low public budget allocations to innovation and the adverse effects 
on firms’ innovation efforts of the insufficient degree of business competition in certain 
sectors.67
66  In any event, in 2017 the early school-leaving rate, at 18.3%, was still higher than the Europe 2020 strategy 
target of 15% and at some distance from the European rate of 10.7%. The target refers to the population aged 
18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in education or training.
67  In this respect, in addition, see Chapter 3 of this report on the lower level of investment in intangible assets by 
Spanish firms overall.
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Various regulatory barriers limit the efficient allocation of resources and business 
competition. According to DIRCE statistics,68 9% of active companies were lost between 
2008 and 2014 in Spain. In the period 2014-16, 5  pp of that decline was recovered, 
although the rate of creation of new companies is still low and the rate of destruction of 
companies is still high. Notable among the factors that may be limiting the emergence of 
new business projects are the regulatory barriers to entry in certain markets, such as, for 
example, delays or moratoria in granting licences to pursue certain activities at the local 
level and the limits on competition in certain sectors, such as road and rail passenger 
transport, or those stemming from the delay in the implementation of the Market Unity 
Law.69 Moreover, certain elements of tax and labour regulations penalise companies that 
exceed certain thresholds.70 In addition, there are the problems that arise when non-
productive companies are lost as a result of insolvency proceedings that are not 
sufficiently fast or efficient, along with certain distortions that may favour less productive 
companies.71
The limited correction of mark-ups in the recovery may be attributable to a lack of 
competition in certain productive sectors. During the crisis, the fact that many firms 
needed to improve their financial position, against a backdrop of rising borrowing costs 
and tighter financing conditions, may have justified the increase in unit mark-ups. By contrast, 
in the current phase of the cycle, failure to adjust relative unit operating surpluses vis-à-vis 
the other euro area countries could indicate a lack of competition in some markets, with 
negative implications for continued competitiveness gains that are essential for correction 
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The labour force participation rate of young people in Spain has been falling since the crisis, in tandem with an increase in the percentage of the 
population receiving some form of education or training. This pattern has continued throughout the past four years of recovery.
68  DIRCE, the Central Companies Directory, is a single information system for all Spanish firms and their local units 
located in Spain.
69  In particular, the Constitutional Court judgment against certain articles of the Law required that its effective 
implementation be reviewed. Specifically, the judgment should encourage regions to pool their practices on a 
sector-by-sector basis, to achieve regulatory standards in keeping with best practice, continuing to seek to 
enhance productivity and not erect barriers to entry to potential competitors.
70  See M. Almunia and y D. López-Rodríguez (2018), “Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax 
Compliance”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 10, pp. 1-38, and M. Almunia, J. F. Jimeno 
and D. Lopez-Rodriguez (2018), “Size-Dependent Regulations in Spain”, Working Paper, forthcoming.
71  See Chapter 4 of Banco de España Annual Report, 2016.
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of the external imbalance.72 It is also important for sectors that are not open to trade that 
there is competition and that relative prices grow in a contained manner, given that sectors 
that produce tradable goods include a high proportion of non-tradable goods and services. 
Indeed, competitiveness gains vis-à-vis the euro area have been concentrated on wage 
adjustments rather than mark-ups. The productivity gains associated with the high rate of 
job destruction in the first stages of the crisis, and the wage restraint observed throughout the 
subsequent period, have restored most of the competitiveness lost vis-à-vis the other euro 
area countries, measured in terms of relative unit labour costs (ULCs). Specifically, while for the 
whole of the market economy, between 1999 and 2008 ULCs rose in Spain by 22 pp more than 
in the euro area, the present relative level is just 5 pp higher. However, in terms of unit operating 
surpluses, the loss of competitiveness in the expansionary phase was on a similar scale to that 
of ULCs, but the subsequent correction has been much more modest. This explains why the 
present level of the value added deflator has risen in cumulative terms by 10 pp more in Spain 
than in the euro area overall since the start of Monetary Union (see Chart 1.22).
Despite the recent improvements, Spanish credit institutions face important 
challenges stemming, inter alia, from the legacies of the crisis, the new regulatory 
framework and technological progress.73 Credit institutions should anticipate these 
changes, continuing to serve as effective intermediaries of financial flows in the economy, 
providing the necessary funds on competitive terms to agents in need of financing. 
Although other European credit institutions must also address this challenge, Spain’s 
credit institutions must do so in a setting in which, despite the considerable efforts made 
in recent years in terms of adjustments, write-downs and restructuring, some of the 
consequences of the crisis continue to weigh heavily on them, as analysed in detail in 
Chapter 2. This is the case of the relative volumes of troubled assets, which despite having 
been considerably reduced in recent years are still relatively high, the low levels of return 
on the banking business in Spain and the comparatively low solvency ratios by international 
standards, although they are clearly above the regulatory minimum levels (see Chart 1.23). 
In 2017 the Single Resolution Board resolved Banco Popular Español on account of the 
serious difficulties it was facing. Although the economic recovery will continue to reduce 
troubled (non-performing and foreclosed) assets, it is essential that credit institutions 
persevere in their efforts to continue to pare down these assets. It is equally essential that 
they continue to cut the operating costs of their business in Spain, bearing in mind that 
bank lending is not expected to return to the levels achieved in the expansionary phase 
that preceded the crisis either in the short or the medium term.
The crisis revealed the need to reform the institutional architecture of the euro area. 
In 2017, the European Commission (EC) headed up several initiatives for progress on four 
fronts: political, financial, economic and fiscal union.74 The process proposed by the EC is 
governed by two complementary principles: a higher degree of solidarity and risk-sharing 
between Member States, and greater assumption of responsibility by national authorities, 
including specific measures to reduce risk in their economies. Recent experience in the 
crisis advises the need for simultaneous progress in the aspects highlighted by the EC.75
5.3  NEED TO CONTINUE WITH 
THE REFORMS IN THE 
EURO AREA
72  See Box 1.2, which documents the development of mark-ups in Spain and considers the possible causes.
73  See Chapter 2 of this Annual Report.
74  See the “White Paper on the future of Europe and the way ahead”, March 2017, European Commission, and the 
“Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union”, May 2017, European Commission, 
which build on the “Five Presidents’ Report”, June 2015, European Commission.
75  Some of the initiatives to complete the euro area and a possible calendar are set out in Box 5 “The debate on 
euro area governance reform”, “Quarterly Report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco 
de España.
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On the financial front, the priority should be to complete banking union. In this area, 
several fundamental issues remain. The first is the creation of a common financial backstop 
for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), where there is broad consensus in favour of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) assuming this function, possibly through a credit 
line. The adequacy of the liquidity provision facilities in all the phases of the resolution 
process also needs to be reviewed, as there are certain constraints on the availability of 
SRF funds and of ECB liquidity (through either monetary policy operations or emergency 
liquidity assistance). A second fundamental issue pending is the creation of a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) that will provide all depositors with the same level of 
protection irrespective of where they are located, reduce the likelihood of the emergence 
of mistrust that can lead to mass withdrawals of deposits, and weaken the links between 
banks and sovereigns. In this area progress has been more modest, with a certain degree 
of consensus being reached on the fact that introducing elements into national banking 
systems that entail future risk-sharing will require the parallel implementation of measures 
to reduce the existing risk. There have also been proposals for the creation of sovereign 
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In 2017, relative ULCs continued to improve vis-à-vis the euro area, meaning that the competitiveness lost during the previous expansionary phase has 
been almost recovered. However, in terms of relative gross surplus per unit of output, the present level is very close to the pre-crisis level.
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bond-backed securities (SBBS) which, under certain conditions, could facilitate greater 
diversification of banks’ current sovereign debt portfolios, which have some bias in favour 
of the sovereign debt of the country of issue.76 For the longer term, the possibility of 
developing arrangements for joint debt issues has also been raised, providing safe 
European bonds that would allow governments to obtain funding at a reasonable cost at 
times of crisis. Lastly, the momentum behind the Capital Market Union project should 
permit greater diversification of private sector funding sources and greater robustness of 
private risk-sharing arrangements. The actions adopted in 2017 notably included those 
aimed at promoting funding for innovation and for new and unlisted firms, helping firms 
gain access to capital market funding, and fomenting long-term, sustainable investment 
and investment in infrastructure.
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Spanish credit institutions have lower capital levels and higher non-performing loan levels than their European peers overall. However, they compare 
favourably in terms of efficiency and rate of return, despite their less favourable recent performance. Thus, the efficiency ratio has tended to deteriorate 
in Spain in recent years and rates of return are at historically low levels.
SOURCES: ECB (Consolidated Banking Data), EBA (Risk Dashboard) and Banco de España.
a Consolidated data.
b EU figure for 2017 is at September.
c Owing to comparability and availability issues, in this case the EBA's Risk Dashboard data have been used.
 SPAIN  EU (b)
76  See the ESRB document “High-Level Task Force on Safe Assets”.
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In the area of fiscal policy, the difficulties associated with the present decentralised 
decision-making framework underline the need for supranational instruments to be 
designed to address adverse shocks. In particular, progress is desirable in the creation 
of some kind of common cyclical insurance mechanism that would help relieve the effects 
of the lack of a centralised fiscal capacity and the low stabilisation capacity of the existing 
public and private risk-sharing mechanisms (as evidenced by the limited size of the EU 
budget). Some of the studies available suggest that a mechanism could be designed, 
involving committing a relatively low volume of funds (1% of GDP, which is less than the 
present European budget) and no permanent transfers between States, which would 
provide a fiscal stabilisation capacity similar to that of the federal transfer system in the 
United States.77
Moreover, the current budgetary governance framework should encourage countries 
to generate headroom during expansionary phases. The lack of incentives that are 
sufficiently powerful to create the necessary headroom reduces the stabilisation capacity 
of fiscal policy throughout the euro area at times of crisis. Recent proposals, which seek 
to give more weight to government debt as a medium-term anchor and to the spending 
rule as an operational tool, are appropriate. In any event, it is essential that supervision of 
compliance with the fiscal rules is strengthened. Simplification of the European budgetary 
framework would be conducive to this, as the present framework is overly complex and 
not sufficiently transparent.
Lastly, on the political front the initiatives seek to secure more effective and more 
transparent governance. There is a growing perception of the need to ensure that the 
project to deepen EMU be linked to an increase in its acceptance by European citizens. In 
this respect, the European Parliament’s capacity for oversight is expected to be 
strengthened and existing intergovernmental treaties to be incorporated into the EU legal 
framework. Consensus has also been achieved on the need to create a European Monetary 
Fund (EMF), anchored in European legislation, to assume the functions and increase the 
potential for action of the ESM. Lastly, the European Commission has proposed that the 
post of European Minister for Economy and Finance be created, to improve economic 
policy coordination and accountability to the European Parliament.
77  See Chapter 3 of Banco de España Annual Report, 2016.
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The political situation in Catalonia continues to be one of the main 
domestic risks for the future performance of the Spanish economy 
as a whole, and of this region in particular. However, the escalation 
of tensions, which peaked with the events of October 2017, has 
tended to subside since November.
Against this background, the economic indicators relating to the 
final months of 2017 and the first few months of this year suggest 
that, in contrast to the greater buoyancy recorded in early 2017, 
the Catalan economy has slowed more sharply than the economies 
of the other large regions. This poor relative performance is primarily 
reflected in a set of indicators relating to firms’ employment 
decisions (social security registrations), household consumption 
(retail trade indices), tourism (non-residents’ overnight hotel stays), 
residential investment (house purchases) (see Charts 6 to 9) and 
business investment, according to the evidence available. As for 
financial market indicators, they are showing a return to normal 
(see Charts 1 and 2), following the period immediately after the 
escalation at the beginning of October 2017, when stock market 
volatility increased and the Spanish market performed less 
favourably than the EURO STOXX index. In particular, this was a 
result of the negative behaviour of the share prices of banks, 
especially those that were then headquartered in Catalonia.
However, it is not easy to determine the extent to which the less 
favourable performance of the economic indicators of this region 
is linked to the political situation, since other factors may be 
affecting the Catalan economy simultaneously. It is also difficult to 
BOX 1.1ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA
SOURCES: INE, IESE Business School, FUNCAS, CIS Barometer, PRS Group and Banco de España.
a Synthetic indicator based on indicators of the volatility of the IBEX-35, exchange rates, oil prices and ten-year bonds.
b Synthetic indicator based on CIS political assessment indicators (current and expectations), political risk indicator (PRS Group), national parliament fragmentation 
index, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), and disagreement in the public deficit forecasts.
c The scenarios correspond to the hypotheses used in Box 1.1, "The Economic Impact of Uncertainty Arising from Political Tensions in Catalonia", Financial Stability 
Report, November 2017, Banco de España. In scenario 1 it is assumed that the level of uncertainty increases temporarily in 2017 Q4, and returns to the 2017 Q3 
level in 2018 Q1. This increase is calibrated on the basis of the statistical distribution of the measures of uncertainty considered, which increase by a magnitude 
that is in the 90th percentile of each series (i.e. only 10% of the historical changes in each individual indicator are higher than those assumed). Scenario 2 assumes 
an increase in uncertainty in 2017 Q4 equivalent to that recorded in the historical episode with the sharpest rise and that following this initial shock the level of the 
uncertainty indicators decreases linearly over the simulation horizon.
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estimate the extent to which these events may have affected the 
economic buoyancy of other regions, through the direct trade links 
existing between the different geographical points of Spain and 
the general climate of uncertainty they may have given rise to. In 
fact, the main channel through which the political situation in 
Catalonia may be affecting its economy, and the Spanish economy 
as a whole, would be the latter one, insofar as it has an impact on 
agents’ confidence and, consequently, their spending decisions 
and financing conditions.
In this respect, the available indicators of economic uncertainty, 
relating to the country as a whole, show that the significant 
BOX 1.1 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE, AIReF and Banco de España.
a AIReF estimations.
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BOX ?
 
TÍTULO RECUADRO BOX 1.1 ECON MIC IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA (cont’d)
increase in October last year was temporary; in subsequent 
months the values of the indicators returned towards more normal 
levels, in line with those observed in the months leading up to the 
peak in political tensions late last year (see Charts 3 and 4). The 
developments in the indicators are in keeping with the most benign 
hypothetical scenario of those for which simulations were 
presented in the Banco de Espana’s Financial Stability Report 
published on 11 November 2017.1 These hypothetical scenarios 
were based on historical episodes in which significant increases in 
uncertainty were observed and incorporated various hypotheses 
regarding how long the current episode may last.
In the short and medium term, the ultimate impact on the Spanish 
economy as a whole of this element of risk will depend on the eventual 
magnitude and duration of the current episode of political uncertainty. 
An easing of tensions in Catalonia could lead to a scenario of higher 
growth. On the other hand, the recent fresh outbreak of tensions could 
have an adverse effect on the confidence of agents and on activity. The 
persistent uncertainty regarding the future of the current legislature, 
following the regional elections of last December, may affect the 
process of normalisation that was perceptible just a few months ago.
1  See Box 1.1, “The economic impact of uncertainty arising from political 
tensions in Catalonia”, Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, 
November 2017. In particular, it was assumed in an initial scenario that 
there would be a temporary, limited increase in uncertainty leading to a 
cumulative loss of GDP by the end of 2019 of some 0.3 percentage 
points, while another more severe and prolonged scenario had a 
substantially larger loss of output. For a description of the econometric
   models that measure the response of economic activity and the 
components of demand to fluctuations in uncertainty, see the analytical 
article “Macroeconomic uncertainty: measurement and impact on the 
Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España.
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Since the start of the crisis there has been a major improvement in 
the competitiveness of the Spanish economy. Relative to the euro 
area, the competitiveness gains have been more apparent in terms 
of unit labour costs than in terms of prices. Between 2008 and 
2017, the losses in competitiveness that had built-up since the 
start of EMU, as measured by relative unit labour costs, were 
almost completely corrected. However, the correction is much 
more modest when the change in the real effective exchange rate 
– based on the CPI or relative industrial prices – is considered. 
That is to say, although price increases have in recent years been 
more contained in Spain than in the euro area, this has not been 
sufficient to offset the sharp relative price deterioration that 
occurred during the pre-2008 upswing.
An analysis of the behaviour of mark-ups, defined as the difference 
between the selling price and production costs, may shed light on 
the factors underlying the differing behaviour of prices and 
compensation per employee. However, one of the difficulties 
involved in analysing mark-ups is that they cannot be directly 
observed, although they can be estimated.
Charts 3 and 4 show estimates of mark-ups – defined as the ratio 
between the gross operating surplus and gross value added of 
non-financial corporations – for various euro area countries based 
on national accounts data. During the crisis mark-ups in Spain and 
Portugal increased, in contrast to the more-or-less-pronounced 
declines recorded in Italy, France and Germany.
Although there is no widely accepted theoretical approach to 
explain the cyclical behaviour of mark-ups, there is an abundant 
economic literature documenting a pattern similar to that seen in 
Spain during the crisis and relating it to the need for firms to 
continue to have internal funds available when financing conditions 
are unfavourable. This argument appears to be particularly 
appropriate to account for events during the financial crisis, when 
mark-ups rose very significantly in the peripheral euro area 
countries and in other economies such as the United States.1 
Gilchrist et al. (2017)2 show that, in a context of intense financial 
pressure (high levels of debt, tightening financing conditions and 
restricted access to new lending), US firms decided to raise their 
mark-ups at the beginning of the crisis in 2008, despite the 
weakness of demand and the possibility of losing market share, as 
a means of generating internal funds and meeting their financial 
obligations, improving their financial position, financing investment 
projects and accommodating potential financial shocks.
However, the validity of the above argument is less clear when we 
consider the developments in mark-ups during the current 
recovery. As seen in Charts 3 and 4, despite the significant 
improvement in financial conditions in recent years, mark-ups 
have not been reduced since 2014 in the countries included and, 
in the case of Spain and Portugal, have remained as firm as in the 
early years of the crisis.3
Based on information for individual non-financial Spanish firms, 
Montero and Urtasun (2014)4 analyse the relationship between the 
increase in price-cost mark-ups and financial pressure in various 
industries over the period 2007-2011, and also consider other 
variables that may, in principle, help to explain the behaviour of 
mark-ups, which approximate the degree of competition, business 
size and the degree of innovation within companies. The results 
confirm the relevance of the degree of financial pressure as a 
significant determinant of the mark-ups of non-financial 
corporations, and also show the relevance of the degree of 
competition in the industry to explain changes in mark-ups in 
Spain. In particular, mark-ups increase to a greater extent in those 
industries subject to greater financial constraints, but also in those 
in which the level of competition is lower.
This latter finding may mean that the maintenance of high mark-
ups during the current upturn reflects a lack of competition in 
some industries, and that this factor predominates over the effect, 
with a negative sign, that the improvement in financial conditions 
may be having on mark-ups. As seen in Chart 5, external financing 
channels5 – essentially bank finance in the case of Spanish SMEs –6 
have been reviving over the last three years. Against a background 
of recovering activity, this should be conducive to a gradual 
reduction in the mark-ups charged on top of the firm’s various 
costs. However, Chart 6 shows that the decline in the degree of 
competition that occurred during the crisis as a result of the 
disappearance of a significant number of firms has still not been 
corrected. In particular, although the concentration indices 
considered show significant losses of competition between the 
period of global financial crisis (2008-2009) and the subsequent 
recession (2010-2013), levels of competition in the Spanish 
economy remained practically unchanged during the start of the 
current recovery (2014-2015). For instance, the degree of 
concentration, as approximated by the market share of the four 
BOX 1.2THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARK-UPS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE RECOVERY
1  Although developments in mark-ups were qualitatively similar, the 
adjustment during the crisis in terms of employment and wages was 
more pronounced in the case of Spain than in other advanced economies 
such as the United States.
2  S. Gilchrist, R. Schoenle, J. Sim and E. Zakrajsek (2017), “Inflation 
Dynamics during the Financial Crisis”, American Economic Review, 
vol. 107(3), pp. 785-823.
3  Also, firm-level data from the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office show that the accounting mark-ups of Spanish firms – 
measured as the ratio of gross operating surplus to value added – 
increased during the initial years of the recovery (2014-2015). 
4  J. Montero and A. Urtasun (2014), Price-cost mark-ups in the Spanish 
economy: a microeconomic perspective, Working Paper 1407, Banco de 
España.
5  Another factor to take into account is the decline from 2013 in bank 
lending rates, which stood, especially in some segments, well above 
those observed in the core euro area countries and which have tended 
since then to converge on those of these countries, as a consequence of 
the various measures taken both nationally (restructuring of the financial 
system) and at the European level (the ECB’s monetary policy measures).
6  Specifically it can be seen how the proportion of Spanish firms facing 
borrowing constraints, which in the depths of the crisis was much larger 
than in the euro area as a whole, has been gradually falling, to around 
average euro area levels (see Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de 
España, for more details).
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BOX 1.2 THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARK-UPS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE RECOVERY (cont’d)
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largest firms in each industry (CR4), increased by 10% during the 
crisis and only declined by 0.1% during the subsequent recovery.7
In the current circumstances, it is necessary to assess in which 
industries there may be insufficient competition and to review 
certain barriers, including regulatory ones, to the participation of a 
greater number of competitors, in order not only to improve 
consumer welfare, but also to increase the positive effects of the 
reforms introduced in labour and financial markets.
BOX 1.2 THE BEHAVIOUR OF MARK-UPS DURING THE CRISIS AND THE RECOVERY (cont’d)
7  The concentration indices considered have a number of drawbacks as 
indicators of the degree of effective competition as they depend crucially 
on how the relevant market is defined. In this case the relevant market is
   considered to be the industry in which firms operate at national level, 
without taking into account, for example, the geographical dimension, 
which in some industries may be a factor in determining the relevant 
market.
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Over the last few years, the ECB’s monetary policy has provided a 
significant stimulus, through historically low key policy rates and 
the implementation of non-standard measures, including the 
expansion of its balance sheet (asset purchase programme (APP) 
and targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs)), and of 
forward guidance. These actions have contributed to loosen 
financial conditions, acting as one of the fundamental drivers of 
the economic recovery in the euro area and have helped to counter 
deflationary pressures. This box presents empirical evidence on 
the macroeconomic impact of the measures taken by the ECB in 
recent years, both in the euro area and on the Spanish economy, 
updating the findings presented in Banco de España (2016).1
To measure the impact of monetary measures in the euro area, a 
structural autoregressive vector model2 is used that captures the 
effect of monetary policy through the size of the Eurosystem’s 
balance sheet. As a first step, a baseline scenario with no balance 
sheet expansion measures and an alternative scenario incorporating 
APP asset purchases and TLTRO allotments are constructed. A 
comparison of these two scenarios shows that over the period 
2015-2018 the ECB’s measures had a cumulative impact of some 
2.3 pp on the real GDP growth rate and of 1.7 pp on the euro area 
inflation rate, as measured by the HICP (see Chart 1).3
The impact of the monetary measures on the Spanish economy is 
analysed using the Quarterly Model of the Banco de España 
(MTBE), which includes with a high degree of detail the 
interrelationships among the aggregate variables.4 The model 
incorporates the effects of monetary policy on the Spanish 
economy through the trade channel, deriving from an increase in 
exports due to higher euro area growth, as well as those operating 
through changes in financial conditions, such as the exchange 
rate, stock prices and the cost of bank financing. The methodology 
used to estimate the effects of monetary measures on the 
exchange rate and stock prices is the “event study approach”, 
which considers as an impact the response of the prices of various 
financial assets to the announcements of monetary policy 
measures.5 As a result of this exercise, it is estimated that the 
ECB’s monetary policy prompted a depreciation of the euro of 
around 11% and a rise in stock prices of around 18% between 
mid-2014 and the last event considered (see Chart 2).6 The 
transmission of the ECB’s measures to the cost of bank financing 
is slower and its identification is based on models seeking to 
approximate the behaviour of bank rates, which incorporate 
interbank rates as determinants, as well as proxy variables for the 
business cycle and the risk premium. The methodology of Banco 
de España (2016) is followed, with the preparation of a 
counterfactual scenario “in the absence of measures”, which 
assumes, inter alia, that interbank rates would have remained 
unchanged. On the basis of this approximation, the impact of the 
ECB’s measures on bank lending rates is estimated to range 
between 85 and 110 bp (see Chart 2).7
When all these assumptions are incorporated into the MTBE, an 
estimate is obtained of the effect of the monetary stimulus 
measures on real GDP and the CPI in Spain. As seen in Charts 3 
and 4, the measures have had significant positive effects on both 
variables. It is estimated that, by the end of this year, the measures 
will have raised real GDP by 2.3% and the CPI by 1.4%. These 
effects are of a very similar magnitude to those estimated for the 
euro area as a whole.8 As regards their composition, Table 1 
shows the contributions of domestic demand and net exports to 
the impact on GDP, the improvement in domestic demand 
explaining somewhat more than two-thirds of this boost, in 
cumulative terms.
In addition to the macroeconomic estimations presented, the 
effects of recent monetary policy on other variables of interest are 
also relevant. On one hand, according to successive Bank Lending 
Surveys, the Eurosystem’s monetary measures since 2014 have 
had positive effects on liquidity, financing conditions and the 
capital of euro area banks.9 However, the effects on bank 
profitability seem to be more ambiguous: the (qualitative) surveys 
mentioned above suggest that the various measures have 
BOX 1.3THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY
1  See Chapter 3, Annual Report 2015, Banco de España.
2  See P. Burriel and A. Galesi (2018), “Uncovering the heterogeneous 
effects of ECB unconventional monetary policies across euro area 
countries”, European Economic Review, 101, January, pp. 210-229.
3  These values are within the ranges of effects estimated by the ECB. See, 
for example, V. Constâncio (2017), “Effectiveness of Monetary Union 
and the Capital Markets Union”, speech, 6 April, Malta.
4  See A. Arencibia, S. Hurtado, M. de Luis López and E. Ortega, 2017, 
New Version of the Quarterly Model of Banco de España (MTBE), 
Occasional Paper 1709, Banco de España.
5  Specifically, the change in prices within a two-day window (between the 
close of business on the day preceding and on the day following the 
event considered) is calculated for around 45 events, including meetings 
of the ECB’s Governing Council at which measures are announced, 
publication of the accounts of meetings and speeches by Council 
members perceived as indicating the possibility of imminent adoption of 
measures. The selection of dates is similar to that of Banco de España 
(2016), adding the meetings of the Governing Council and the publication 
of accounts up to the decisions of October 2017, the final event 
considered. For further details of the hypotheses and other considerations
   in relation to this methodology, see Chapter 3, Annual Report 2015, 
Banco de España. Alternative measures of the impact of actions on 
financial conditions are to be found in V. Constâncio (2017). “Effectiveness 
of Monetary Union and the Capital Markets Union”, speech, 6 April. 
Malta.
6  Also, it is estimated that the measures reduced Spain’s sovereign risk 
premium by some 70 bp, with respect to the German Bund, information 
that is used later to measure the impact of the actions on bank rates.
7  In the case of corporate loans of less than €1 million, that part of the fall 
in rates attributed to monetary policy is small. However, it is possible 
that the effects are being underestimated as the equations do not 
capture the positive effect of TLTROs on the cost of bank liabilities and 
the terms and conditions of these loans.
8  The similarity of the macroeconomic effects of monetary measures does 
not mean, however, that the transmission channels have been the same 
as those in the euro area as a whole. For an analysis of the transmission 
channels of non-standard monetary policy in the context of a monetary 
union with heterogeneity among its members, see Box 3.3, Annual 
Report 2015, Banco de España.
9  The evidence can be found, for example, in Ó. Arce and A. del Río (2018), 
“Las implicaciones macroeconómicas y sobre el sector bancario de la 
política monetaria del BCE”, Papeles de Economía Española, No. 155
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BOX 1.3THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY (cont’d)
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The monetary policy measures introduced since 2014 have led to a significant easing of financial conditions in Spain and the rest of the euro area
(bank lending rates, sovereign debt spread, exchange rate, etc.). This in turn has had a notably positive effect on GDP and inflation in Spain and in the
euro area as a whole in the period 2014-17, which is projected to continue to some degree in 2018.
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a Estimation based on Burriel and Galesi (2018): “Uncovering the Heterogeneous Effects of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policies across Euro Area Countries”, 
European Economic Review, 101, pp. 210-229. The 2018 data are March MPE projections.
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SPAIN. CONTRIBUTION OF MONETARY POLICY TO INFLATION
OBSERVED AND BANCO DE ESPAÑA'S MARCH 2018 PROJECTIONS ESTIMATED WITHOUT MONETARY STIMULUS
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Table 1 
THE EFFECT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING MEASURES IN SPAIN (a)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Percentage deviations from baseline scenario levels, calculated using the Quarterly Model of the Banco de España (MTBE).
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counteracting effects,10 while the quantitative analyses show 
neutral net effects.11 The empirical evidence also suggests that the 
measures have had clearly positive effects, especially the corporate 
sector purchase programme (CSPP) on market financing to non-
financial corporations and, indirectly, on the availability of credit to 
small businesses.12 Finally, monetary measures appear to have 
had a positive impact on the public finances of the main euro area 
countries, by reducing the burden of public debt interest payments 
and, indirectly, through the macroeconomic impact on cyclical 
items of revenue and expenditure.13
BOX 1.3THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY (cont’d)
10  According to the BLS, the TLTRO and APP programmes have had 
opposite effects on banking profitability, although the number of banks 
reporting positive effects of the former far exceeds the number of those 
reporting negative effects of the latter. There appears to be greater 
consensus among banks regarding the adverse effects on their 
profitability of the negative interest rate policy.
11  For a quantitative analysis of the various channels through which 
monetary measures affect banking profitability, see, for example, B. 
Cœuré (2016), Assessing the implications of negative interest rates, 
speech at the Yale Financial Crisis Forum, 28 July 2016, ECB, and Ó. 
Arce, M. García-Posada, S. Mayordomo and S. Ongena (2018), 
Adapting lending policies when negative interest rates hit banks’ 
profits, Banco de España, mimeo.
12  See Making room for the needy: The credit-reallocation effects of the 
ECB’s Corporate QE, Working Paper 1743, Banco de España (2017).
13  See the analytical article “The impact of unconventional monetary 
policy on euro area public finances”, Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco 
de España.
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Spain’s government debt-to-GDP ratio and structural budget 
deficit are both well above the limits established within the 
framework of the budgetary rules defined in the European Union’s 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which means that further fiscal 
consolidation will be required in the coming years. Apart from 
these constraints, there are economic reasons, relating to the 
need to reduce the vulnerabilities of the Spanish economy (as 
mentioned in the main text of this chapter), which make it advisable 
to continue with this process. This box presents a discussion of 
various short and medium-term scenarios for public finances.
The Spanish government is currently subject to an excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP), which was opened in April 2009,1 under 
the so-called corrective arm of the SGP. Apart from France, whose 
EDP is expected to be closed this year, Spain is currently the only 
country in the Union recording an “excessive deficit”, i.e. a budget 
deficit of more than 3% of GDP. The deadline set by the EU Council 
for remedying this situation is 2018.2 In this respect, the draft state 
budget for 2018, presented on 27 March, projects a budget deficit 
of 2.2% of GDP this year.
When the Council determines that a member country has 
overcome an EDP situation it automatically becomes subject to 
the “preventive arm” of the SGP. In this new situation, the country 
remains subject to a set of rules that restrict its fiscal policy 
actions, which in the case of Spain would involve the following 
requirements. First, the structural budget deficit, which according 
to the European Commission stood at 3.1% in 2017, should 
decline by 0.5 pp of GDP each year under normal conditions,3 until 
the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of structural balance 
is achieved. Second, the public debt-to-GDP ratio must be 
reduced each year by one-twentieth of the difference between the 
level that year and the 60% target. Given that the debt ratio stood 
at 98.3% of GDP in 2017 this rule would require an average annual 
reduction of 1.5 pp of GDP over the next decade. Finally annual 
growth of general government spending should be less than or 
equal to the medium-term potential growth of the economy.4
In order to assess the impact of these requirements, hypothetical 
scenarios are provided below illustrating the impact of compliance 
on the medium-term public debt-to-GDP ratio, depending on a 
number of macroeconomic and financial assumptions. The chart 
BOX 1.4SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERM FISCAL POLICY SCENARIOS
1  Determined in the EU Council Decision of 27 April 2009.
2  According to EU Council Decision of 8 August 2016, Spain must reduce 
its general government deficit to 2.2% of GDP in 2018 and achieve a 
cumulative improvement of 0.6 pp of GDP in the structural balance 
between 2016 and 2018. 
SOURCE: Banco de España, using the model described in P. Hernández de Cos, D. López Rodríguez and J. J. Pérez (2018), The challenges of public deleveraging, 
Occasional Paper 1803, Banco de España.
a Maximum annual fiscal effort scenario (change in structural balance) of 0.5 pp per annum, until the Medium-Term Objective is attained (structural balance = 0). In 
the scenario of potential growth = 1.5% and compliance with the debt rule, the constant annual fiscal adjustment is calculated so that the rule is complied with on 
average, i.e. so that the annual average change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is a reduction of 1/20 of the difference between the debt value for each year and 
the 60% reference.
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SIMULATED PUBLIC DEBT PATHS IN A SCENARIO OF CONVERGENCE TO THE MEDIUM-TERM STRUCTURAL BALANCE OBJECTIVE (a)
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3  More generally, under European regulations, the adjustment required, in 
terms of the change in the structural balance, is modulated in accordance 
with a matrix of cases that takes into account the levels of the output 
gap and public debt and the European Commission’s assessment as to 
whether or not there is a debt sustainability risk. Thus, for example, if the 
output gap is greater than 1.5 pp, public debt is greater than 60% and 
the Commission’s assessment is that there is no public debt sustainability 
risk, the structural adjustment required would be either more than 0.75 
pp, if GDP growth is below potential, or more than 1 pp, if growth is 
above potential. For further details, see European Commission (2016), 
“Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact 
and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence 
Programmes”
4  The Commission and the Council monitor compliance with these 
requirements, so that, in the event that “significant deviations” are 
identified, a process is launched to correct them. If this is not observed, 
sanctions can be imposed.
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presents hypothetical scenarios for public debt over the next 
decade based on a model simulating the dynamics of public debt.5 
It can be seen that a process of public deleveraging as required by 
the SGP in the case of the Spanish economy will require a 
significant and long-lasting fiscal consolidation.
Specifically, given the level of the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2017 
and the European Commission’s estimates of the Spanish general 
government structural deficit for the same year, and assuming 
average nominal economic growth over the coming decade of 3% 
and implicit public debt interest rates of 2.5%, meeting this 
objective would require an average primary surplus of 0.8% of 
GDP, as compared with the deficit of 0.6% of GDP estimated for 
2017, which would place the public debt-to-GDP ratio slightly 
above 85% in 2027. Average real GDP growth 1 pp higher than in 
this scenario would, keeping the other assumptions unchanged, 
lead to a public debt-to-GDP ratio of around 80% in 2027 or, 
alternatively, a public debt-to-GDP ratio similar to that in the 
preceding scenario, but with a significantly lower fiscal effort. In 
the latter case, the average primary surplus necessary to achieve 
this level of debt would be 0.2% of GDP, 0.6 pp per year below the 
baseline scenario.
These simulations highlight the importance of pressing ahead with 
fiscal consolidation while at the same time implementing the 
structural reforms necessary to increase the economy’s growth 
capacity. The simulations presented also show the difficulty of 
meeting the conditions laid down in the First transitional provision 
of the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial 
Sustainability (LOEPSF by its Spanish abbreviation) on the 
transitional period for convergence with the reference values set 
by that law, which are in line with those in the SGP, i.e. 60% for 
general government as a whole. According to this provision, the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio for each tier of government should be 
reduced at the annual average rate necessary to achieve this 
aggregate limit in 2020.6 Given the current levels of the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio of slightly above 98% of GDP, meeting the 
objective in 2020 would require a reduction of around 40 pp in the 
ratio over three years, an even larger correction than in the previous 
public-sector deleveraging process that took place between 1997 
and 2007, when this ratio was reduced by some 30 pp over 
somewhat more than a decade, against a very favourable 
macroeconomic backdrop. In this respect, in line with the 
recommendations of the Spanish Independent Authority for Fiscal 
Responsibility (AIReF by its Spanish abbreviation), it would be 
advisable to use the appropriate legal mechanisms to extend the 
transitional period for meeting the limit set in the LOEPSF, adapting 
the requirements specified in the first transitional provision of this 
law and defining a credible and demanding reference path for 
sustained reduction of the debt ratio, that is consistent in any 
event with the requirements of the SGP.7
BOX 1.4SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERM FISCAL POLICY SCENARIOS (cont’d)
5  See P. Hernández de Cos, D. López-Rodríguez and J. J. Pérez (2018), 
The challenges of public deleveraging, Occasional Paper 1803, Banco 
de España.
6  Some further requirements are also established for the transition phase, 
under normal conditions: i) the change in the non-financial expenditure 
of each tier of government may not exceed the Spanish economy’s real 
GDP growth rate; ii) when the Spanish economy achieves a real growth 
rate of at least 2% per annum or generates net employment with growth 
of at least 2% per annum, the public debt ratio must be reduced annually 
by at least 2 pp of GDP; iii) the structural deficit of general government 
as a whole must be reduced on average by at least 0.8% of GDP per 
annum, although in the event of an EDP, the deficit reduction must be in 
line with the requirements of the latter. Also, the LOEPSF gives an 
absolute priority to the payment of public debt interest and capital 
charges over all other budgetary commitments, which may be especially 
important to dispel any doubts that may arise regarding the public 
finances at times of financial instability or deterioration in confidence.
7  See the AIReF’s report of 20 July 2016 “Report on compliance with the 
Budget Stability and debt targets and with the expenditure rule 2016 by 
the different public administrations”.
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Despite the major advances of recent years, the Spanish banking sector continues 
to face significant challenges, many of which it shares with other euro area banking 
systems. Following the crisis and the subsequent banking sector restructuring and clean-
up, the economic recovery of recent years has helped to reduce non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and raise profitability.1 However, the effects of the crisis on the financial position of 
banks have far from completely disappeared. Thus profitability remains below the medium- 
and long-term reference levels and banks face a new and more demanding regulatory and 
competition framework (see Diagram 2.1). In a highly banked economy such as that of 
Spain, it is important to address these challenges so as to put the banking sector in a 
sufficiently strong position to contribute to economic growth and job creation.
The volume of impaired bank assets has decreased significantly from its peak, but 
remains high. The coming years will foreseeably see these assets continue to decrease. 
However, at the pace of the current fall, the NPL ratios will continue to be relatively high at 
the end of 2020, so it is of particular interest to the supervisory authorities that banks 
address this challenge promptly.
The recovery of Spanish bank profitability is another major challenge. Its low current 
level is mainly due to the residual effects of the crisis and the consequences of the 
deleveraging of the private sector of the Spanish economy. Impairment losses and other 
extraordinary losses continue to eat up a large portion of income compared with the 
situation prior to the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2008. Moreover, the 
adjustment of operating expenses has been unable to fully offset the fall in income since 
then. The overall net effect of the low interest rates seems to have been comparatively 
lower, despite the fact that they have exerted negative pressure on net interest income.
In the regulatory arena, banks have now largely adapted to the new requirements 
calling for, inter alia, higher levels of own funds and liquid assets. In both cases 
Spanish banks amply meet the minimum requirements, although, with respect to the 
European average, their liquidity position compares better than that of capital. Furthermore, 
some reforms still have to be defined in detail or fully implemented, which will require 
further adaptation by Spanish banks. 
The main medium-term challenge lies in the new competition framework derived 
from the new technologies and the progressive financial disintermediation. Financial 
innovation represents both a threat and an opportunity for banks. It will foreseeably bring 
increased competition in some segments and changes in the demand for banking services 
and how they are provided, which will oblige banks to embark on a process of anticipation 
and adaptation. At present, the penetration of these new technologies in Spain is limited 
and there is much uncertainty as to their final effects, although they may be considerable. 
Financial disintermediation similarly poses a challenge for banks, the progress of which 
will depend on both conjunctural and structural factors, such as interest rates, the purchase 
of corporate bonds by the Eurosystem, new competitors, advances towards a capital 
markets union and trends in long-term saving.
Summary
1  On the crisis, see the Report on the financial and banking crisis in Spain, 2008-2014, Banco de España.
Europa Meeting Room in the Cibeles building during the III Economic History Conference.
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The Spanish banking sector has undergone extensive restructuring since the onset 
of the crisis in 2008. The number of Spanish banking entities (Spanish-owned consolidated 
groups and banks not belonging to a group) fell from 122 at the beginning of the crisis to 
65 in 2017, and the number of branches and employees decreased by 40% and 32%, 
respectively, in that same period.2 As a result, there was a considerable increase in 
concentration in the banking industry. Thus the five largest groups went from representing 
49% of the total assets of business in Spain in 2008 to 70% in 2017, some 20 pp above 
1  Introduction 
2  The number of branches decreased most sharply in the more populous municipalities, where the network 
expansión of 2000-2007 had been concentrated, and this mitigated somewhat the concern over financial 
inclusión of rural populations. However, these rural populations show a long-term trend, dating from before 2007, 
of decline in the number of branches, which is related to their demographic decay. For more details, see Banco 
de España, Financial Stability Report, 11/2017, Box 2.5.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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FROM THE CRISIS
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THE CHALLENGES FACING THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR FIGURE 2.1
Fewer bad loans and higher profitability
Clean-up and restructuring 
following the crisis
Economic recovery
DESPITE THIS IMPROVEMENT, SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN
It is vital to successfully meet these challenges to enable the banking sector to build up 
sufficient strength to contribute to sustaining the current expansion
THE SOLVENCY AND PROFITABILITY OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM HAVE IMPROVED IN RECENT YEARS
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the EU average.3 The consequences of the crisis are also plainly visible in the outstanding 
balance of banks’ customer lending in Spain, which increased sixfold in the long expansion 
from 1995 to 2008 and then contracted by a third, and in the cumulative losses on the 
income statement due to asset impairment in Spain, which at end-2017 exceeded €310 
billion (equal to 11% of the total balance sheet at 31 December 2007).4
However, the profitability of the banking sector has not recovered fully and the 
volume of NPLs on bank balance sheets is still high. The recovery of the Spanish 
economy since the end of 2013 has helped Spanish banks to reduce their bad loans and 
improve performance. Nevertheless, their return on equity (ROE) remains low in historical 
terms and the stock market prices of Spanish (and, more generally, European) banks 
continue to reflect investors’ uncertain expectations as to the future bank performance.
Consequently, Spanish credit institutions continue to face a number of challenges, 
largely shared with other euro area banking systems, which may have macroeconomic 
repercussions. Some of these challenges are associated with the conjunctural situation, 
while others are medium- and long-term issues. In a highly banked economy such as Spain, 
it is vital to address these challenges and strengthen the banking sector so it can contribute 
to economic growth and job creation, effectively performing its task of financial intermediation. 
The experience of the past crisis illustrates how the weakness of banking systems in some 
countries contributed to intensifying the crisis. The following sections of this chapter analyse 
these challenges. They begin with the reduction of impaired assets resulting from the crisis 
and continue with the reestablishment of profit margins more in line with the rates of return 
required by investors and the adaptation to the new regulatory and competition framework.
The onset of the crisis was followed by a sharp rise in the bad loans of Spanish 
deposit institutions. In 2013, when the impairment of bank balance sheets peaked, non-
performing loans in customer business in Spain reached nearly €200 billion, nearly eight 
times more than in the previous crisis in 1994.5 Additionally, banks’ balance sheets in 2013 
included foreclosed real estate assets with a gross book value of nearly €80 billion.6 Four 
years later, the former had decreased by half, albeit still remaining at high levels, while the 
latter had fallen to €58 billion.7
High levels of bad loans have negative consequences not only for banks themselves, but 
also for the economy as a whole. An increase in bad loans impacts initially on the income 
statement and capital of banks, but, once this stage has passed, the persistence of high ratios 
of troubled assets (non-performing loans and foreclosures) for a prolonged period has 
additional effects. First, it means that human and physical resources have to be deployed for 
their management, preventing these resources from being used in other activities, including 
the extension of new loans. Second, their maintenance introduces an additional element of 
uncertainty as to the quality and valuation of bank assets, which may contribute to raising the 
cost of bank funding. One way or another, this may lead to a tightening of the supply of credit.
2  The reduction of 
impaired assets arising 
from the crisis
3  Counting its business abroad, the concentration of the Spanish banking sector is even higher (81.5% in 2017).
4  In this chapter use is made sometimes of consolidated data and at other times of the individual data for business 
in Spain of deposit institutions. The former are useful for international comparisons and the latter serve to focus 
on developments in Spain.
5  With an outstanding volume of lending five times larger.
6  Book value before deduction of impairment provisions recorded subsequent to foreclosure.
7  The fall was concentrated in 2017, the last year for which data are available, largely for accounting reasons. It 
was due, firstly, to the adjustment of the gross book value of the foreclosed assets of Banco Popular Español to 
their value net of provisions at the date of its resolution and, secondly, to additional reporting adjustments in the 
rest of the system.
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The available evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between bad 
loans and new credit extension. Chart 2.1 shows the correlation coefficient between the 
NPL ratio lagged by one period and, firstly, the change in credit (see Chart 2.1.1) and, 
secondly, the cost of funds (see Chart 2.1.2), for a sample of 61 Spanish deposit-taking 
institutions between 2000 and 2017. The correlation with the rate of change of credit is 
negative in practically the whole period, and more so from 2009, coinciding with the 
economic crisis. This observation is in line with the thesis that banks with higher NPL 
ratios are those which most reduce (or least increase) their credit, particularly during the 
crisis. Chart 2.1.2 shows that the correlation between NPL ratio and cost of funds was 
negative before 2009,8 but became positive thereafter and its absolute value was higher 
than in the previous period, reflecting the fact that banks with higher NPL levels had a 
higher cost of funds. In recent years the relationship between NPLs and cost of funds has 
loosened, coinciding with the abundant market liquidity linked to the Eurosystem’s 
expansionary monetary policy and the firming of the economic recovery, but the negative 
relationship with credit growth remains.
Additionally, the persistence of high NPL levels may have other negative 
consequences. In particular, the persistence of a high proportion of households and/or 
non-financial corporations in a fragile financial position, with high levels of debt, may 
reduce the momentum of spending and curtail the recovery of the economy, with feedback 
effects on bank balance sheet quality. Moreover, in the case of the euro area countries, the 
prompt correction of the NPL levels derived from the crisis is now also necessary to foster 
greater progress in the construction of the banking union. As noted in Chapter 1, there is 
a certain consensus that the greater sharing of risk entailed by the pieces yet to be put in 
place to complete the banking union (financial backing to the SRM, the European Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme) will only be possible if simultaneous progress is made in reducing the 
currently existing risks.
8  Particularly in the final years of expansion, in which those banks which most increased their lending (and 
consequently most reduced their non-performing to total loans ratio by raising the denominator) had a higher 
cost of funds.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Cross-sectional correlations of 61 Spanish deposit-taking institutions (the significant institutions and the main less-significant institutions, including all the credit 
cooperative sector).
CHART 2.1HIGH NPL LEVELS IMPACT NEGATIVELY ON CREDIT GROWTH AND THE COST OF BANK FUNDING
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The NPL ratio in Spain is being corrected within the framework of cyclical recovery of the Spanish economy and is now around the euro area average. 
Foreclosed assets are also being reduced, albeit at a slower pace, which will foreseeably quicken in 2018 with the execution of major sale transactions 
announced in 2017.
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The outlook for bank balance sheets is favourable, given the impact that the 
economic recovery is having on the reduction of the NPL ratio of the resident private 
sector. Chart 2.2.1 shows how the NPL ratio is highly correlated with the economic cycle 
and exhibits a downward trend whenever GDP picks up and the unemployment rate falls, 
as is expected to occur in the coming years. The correction is particularly apparent in 
loans to construction and real estate development firms (see Chart 2.2.2), a segment in 
which the NPL ratio reached higher levels from the onset of the crisis and where, despite 
having decreased, it was nearly 20% in December 2017. In lending to households, this 
ratio has decreased more moderately and recently non-performing assets and the NPL 
ratio have even risen somewhat in the “consumer credit and lending for purposes other 
than house purchase” sector.9 In any event, more disaggregated analysis shows not only 
that the average level of the ratio has decreased but also that the percentage of banks with 
high levels of the ratio has fallen particularly sharply (see Chart 2.2.3).
With respect to the banks of other euro area countries which also accumulated high 
NPL levels during the crisis, Spanish banks are at a relatively advanced stage in the 
reduction of non-performing assets. Indeed, the ratio of non-performing exposures to 
total loans and debt securities of Spanish banks at consolidated level now stands close to 
the euro area average (see Chart 2.2.4). Furthermore, the inflows and outflows of NPLs 
(see Chart 2.2.5) have a negative net balance (explaining the fall in the ratio), with a 
decrease of 31% in inflows of new NPLs between 2014 and 2017. Meanwhile, foreclosed 
assets (see Chart 2.2.6) peaked in June 2012 (€96 billion) and the decreases since then 
have been more limited, despite the transfer of assets to the Spanish Asset Management 
Company (Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria 
– Sareb). However, in recent years the net balance of inflows and outflows has become 
negative due to the increase in the latter. This trend may become more marked in 2018 if, 
as announced, the major real estate asset sale transactions initiated by some of the 
biggest Spanish banks materialise.
In any event, the adjustment currently under way in the NPL ratio in Spain is 
proceeding at a relatively moderate pace. Charts 2.3.1-2.3.4 compare the behaviour in 
the quarters following each of the last three peaks in the ratio in recent decades in Spain 
(March 1985, March 1994 and December 2013). As can be seen, the rate of decline in the 
most recent period is lower than on the previous two occasions (see Chart 2.3.1). However, 
this is explained mainly by the atypical behaviour of lending (the denominator of the ratio, 
shown in Chart 2.3.2), which not only has failed to expand but rather has fallen off during 
the current recovery phase as a whole. Regarding NPLs, the decrease was particularly 
slow in the second half of the 1980s, while it seems to have been similar in the two 
subsequent episodes (see Chart 2.3.3), in line with the also similar behaviour of real GDP 
in these two cases (see Chart 2.3.4).10 Even so, the decrease in NPLs is somewhat slower 
in the last few quarters and, at the rate of fall of the last three years, NPLs would still 
exceed €50 billion at the end of 2020, a figure which is still significant (4.4% of credit to the 
resident private sector at end-2017). This assessment is in line with that resulting from 
analysis of the historical relationship between the volume of NPLs and their basic 
determinants (see Chart 2.3.5).11
    9  See Banco de España, Financial Stability Report, 05/2018.
10  Adjusted for inflation, the cumulative decrease since 2013 is 13 pp less than the previous correction and 6 pp 
more than in the late 1980s.
11  There is no systematic information on foreclosed assets prior to 2010, which prevents comparative analysis of 
their behaviour in previous recessions as has been done for NPLs.
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SOURCES: ECB, CGFS, FDIC and Banco de España.
a NPLs as a proportion of total credit to the resident private sector.
b Based on a dynamic single-equation model relating the volume of NPLs to GDP, the unemployment rate, the credit-to-GDP ratio, changes in real GDP and in the 
nominal lending interest rate and lags in the dependent variable.
c The consolidated data for Spain, Ireland and the Baltic countries are obtained from the ECB and consist of NPLs as a proportion of total debt instruments. The 
data for the United States are from the FDIC (call reports). The data for the United Kingdom are from the BIS report entitled "Structural changes in banking after 
the crisis".
The slow fall in the NPL ratio is due mainly to the decrease in the denominator (loans). However, NPLs are also falling somewhat more slowly than in the previous 
recovery and more sluggishly than would be predicted by a model of their relationship with their basic determinants. Although a slow correction is usual in this type 
of crisis, at its current rate of fall the NPL ratio would still be relatively high at the end of 2020.
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Analysis of similar episodes in other countries confirms that when the NPL ratio rises 
significantly, it takes a long time to recoup its previous level (see Chart 2.3.6). In the 
United States, for example, following the 2009 crisis, the NPL ratio did not return to its 
previous levels for 5-6 years after reaching its cyclical high. In other cases, in which the 
increase in NPLs was extremely sharp and fast, such as the Baltic countries and Ireland, the 
correction was somewhat faster, but even so required a similar number of years. The resolution 
of the situations of financial fragility of agents which lie behind these high impaired asset 
ratios requires some time, and the optimum strategy for maximising recoverable value is not 
always that of immediate settlement of the transaction. Therefore, historically, the remediation 
of such situations of high NPLs tends to be progressive and to extend over long periods.
However, these situations also have negative implications for the economy as a 
whole which go beyond the direct impact on banks, and this is the reason for the 
diverse measures taken within the framework of the July 2017 Action Plan of the 
European Council. The measures include most notably the package made public by the 
European Commission in March this year proposing to review the capital requirements 
legislation in order to introduce a provisioning schedule for future NPLs, a draft directive 
for creating a secondary NPL market, an out-of-court mechanism for accelerating the 
recovery of collateral value and the publication of guidance to facilitate the creation of 
asset management companies.12 At the same time, in its capacity as prudential supervisor 
of significant institutions in the euro area, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
assumed leadership in this area with major initiatives. These included the issuance in 
March 2017 of guidance on NPL management and, more recently in March 2018, the 
publication of an addendum to the previous guidance to make public its supervisory 
expectations on the provisioning of new NPLs within the framework of the annual 
supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP).13 This supervisory authority also 
continues its close oversight of compliance with strategic plans to reduce the impaired 
assets of the banks under its control which have high NPL ratios.
The crisis highlighted the problems built up during the expansion, such as the over-
indebtedness of the private sector, and had a notable impact on the profitability of 
Spanish banks. The high volume of losses generated in the crisis materialised principally 
in 2012 when the Bankia crisis took place and substantial write-offs were made, largely 
linked to the results of the stress tests conducted within the framework of the programme 
of financial aid to the sector by European institutions. Consequently, the aggregate ROE of 
deposit-taking institutions in Spain at consolidated level fell to -25% (see Chart 2.4.1).
Subsequently, profitability partially recovered and has remained at positive, albeit low, 
levels. Bank profitability presently stands clearly below its pre-crisis levels and also below 
available estimates of the return demanded by investors (or cost of capital; see Box 2.1). 
Consequently, the valuations of bank shares are generally below book value. In comparative 
terms, Spanish bank profitability in 2016 was slightly better than that of the euro area as a 
whole or of UK, German and Swiss banks, but clearly below the returns obtained in other 
advanced economies such as Australia, Canada, the USA or Sweden (see Chart 2.4.2).
The main differences between Spanish banks and those of other countries with 
higher bank profitability are due to expenses and impairment losses. This can be seen 
3  Return to profitability
3.1  DELIMITING THE PROBLEM
12  See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1802_en.htm.
13  See ECB (2017), Guidance to banks on non-performing loans and ECB (2018), Addendum to the ECB Guidance to 
banks on non-performing loans: supervisory expectations for prudential provisioning of non-performing exposures.
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in Chart 2.5, which shows the behaviour of various income statement items of Spanish 
credit institutions and the average behaviour in five advanced economies in which the 
average ROE was above 9% in 2015-2016. The chart also shows the average behaviour 
for euro area countries. The banks with current high profitability underwent their crisis 
before Spanish banks did (in 2008, compared with 2012) and it was generally less marked. 
The return on assets (ROA) of these banks subsequently recovered to levels similar to 
those before the crisis, while this did not occur in the case of ROE, this differing behaviour 
being due to their lower leverage in recent periods partly associated with the greater 
capital requirements under the new regulations. Even so, ROE stood above 10% in this 
group of countries in 2016, compared with 5% in Spain. Measured as a percentage of 
assets, from 2007 to 2016 net interest income and total operating income performed 
similarly in Spain and on average in the five countries with higher profitability; by contrast, 
operating expenses and impairment losses behaved worse in Spain.14 The former 
behaviour is related to the process of capacity adjustment and the latter to the 
consequences of the crisis. Both are considered in greater detail below.
The impact of the crisis was sharper at banks focused on business in Spain (see 
Chart 2.6). The activity of Spanish banks abroad continued to expand in those years, 
while that in Spain contracted. This activity abroad, however, is concentrated in a very 
small number of banks. Specifically, in December 2017, just four groups accounted for 
99% of total international exposure and the bulk continued in the hands of the two largest 
banks. For these banks, their international business constituted a valuable source of risk 
diversification during the crisis, although that is not to say that this business segment was 
bereft of challenges.15
SOURCES: BIS and Banco de España.
a The 2017 data do not reflect the losses of Banco Popular Español in the first half of the year. If these were included, the aggregate ROE for 2017 would be 2.2%.
b Data taken from the report of the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System, entitled "Structural changes in banking after the crisis".
Following the losses of 2012, profitability has again become positive, but has not returned to pre-crisis levels and stands below the levels of countries 
such as Australia, Canada, the USA or Sweden, although above the euro area average.
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14  In the comparison, it must be kept in mind that some differences, particularly in the levels of certain time series, 
may be due to regulatory differences. Also, the country averages naturally mask any more volatile behaviour of 
specific countries.
15  See I. Argimón (2017), Decentralized multinational banks and risk taking: the Spanish experience in the crisis, 
Working Paper 1749, Banco de España.
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Comparison of Spain with five developed countries whose banking systems had profitabilities above 9% in 2015-2016 shows that since 2007, expressed 
as a percentage of assets, the income of Spanish banks does not seem to perform worse than the average of those five countries. By contrast, operating 
expenses and impairment losses perform clearly worse in Spain.
SOURCES: BIS and Banco de España.
a Data taken from the report of the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System, entitled “Structural changes in banking after the crisis”.
b  Weighted average of available countries.
c  Average of countries with ROE above 9% in 2015-2016 (Australia, Belgium, Canada, the USA and Sweden).
CHART 2.5POORER RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF OPERATING EXPENSES AND IMPAIRMENT LOSSES IN SPAIN 
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The type of international business of Spanish banks enabled them to withstand the 
effects of the crisis better than other European banking systems. The crisis particularly 
affected international business conducted and funded from the countries of origin, which 
had grown strongly in the previous years, especially in Europe. The financial crisis and the 
tighter regulation led many banks to reassess their international activity, reducing it and 
concentrating it in their main markets.16 The international business of Spanish banks, by 
contrast, was based mainly on activities carried out through subsidiaries, largely in 
emerging markets, and funded mainly in local currency. Due to its nature, this type of 
business is less exposed to tensions on the global funding markets such as those seen 
during the crisis.17 Following the acquisitions made during the crisis, the external activity 
of Spanish banks is now spread mainly between the United Kingdom, Latin America and 
the United States.
Given that international business is concentrated in very few banks and has performed 
better recently, the rest of this section focuses on banking activity in Spain. This 
means that the conclusions drawn from the analysis are not affected by the significant 
activity abroad of the two main Spanish banking groups which, at consolidated level, 
continued to gain weight in 2017, their share of the total activity of the sector rising to 36%.
Several factors contribute to explaining the low profitability of the banking sector in 
Spain. Some are cyclical and others are of a more structural nature. A number of them are 
shared with other banking systems while others are more specific to Spain. The factors 
potentially more significant in Spain include notably the impact of bad loans, the contraction 
3.2  THE MAIN DETERMINANTS 
OF LOW PROFITABILITY 
SOURCES: Asociación Española de Banca and Banco de España.
a The 2017 data do not reflect the losses of Banco Popular Español in the first half of that year. If these were included, the ROA for 2017 would be 0.09%.
The activity of Spanish banks abroad continued to expand during the crisis, while it contracted in Spain. For those few banks engaging in such business 
abroad, it represented a valuable source of income during the crisis.
CHART 2.6THE LOW PROFITABILITY OF SPANISH CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IS CONCENTRATED IN BUSINESS IN SPAIN
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16  See R. N. McCauley, A. Bénétrix, P. McGuire and P. von Goetz (2017), Financial deglobalization in banking?, 
Working Paper 650, Bank for International Payments.
17  Recent evidence points to a certain shift to this type of model in general. See, for example, IMF (2015), 
“International banking after the crisis: increasingly local and safer?”, Global Financial Stability Report, April, and 
L. Gambacorta, S. Schiaffi and A. Van Rixtel (2017), Changing business models in international bank funding, 
Working Paper 1736, Bank for International Settlements.
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of local activity and the low interest rates. Each of these is analysed in greater detail below. 
The tighter banking regulation (described in Section 4 below) also affects the profitability 
of certain activities and obliges banks to readjust their business structure. Some activities 
have to be transformed and the means used for provisioning them must be appropriately 
readjusted, a process which is not always free from friction.18 In any event, as we have 
seen, there are banking systems whose profitability, although below pre-crisis levels, is 
relatively high despite the current environment of stricter regulation, which indicates that 
such transformation is possible and that this factor cannot be considered to be a basic 
determinant of the current low profitability in Spain.
Furthermore, profitability depends on the specific characteristics of the business of 
each bank. This explains why banks which perform very differently coexist in the same 
country. Box 2.2 analyses the determinants of profitability from a microeconomic 
standpoint, and finds that variables such as size, solvency, efficiency or asset quality also 
contribute to explaining differences between banks.
The deterioration of the credit quality of assets affects the income statement of 
credit institutions in two ways. First, an increase in NPLs reduces the interest income 
received. Second, a higher probability of default reduces the value of the related assets. 
The latter is undoubtedly the main effect and largely explains banks’ conjunctural profit 
performance. Calculated using data on business in Spain expressed as a percentage of 
assets, the correlation between impairment losses and net profit is -0.97, indicating the 
extent to which credit institutions’ profitability is dependent on these results.19
Impairment losses peaked in 2012 and have subsequently moderated, although 
without returning to their pre-crisis values. Chart 2.7.1 shows how these losses 
consumed half of operating income before provisions and impairment charges in 2016, 
and the bulk of it in 2017, which contrasts with the levels of around 25% in the years prior 
to the crisis. Expressed in terms of assets, these losses were twice as high in 2015-2017 
as in 2003-2005. Had they remained at their 2003-2005 level, the ROE of the local 
business of Spanish banks in the last few years would have been 5.2% instead of the 
1.7% observed. Finally, Chart 2.7.2 shows how, in terms of GDP, the fall in the net profit 
of business in Spain between the aforementioned two 3-year periods is basically due to 
impairment losses.20 By contrast, operating income expressed as a percentage of GDP 
scarcely changed, and the other items contributing to the fall in profit are other net gains/
losses and intangible asset amortisation, while the lower taxes partially offset those 
negative results. 
The behaviour over time of impairment losses is directly related to the level of NPLs 
and foreclosed assets, but also to the volume of provisions. A high but decreasing 
level of NPLs, such as currently exists in Spain, does not necessarily imply additional 
future losses if those loans are sufficiently provisioned. In this respect, the clean-up in 
2017 of the balance sheet of Banco Popular Español and other similar measures taken that 
3.2.1  Impact of bad loans 
18  The document entitled Structural changes in banking after the crisis, by the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS) shows how banks now operate with higher levels of capital (and thus lower leverage ratios), a 
lower volume of activity on certain higher-risk markets with complex products and less recourse to wholesale 
funding, particularly at short-term.
19  Even excluding the years 2011 and 2012, the correlation continues to be high at -0.78. At consolidated level the 
correlation is -0.92 in the period 2001-2017.
20  Normalisation by GDP controls for the impact of the crisis on the level of assets and equity, which are the two 
variables typically used to measure bank profitability.
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year have raised the credit quality of the sector’s assets. In September 2017, the coverage 
ratio of NPLs to the resident private sector in Spain was 41%, slightly below the European 
average. That ratio rises considerably, to 87%, if the value of the collateral on those loans 
is also taken into account.
The crisis highlighted the unsustainability of the previous strong credit growth in 
Spain and prompted a sharp correction. Between 2000 and 2008, the total assets and 
bank credit to customers in Spain, expressed as a percentage of GDP, increased by 107 
pp and 81 pp, respectively, to 266% and 158%. Since then, those increases have been 
largely corrected in both cases (see Chart 2.8.1).
During the expansion phase, bank income grew more strongly than expenses. The 
high demand for bank credit spurred net interest income, which practically doubled 
between 2000 and 2008, and at the same time other operating income (fees and 
commissions, gains on financial transactions, etc.) also rose at the same or an even 
faster pace. As a result of this, total operating income exceeded 6% of GDP, more than 
1 pp above the levels at the beginning of the century (see Chart 2.8.2). Against this 
background, banks also expanded their capacity, increasing the number of branches 
and employees by 17% and 14%, respectively. Total operating expenses increased by 
more than 50%, but this was less than that of income, so the operating efficiency of 
banks improved notably.
The correction of the level of credit following the outbreak of the crisis unleashed a 
process of sharp reduction in income. Net interest income was particularly affected by 
the fall in credit and total assets and by the lower interest rates. Other sources of income 
also evolved negatively. Net fees and commissions, for example, decreased by 20% 
between 2007 and 2013, influenced by the decrease in those for receipt and payment 
3.2.2  Contraction of the 
volume of activity  
and operating costs 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Individual statement of income. Business in Spain.
b Gross income less operating expenses, excluding items with extraordinary gains/losses during the crisis, such as contributions to the Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme, severance payments and amortisation of intangible assets. 
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The crisis evidenced the unsustainability of the previous strong credit growth and prompted a still-ongoing correction which fed through also to the 
income of the banking sector in Spain. Despite the simultaneous sharp adjustment of employment and branch numbers, operating expenses decreased 
to a much smaller extent, partly because of the rise in some items mainly linked to new technological developments.
SOURCES: BIS, INE and Banco de España.
a Individual balance sheets and income statements. Business in Spain.
b Operating income and expenses, excluding items with extraordinary gains/losses during the crisis, such as contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme, 
severance payments and amortisation of intangible assets.
c Operating expenses as a proportion of gross income, excluding items with extraordinary gains/losses during the crisis.
d Consolidated data from the report by the BIS's CGFS entitled "Structural changes in banking after the crisis".
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services.21 In response to the fall in income, Spanish banks undertook a major adjustment 
of their productive capacity, helped by a simultaneous process of concentration. In all, 
they downsized their branch network by 40% and cut staff by 32% with respect to the 
peaks reached in 2008 (see Chart 2.8.3). However, their operating expenses in business in 
Spain decreased by only 15%,22 compared with a fall of 30% in income.
The downward stickiness of operating expenses is due partly to some fixed costs 
and partly to the growth of some items. The existence of fixed costs is reflected in the 
procyclical behaviour of the efficiency (cost/income) ratio, clearly visible in Chart 2.8.4. In 
any event, at consolidated level, Spanish banks continued to compare favourably with the 
majority of their peers in other developed countries (see Chart 2.8.5). Furthermore, 
disaggregated analysis of the components of operating expenses shows how, while staff 
expenses and tangible fixed asset depreciation decreased by 22% and 40%, respectively, 
other administrative expenses (quantitatively less than staff expenses) even increased 
slightly between 2008 and 2017, and only in the last two years have they initiated a 
downward course. This reflects the uneven behaviour of the various component items (see 
Chart 2.8.6). In particular, there were increases in IT and technical report expenses, taxes 
and legal expenses,23 and especially in outsourced services, which nearly doubled.
In the short- and medium-term, the high bank credit balances seen in the previous 
expansion are not expected to return, so banks will have to persevere in their search for 
alternative sources of income and in the control of their costs. Box 2.3 analyses the 
determinants of household and non-financial corporation debt. The conclusions are that some 
of the factors behind the increase in debt in the opening years of this century (demographic 
behaviour, strong growth in house prices and the real estate investment boom) will probably 
act much more weakly or even in the opposite direction in the coming years. Against this 
background, the levels of income seen during the period before the last crisis are not expected 
to return in the short and medium term, so banks will have to adapt their expenses and 
business structure to this new environment. In some cases, this may require further advances 
in banking consolidation, at domestic and/or euro area level, to accelerate the adjustment of 
banks’ cost structures, without any reduction in the level of competition in the sector.
The effects of low or even negative interest rates on bank profitability operate in 
opposing directions. It should be kept in mind that the low interest rates are largely a 
consequence of the monetary policy formulated in response to an environment of low 
growth and inflation. Against this background, these measures should have a favourable 
impact on economic activity and consequently on the demand for credit and other bank 
services, as well as on the value of assets and the volume of loan losses of banks. The 
latter have decreased not only because of the smaller debt burden due to the lower interest 
rates, (particularly in countries where variable-rate loans predominate, such as Spain), but 
also because of the expansionary effects on GDP and employment, agents’ income and 
the value of collateral assets. Unquestionably, a less accommodative monetary policy 
would have hindered achievement of the current economic recovery, which is what is 
allowing credit institutions to return to lower NPL levels and positive profitability. By 
3.2.3  Low interest rates 
21  The strongly cyclical behaviour of these fees and commissions is due to those relating to credit and debit cards, 
which currently account for 40% of them and which rose by 63% between 2000 and 2007 and subsequently 
fell by 47% between 2007 and 2015.
22  The operating expenses shown do not include severance payments or intangible asset amortisation, two items 
which grew exceptionally strongly during the crisis, so their behaviour is not considered to be representative of 
banks’ normal operating costs.
23  This does not include expenses deriving from implementation of court decisions on floor clauses and the like, 
which are included in net interest income.
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contrast, against a background of banks’ strong reluctance to introduce negative 
remuneration of deposits, falls in interest rates tend to reduce net interest income per unit 
of assets. Although this effect may temporarily be offset partially by the capital gains 
derived from the increase in value of some assets in a setting of low interest rates, below 
a certain threshold (reversal rate) the net impact would be negative.24 In countries where 
fixed-rate loans prevail, the Eurosystem’s unconventional monetary policies have additional 
negative effects at medium and long term through the flattening of the yield curve. However, 
this is less significant in Spain due to the predominance of variable-rate loans.
The results of the available estimates of the net effect of interest rates on bank 
profitability are not conclusive. Some studies report a negative impact.25 By contrast, 
others find that this result disappears when the effect of variables which capture expectations 
as to economic growth, inflation and the risk of borrower default is taken into account.26 The 
ECB’s estimates similarly suggest that the various opposing effects tend to cancel out not 
only in the euro area as a whole, but also in Spain and in the other large euro area economies.27 
A recent study on this subject using data obtained from euro area banks reveals that the 
banks which recognise a larger negative impact on their net interest income from the negative 
rates applied by the ECB to its marginal deposit facility are those which, in general, have a 
lower level of capitalisation and thus a lower capacity to assume new risks to offset the 
contractionary effect of negative interest rates on their per-unit net interest income.28
International comparison of the current profitability of the various banking systems 
suggests that quantity-related effects may outweigh price-related effects. Chart 2.9.1 
shows that only the banking systems of countries in which total financing to the private 
sector (bank loans and debt securities) grew by at least 3% posted ROEs above 9% in 
2015-2016, despite interest rates that were negative (as in Belgium, Sweden or Finland) 
or very low (as in Hong Kong, the USA, Canada or Norway). In this respect, Chart 2.9.2 
of the same chart shows how, in Spain, two-thirds of the fall in deposit-taking institutions’ 
net interest income between 2008 and 2017 was due not to the decrease in unit margins 
but to the contraction of assets and the post-crisis shift in the asset mix towards a lower 
weight of credit.29
In any event, the responses of Spanish and European banks to the specific question 
in this respect contained in the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey confirm that low 
interest rates negatively affect their net interest income through the narrowing of 
unit margins.30 The quantitative information is consistent with this result, although the 
24  See M. K. Brunnermeier and Y. Koby (2018), The reversal interest rate, mimeo. This model, however, does not 
take into account the aforementioned effects on NPLs and credit volume.
25  See, for example, C. Borio, L. Gambacorta and B. Hofmann (2017), “The influence of monetary policy on bank 
profitability”, International Finance, 20, spring, pp. 48-63, and S. Claessens, N. Coleman and M. Donnelly 
(2017), “Low-for-long” interest rates and banks’ interest margins and profitability: cross-country evidence, 
International Finance Discussion Papers 1197, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
26  C. Altavilla, M. Boucinha and J. L. Peydró (2017), Monetary policy and bank profitability in a low interest rate 
environment, Working Paper No 2105, European Central Bank. Also described in this study are net results 
which are zero in a BVAR model and positive in the response of bank stock market values to monetary policy 
expansionary surprises in the euro area.
27  See European Central Bank, Annual Report, 2017.
28  See O. Arce, M. García-Posada, S. Mayordomo, and S. Ongena (2018), Adapting lending policies when negative 
interest rates hit banks’ profits, forthcoming.
29  See also J. Martínez (2017), Spanish deposit-taking institutions’ net interest income and low interest rates, 
Economic Bulletin 3/2017, Banco de España.
30  See, for example, I. Roibás (2017), The October 2017 Bank Lending Survey in Spain, Economic Bulletin, Banco de 
España. By contrast, banks report that other monetary policy measures such as targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTROs) and the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme have had a positive impact on their profitability.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 97 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 2 THE CHALLENGES FACING THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR
SOURCE: BIS, ECB and Banco de España.
a International comparison of averages in 2015-2016 for 19 developed countries (Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, United States, Spain, 
Finland, France, Netherlands, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland), obtained from the report by the Committee on the Global 
Financial System of the Bank for International Settlements entitled “Structural changes in banking after the crisis”. Red denotes ROE below 4%, yellow, between 
4% and 9% and green, above 9%.
b Total (bank and non-bank) credit to the private non-financial sector
c Countries where floating-rate credit predominates (Austria, Finland and Luxembourg).
d Countries where fixed-rate credit predominates (Germany, France, Netherlands and Belgium).
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in Spain, the fall in credit institutions' net interest income since 2008 is due more to the lower volume of activity than to the contraction of unit margins, 
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price effect seems to have been moderate as a result of the partial pass-through of market 
interest rate falls to bank credit (see Charts 2.9.3-2.9.6). Thus, although the zero rate 
effectively acted as a floor for the average remuneration of deposits, this negative effect 
on the margin tended to be offset by an also generally lower pass-through of market 
movements to the lending interest rate. In the case of Spain in particular, the latter 
decreased by 1.7 pp in new lending and by 2 pp in outstanding balances from the pre-
crisis period (average of 2003-2007) to 2017, compared with a decrease of 3.1 pp in the 
reference interest rates.31 This has resulted in fairly steady net interest income margins in 
Spain in recent years at both local and consolidated level (see Chart 2.9.6). Insofar as the 
reluctance of banks to cut their margins explains a portion of the contraction in lending in 
Spain, in this way, the low interest rates may have also contributed indirectly to the decline 
in net interest income. However, the fact that firms with alternative sources of financing 
have made only limited use of them does not seem to indicate the existence of a significant 
demand ousted by relatively high bank lending interest rates.
In short, the overall net effect of the low interest rates on bank profits seems to have 
been comparatively smaller than that of the other factors analysed, although the low 
interest rates have exerted negative pressure on net interest income. That said, if 
interest rates remain very low for a long period, against a background in which this monetary 
stimulus does not induce a sufficient recovery in the economy and of the demand for credit, 
the negative effects on bank income may ultimately predominate over the positive impact.
The global financial crisis initiated in 2008 prompted a broad regulatory response which 
included the strengthening of solvency standards and the introduction of liquidity and 
resolution requirements. The set of rules known as Basel III represents an international 
consensus on the reform of banking regulation following the crisis. The first phase of the 
Basel III reforms, designed between 2010 and 2011, focused on raising the amount and 
improving the quality of bank capital, the inclusion of macroprudential instruments and 
developing liquidity standards and counterparty exposure limits.32 Basel III also introduced 
new short-term (30 days) and medium-term (1 year) liquidity requirements based on the 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). These measures set 
a required minimum volume of liquid assets (such as, for example, sovereign debt 
securities) with respect to the funding requirements calculated under stressed scenarios 
for the relevant period. In the resolution arena, the relevant European directive (BRRD, 
Directive 2014/59/EU) and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR, Regulation 
EU 806/2014) establish a common framework in the EU which aims to accurately delimit 
the circumstances in which financially distressed banks are subject to winding-up or 
resolution processes, defining the responsible authority (the Single Resolution Board) and 
the characteristics of those processes. In addition, the principal of separation between the 
supervisory and resolution authorities is established and the financial liability of bank 
stakeholders is expressly defined, removing the previous uncertainty created by a system 
of implicit government guarantees.33
4  The new regulatory 
framework 
31  Although Spanish banks saw a significant (2.7 pp) fall in the average return on their mortgage loans to 
households as a result of the predominance of interest rates tied to 12-month EURIBOR, the declines were 
clearly smaller in loans to non-financial corporations and in consumer credit and other lending to households 
(1.9 pp and 0.4 pp, respectively).
32  This first round of reforms was incorporated in Spanish legislation through Law 10/2014, Royal Decree-Law 
84/2015 and Banco de España circular 2/2016.
33  This European legislation was transposed into Spanish law in 2015 by means of Law 11/2015 and Royal Decree 
1012/2015, although the Spanish regulatory response to the crisis already contained significant changes in this area 
prior to approval of the BRRD and the SRMR, including the creation of the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada 
Bancaria (Spanish Resolution Authority) and the reform of the deposit guarantee fund, among other measures.
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Practically all the requirements of the first phase of Basel III will become effective at 
the end of 2019. In 2018 the capital buffers additional to the basic Pillar 1 requirement 
stand at 75% of their final value, while the deductions from own funds subject to a phase-in 
schedule will be applied in full. The LCR requirement was 80% in 2017 and is 90% in 2018, 
and the NSFR requirement has entered into force this year with a minimum level of 100%.34
In Spain, these measures are bringing about a significant increase in the solvency 
indicators of Spanish credit institutions. Chart 2.10 shows that in the expansionary 
period prior to the crisis (2000-2007) capital and risk-weighted assets (RWAs) increased 
34  A study by the European Banking Authority (EBA), for a sample of 144 EU banks, shows that, at December 
2016, the average NSFR was 112%. 88% of the banks considered met the minimum of 100% and, for those 
that did not do so, the  shortfall  was €116 million, equal to 4.6% of their assets (see CRD IV – CRR/Basel III 
monitoring exercise results based on data as of 31 December 2016), 12 September 2017.
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sustainedly and that the total capital and Tier 1 capital ratios held steady. After 2007, in line 
with the higher regulatory requirements, capital increased more rapidly than RWAs, which 
were steady or decreasing, giving rise to an increase in regulatory solvency ratios.35 The 
available evidence indicates that the benefits of raising capital ratios with respect to the 
pre-crisis requirements, in terms of lower risk and volatility of the financial sector, clearly 
exceed the costs derived from lower availability of credit.36 Regarding other European 
countries (see Chart 2.10.3), the Tier 1 capital ratio37 of Spanish significant institutions at 
September 2017 stood at 11.3%, clearly above the regulatory minimum but below the 
average of 14.3% of significant institutions monitored by the European Banking Authority.38 
There is of course heterogeneity in the level of solvency of the sample of Spanish banks, 
but individually they all have capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. It should also be 
noted that in terms of the simple leverage ratio, which is not affected by possible limitations 
on RWA measurement, the average shown by Spanish banks in September 2017 (5.6%) 
was above the European average of 5.2%. In terms of liquidity, Spanish banks had an LCR 
ratio of approximately 150%, also clearly above the regulatory requirement and in line with 
the European average (see Chart 2.10.4). The fact that the average capital of Spanish 
banks is lower than the average of their European peers may imply less favourable funding 
conditions, which provide an incentive to continue strengthening their capital ratios.
In December 2017 the finalisation of a second phase of post-crisis reforms within the 
framework of Basel III was agreed.39 This second phase focuses on developing the 
regulatory framework for the calculation of RWAs, since the excessive variability between 
banks for similar risks led some market agents to question the reliability of their calculation 
in some cases. The reforms envisaged include: improvement of credit and operational risk 
calculation methods under the standardised approach, constraints on the use of internal 
models and the introduction of a leverage ratio based on unweighted total assets to 
supplement the risk-weighted capital ratio, the current levels of which have been described 
in the preceding paragraph. These reforms will be implemented stepwise in two phases 
which will commence in 2019 and 2022 and will end in 2027.
In the resolution arena, the approval of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) likewise did not mark the end of the process of reform, since various areas 
of discussion remain open on how to implement major aspects of this framework. 
The European Commission published a package of proposed legislative changes to the 
BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR). Some of these reforms 
have already been approved through Directive 2017/2399 amending the BRRD and 
creating a new category of non-preferred senior (ordinary) debt instruments. This new 
category ranks behind ordinary debt in the order of seniority of claims in insolvency 
proceedings, so it facilitates compliance with the minimum requirement for own funds and 
eligible liabilities (MREL) for loss absorbency purposes. However, many other proposals 
remain under discussion, particularly the inclusion in European legislation of international 
resolution agreements on total loss-absorbing capability (TLAC). The requirements of the 
TLAC agreements for global systemically important institutions are interrelated with the 
requirements set out in European MREL rules, creating a regulatory challenge in the 
35  In 2012, Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 8/2012 tightened the provisioning rules for real estate exposures; they 
had a significant negative impact on the profits and capital of the Spanish banking system.
36  See P. Aguilar, S. Fahr, E. Gerba, and S. Hurtado (2018), Quest for robust optimal macroprudential policy, 
forthcoming.
37  Fully loaded CET1 ratio, i.e. applying the Basel III rules in force from 2019.
38  EBA data, which consider a representative European level sample, although the level of coverage differs across 
countries.
39  The text of the post-crisis reforms approved can be found at Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 101 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 2 THE CHALLENGES FACING THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR
immediate future. The negotiations on these texts are expected to be completed by the 
end of 2018, thereby reducing from that date the uncertainty currently faced by banks over 
future legislative developments and the consequent funding needs.40
European and, in particular, Spanish banks also face, from 2018, new accounting 
requirements derived from the international agreement on International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS-9). Banco de España Circular 4/2017, which came into 
force in January 2018, adapted IFRS-9 to Spanish legislation and introduced as the main 
new feature a change of criterion (from incurred loss to expected loss) in the calculation 
of provisions, which entails earlier recognition of financial impairment losses. The circular 
deals with other accounting requirements, such as the classification of financial assets 
under IFRS-9 and the requirements for the use of internal models in the calculation of 
provisions. Last year the EBA completed its second impact assessment of IFRS-9 
through a survey of 54 large European banks in which these estimated the effect of the 
new rules on capital and provisions.41 The survey results reported by the EBA were an 
estimated increase of 13% in credit loss provisions as a result of application of the new 
methodology and a decrease of 45 bp in the CET1 ratio. Despite being a useful reference, 
this survey does not dispel the uncertainty associated with the new Standard, since the 
sample of banks, albeit representative, is not complete, and it is based on estimates by 
the survey respondents.
All in all, the regulatory changes introduced and those yet to be defined constitute a 
significant alteration of the framework in which credit institutions operate, to which 
they still have to complete their adaptation. From an aggregate standpoint, the possible 
negative impact on bank profitability of some of the new rules recently approved or in the 
process of adoption (due to the disappearance or reduction of previous implicit government 
guarantees or to the obligation to make increased use of more expensive funding 
instruments, such as capital and hybrids) should be offset by the greater stability of 
banking systems. For individual banks, the new environment requires an adaptation in 
which the possible loss of profitability is offset by gains in efficiency and/or business 
structure redefinition. Although a good part of the regulatory changes have already taken 
place, the interaction between the implementation schedules of the reforms still pending 
and the market funding conditions will determine the remaining costs of transition.
In addition to the challenges described earlier, credit institutions face other 
challenges deriving from the current business environment. These include most 
notably new technological developments and the possible acceleration of the financial 
disintermediation process.
New technological resources bring important challenges and opportunities for 
banking institutions. Over the course of time the financial sector has been subject to 
multiple technological changes that have modified the way it operates. However, what 
distinguishes these transformations – which relate to the internet, to the increase in 
computational capacity for big data processing and to the greater automation of processes – 
is how rapidly they are implemented and disseminated. Such a combination has led to a 
reduction in barriers to entry in certain traditional banking activities, creating the possibility 
5  The new competition 
framework
5.1  TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
40  Preliminary estimates of the EBA for a significant sample of EU banks showed an increase in the ratio of MREL 
eligible liabilities to RWAs from 35.9% in 2015 to 37.8% 2016 (see EBA updates its quantitative analysis on 
MREL).
41  EBA report on results from the second EBA impact assessment of IFRS 9, 13 July 2017.
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for new competitors to arise which, at any given time, are able to access bank customers 
in a highly dynamic manner for a relatively modest additional investment outlay.
This means that banks need to increase their investment in innovation, which entails 
a rise in costs in the short term, in order to anticipate possible changes in their 
business environment. The arrival of new technologies in financial services may lead to 
an essential change in the way that banks operate and deal with customers, which should 
be designed and implemented rapidly to avoid losing market share. This challenge is even 
more complex considering the present environment of low profitability and uncertainty 
about the viability of the different projects.
The growing demand for immediate access from different places and channels to a 
broad range of financial services calls for changes to the structure and business 
model of traditional banking, which in turn require improvements in efficiency. These 
improvements affect the branch network and the development of applications for mobile 
devices and for the internet, which allow general administrative expenses to be reduced. 
In this connection, some of the developments made in the latest wave of digital 
technological innovation, commonly known in the financial sphere as fintech, can easily be 
converted into operational tools for banking.42
Additionally, the technological revolution opens the door to new competitors in 
various business areas, often operating in very specific market segments, by allowing 
the disaggregation of the value chain. One of the areas with the highest degree of 
penetration by new competitors is payments, particularly retail payments, involving large 
technological firms and a high data processing capacity. In this connection, several joint 
ventures or other kinds of alliances with traditional banks have been undertaken to harness 
synergies but, in any event, increased competition in this segment of traditional banking 
business is causing a decline in income from transactional services. The entry into force in 
2018 of the new European directive on EU-wide payment services (known as PSD-2), 
coinciding with the implementation of the new directive on data protection (the General 
Data Protection Regulation), is an important challenge in this connection, as it introduces 
new providers that are able to access bank customers without actually being banks or 
being subject to bank regulations.
The future outlook for other areas characterised by a greater financial rather than 
technological component is more uncertain, and its permanent effects on, for 
instance, the traditional provision of credit through banks are still unknown. The 
application of artificial intelligence and the systematic use of large databases with real-
time information and a high degree of disaggregation (commonly known as big data) in 
these areas or in that of regulatory compliance will necessarily entail efficiency gains, 
which can be developed at the banks themselves. However, the room for the emergence 
and growth of new competitors may also be high.
The development of this new financial ecosystem has positive and negative 
implications, in the form of higher risk, not only for the banking system. Notable 
among the advantages is that some innovations can generate greater financial inclusion 
by reducing intermediation costs, providing additional SME access to funding (particularly 
in the case of new businesses), and delivering efficiency gains in the financial sector as a 
42  These include, for example, the application of high-speed analyses of big data to better define customer risk 
profiles, cloud storage, mobile payment services and the new remote identity proofing methods.
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whole. As regards costs, more competition in the banking sector could erode profitability 
from banks’ traditional sources of income, incentivising greater risk-taking. Also, adapting 
to these technologies might involve greater reputational and operational risks, with aspects 
such as cybersecurity gaining in importance and becoming one of the principal challenges 
for institutions. The higher risk of non-compliance in the areas of data protection or 
prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, regulatory arbitrage, the increased 
interdependence between multiple actors within the financial sector and the potential 
disintermediation of some of them are other potential cost-generating areas.
At end-2017 this sector in Spain employed more than 5,000 persons in more than 
300 firms (238 fintech and 63 insurtech companies).43 In the case of alternative finance 
platforms, according to private consultant surveys, the highest volume of funds is channelled 
in Spain through loans between individuals for business projects, while on average in the 
EU it is the loans between individuals to finance consumption which have the highest 
volume of activity (see Chart 2.11). The weight of cross-border transactions can represent 
almost 50% of the total volume of activity in some models. In order to promote initiatives in 
this field, the CNMV created in mid-2017 a fintech portal to address consultations,44 which 
channelled 130 requests for assistance up to December. The creation in early 2018 of the 
Associate Directorate General Financial Innovation and Market Infrastructures reflects the 
importance assigned by the Banco de España to these developments.
The relatively scant penetration of digital banking in Spain may be one of the 
determining factors behind the efficiency gains which can be associated with 
these technological changes. A recent report considers that the relatively high mobile 
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There is a predominance of P2P consumer lending, which also features the highest proportion of cross-border activity, although the highest average value 
per transaction is found in real estate crowdfunding. Although immaterial in terms of amount, alternative finance in Spain enjoys sustained growth, 
especially in lending to enterprises, where more than one-third of inquiries received by the CNMV are concentrated.
SOURCE: Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (2018) and CNMV.
a The categories in the chart relate to: (1) real estate crowdfunding, (2) equity-based crowdfunding, (3) P2P property lending, (4) P2P business lending, (5) invoice 
trading, (6) reward-based crowdfunding, (7) P2P consumer lending and (8) donation-based crowdfunding. 
43  Data from the Spanish Fintech and Insurtech Association. These terms refer to high-tech companies operating 
in the financial and insurance businesses, respectively.
44  http://www.cnmv.es/portal/Fintech/Innovacion.aspx?lang=en.
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phone penetration in Spain and, especially, the small number of customers per branch, 
below that for all the countries analysed, means that there is much potential for improving 
efficiency through these channels in Spanish banking.45 The importance of physical vs 
digital distribution channels is, in the ECB’s opinion,46 one of the differentiating factors 
between countries in terms of efficiency gains deriving from the technological revolution. 
According to Eurostat data (see Chart 2.12.2), Spain ranks fourth in Europe by number 
of financial transactions in cash, with a penetration of digital banking in 2017 of 46%,47 
below the percentage for the EU-28 (51%) and very far from that for the more digitalised 
countries, such as Iceland (93%), Norway (92%) and Denmark (90%). On 2017 data, the 
percentage of individuals who requested a bank loan, purchased shares or bonds, or 
took out or rolled over insurance policies via the internet in Spain was very low (see 
Chart 2.12.1). However, only 14% of the population had never used the internet in 2017, 
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In ten years the percentage of people using the internet to communicate with banks has doubled to 50%, although in Spain this percentage is lower than 
15% in the case of persons who have made one financial transaction and stands at 2% in the case of persons taking out a loan.
SOURCE: Eurostat.
45  See Morgan Stanley Research, Global banks and diversified financials. Banking at the speed of light, 7 January 2018.
46  See European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, May 2017. 
47  Approximated by the percentage of individuals between age 16 and 74 who in the last three months before the 
survey used the internet to interact with a bank, including making payments or consulting bank account 
movements or balances.
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compared with 43% ten years earlier. Although a lower predisposition to the use of 
digital channels has been observed to date in Spain as compared with other European 
countries, their implementation has grown rapidly and, accordingly, the use of online 
banking is expected to increase.
The funding structure of Spanish firms, including most large corporations, has 
been traditionally marked by the predominance of bank credit. Thus, Chart 2.13.1 
shows that in 2007 loans accounted for 95% of Spanish non-financial corporations’ 
total debt (including fixed-income securities). From the institutions’ viewpoint, such 
loans represented 51% of credit to the private sector in Spain and 32% of non-
consolidated total assets.
A banking disintermediation process was initiated during the crisis, which certain 
recent developments might contribute to accentuate, thus reducing the weight of 
banks in the funding of economic agents. In this connection, the possible entry of new 
competitors with innovative technologies would be particularly significant, as explained in 
Section 5.1 above. Stricter bank regulations and the development of new infrastructures, 
such as the alternative fixed-income market (MARF, by its Spanish abbreviation), the 
definition of simple and transparent securitisations and other measures which may arise 
from the European project to create a capital markets union, will foreseeably exert influence 
in the same direction. It is perceived that a more diversified funding structure at aggregate 
level is more stable in the face of possible shocks and, therefore, the regulatory trend will 
continue in the direction of eliminating any potential constraints on financing sources 
alternative to the banking sector. Also, a potential increase in long-term savings, in 
response to, among other factors, the ageing of our society, will also probably contribute 
5.2  BANKING 
DISINTERMEDIATION
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a Spanish fixed-income securities include issues by resident and non-resident subsidiaries at market price, which are deducted from the loans obtained by the 
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c Data as at June 2017 for Japan and the United States and as at September 2017 for the rest.
d Includes issues made by resident subsidiaries.
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in this sense, although to date savings of this kind in Spain have also been largely 
intermediated by the banks themselves.48
In more conjunctural terms, recently there has been a relative increase in the cost of 
bank funding as compared with that obtained from the markets. The limited pass-
through of the decrease in market interest rates to bank credit interest rates mentioned 
previously and certain effects of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme have 
contributed to this. Specifically, the evidence available shows that the announcement of 
the corporate sector purchase programme in March 2016 led to an increase in the 
propensity to issue eligible bonds in Spain and a decrease in issuing firms’ demand for 
bank credit.49 The positive aspect is that a high proportion of funds released was converted 
into loans to other firms, generally smaller and non-bond issuing, and, therefore, the net 
impact on banks was clearly lower. Additionally, other unconventional measures of the 
Eurosystem, such as injecting liquidity at long-term and at potentially negative interest 
rates could have favoured a larger volume of bank credit.
The path followed in previous years towards a certain loss of weight of bank 
funding continued in 2017. The past year was the first since 2010 in which the 
outstanding balance of funding of non-financial corporations in Spain increased, albeit 
very slightly (see Chart 2.13.2). However, this increase arose mainly from sources other 
than banking sources, since credit from Spanish institutions contracted once again for 
the ninth year running (by 0.6%), while the outstanding balance of fixed-income 
securities increased (by 7.6%).
The continuation of this trend poses an additional challenge for credit institutions as 
it entails a further decline in their volume of business and income. This is particularly 
relevant in the current setting of a modest increase in the overall demand for financing in 
Spain – which, as has been seen, explains in some measure the current low profitability of 
the Spanish banking sector – and could contribute to eroding the unit margins which to 
date permitted sustaining in part the profitability of institutions.
48  In connection with the structure of households’ asset portfolios in Spain, see I. Fuentes and M. Mulino (2017), 
“Evolución de los flujos y los balances financieros de los hogares y de las empresas no financieras en 2016”, 
Boletín Económico, 2/2017, Banco de España; I. Fuentes (2016), “Evolución reciente de los planes y fondos de 
pensiones en España”, Boletín Económico, December, Banco de España; and V. García-Vaquero and F. Alonso 
(2015), “Desarrollos recientes de la industria de la inversión colectiva en España”, Boletín Económico, 
December, Banco de España.
49  See O. Arce, R. Gimeno and S. Mayordomo (2017), Making room for the needy: the credit-reallocation effects 
of the ECB’s corporate QE, Working Paper No. 1743, Banco de España.
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BOX 2.1 COST OF EQUITY IN THE EUROPEAN AND US BANKING SECTORS
This box analyses the change in recent years in the cost of equity 
(COE) for the banking systems of Spain, Germany, France and 
Italy compared with the COE for the United States. The COE is the 
return required by investors for acquiring shares in a firm, in this 
case in particular in a bank. Long term, return on equity (ROE) 
should be consistent with the cost of equity,1 making the COE an 
important benchmark for measuring bank profitability. The cost of 
equity is not a directly observable variable, so it must be estimated. 
There are various possible methods that may be used, but the 
usual method is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which 
calculates the COE as the sum of a bank-specific risk premium 
and the risk-free rate of return. The risk premium, in turn, is 
obtained by multiplying the correlation between the bank’s share 
value and a market index (in other words, the bank’s beta) by the 
overall market risk premium; the higher the beta, the higher the 
return required of the bank.
The methodology used in this box to calculate the cost of equity 
divides into two stages.2 First, the aggregate risk premium of euro 
area listed financial and non-financial corporations is calculated as 
the difference between the real discount rate implicit in the share 
SOURCES: Datastream, Consensus Economics, Federal Reserve Economic Data and Banco de España.
a Estimates based on profit forecasts and stock prices of EURO STOXX and S&P 500 firms. Risk-free interest rates obtained from returns on French government 
and US Treasury inflation-indexed bonds.
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1  This does not necessarily mean that if ROE is lower than the COE banks 
cannot raise new own funds on the market, but they should do so at a 
lower price, equating expected future profitability to the cost of equity.
2  This methodology is similar to that used by the ECB. See, for example, 
Box 5 of the ECB’s May 2015 Financial Stability Review and Box 1 of the 
ECB’s Economic Bulletin 1/2016. It was also used by the Banco de 
España in Box 2.2 of its May 2016 Financial Stability Report.
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BOX 2.1 COST OF EQUITY IN THE EUROPEAN AND US BANKING SECTORS (cont’d)
price and the real risk-free interest rate.3 The discount rate is obtained 
by equating the present value of the expected future profits of EURO 
STOXX firms to their market price.4 The banking sector premium for 
each country is then obtained by multiplying the market risk premium 
by the beta corresponding to the EURO STOXX Banks index of each 
country.5 The cost of equity is the result of adding this banking sector 
premium for each country to the real risk-free rate of return. It is, 
therefore, a measure expressed in real terms. In the case of the 
United States, an equivalent methodology is used, taking the 
S&P  500 index and the S&P  500 Banks index, respectively, to 
calculate the market premia and the banking sector beta.6
Following the methodology described, Chart  1.1 depicts the 
change in the risk-free interest rate and the cost of equity (both 
in real terms) for the banking systems of Spain, Germany, Italy 
and France. As it shows, at end-2017 the cost of equity was over 
10% in all four countries, while the risk-free rate of return, which 
is common to all four, was negative. Pre-crisis, the cost of equity 
of banks held relatively stable around 6%, while the risk-free 
interest rate fluctuated between 2% and 4%. Accordingly, the 
risk premium required of Spanish and other European banks 
rose significantly during the crisis and continued to rise, albeit 
with fluctuations, up to end-2017. This high risk premium could 
be associated with the greater uncertainty that continues to 
loom over asset values and over the prospects for returns in the 
new post-crisis framework. In the United States, both the risk 
premium and the cost of equity also rose, but to a lesser extent 
(see Chart 1.2). The cost of equity of banks in the United States 
at end-2017 was some 2 pp lower than that of their European 
counterparts (8%), possibly reflecting less uncertainty 
surrounding expected future profits on one and the other side of 
the Atlantic. 
Lastly, Charts 1.3 and 1.4 show how the returns required of credit 
institutions by investors have responded to changes common to 
listed financial and non-financial corporations overall and to 
changes specific to the banking sector. In particular, since early 
2016, the cost of equity of banks has risen compared with that of 
other sectors, both in Europe and in the United States, as it did in 
the most critical stages of the crisis.
3  Owing to its high liquidity, in the euro area the yield on a French 
government bond index was used (inflation-indexed bonds with an 
average duration of nine years).
4  Future profits are estimated, by tranches, drawing on analysts’ 
expectations (I/B/E/S) and on expectations of potential economic 
growth. This proxy is commonly known as the three-stage Gordon 
model.
5  Beta is estimated as the coefficient of the daily market return in a 
regression in which the endogenous variable is the daily return on the 
subindex. To take into account possible changes in the value of beta 
over time, this estimate is made using one-year rolling windows.
6  In this case, the risk-free asset is the ten-year US Treasury inflation-
indexed bond.
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BOX 2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN BANKS’ INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS ON PROFITABILITY
The average profitability of a country’s banking sector for a specific 
period is influenced by the sector’s aggregate structure and by 
macroeconomic and financial conditions. Knowledge of these 
conditions is not sufficient, however, to explain the heterogeneous 
results obtained by different banking groups in the same country. 
With the aim of analysing the dispersion of bank profitability, this 
Chart 1
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SOURCES: SNL Financial, IMF, BIS and Banco de España.
a Sample of 106 international banks from 23 countries from the euro area, the United Kingdom and Nordic countries for the period 2005-2016. Definition of 
the variables: diversification ratio (proportion of non-attributable operating profit to net interest income), deposit ratio (proportion of deposits to total assets), 
efficiency ratio (operating expenses to operating profit), NPL ratio (ratio of non-performing loans to total loans), liquidity ratio (proportion of liquid assets to total 
assets), solvency ratio (capital per books to total assets ratio) and LN assets (natural logarithm of total assets).
b Charts 1.3-1.5 show, for the corresponding i variable, the effect of the difference between the average of that variable at Spanish banks (X
_
_(i,ESP))  and in the 
euro area as a whole (X 
_
_(i,Z EUR)) on the profitability explained by the regression model, namely, β_i∙(X
_
_(i,ESP)-X
_
_(i,Z EUR)), where β_i is the coefficient of the 
model estimated in accordance with specification (2) of Table 1. Cahrt 1.6 totals for each year the effects of the four variables in Charts 1.3-1.5 in order to obtain 
the aggregate effect of the significant characteristics.
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BOX 2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN BANKS’ INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS ON PROFITABILITY (cont’d)
box looks at the relationship between the return on assets (ROA) 
and different individual characteristics for a sample of European 
listed banks focusing on the euro area in the period 2005-2016.1
Chart 1.1 shows that the ROA ratio declined from the start of the 
crisis in 2008 for the sample as a whole but that there was a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity across banks which grew as 
the crisis progressed. While in 2005-2006 the dispersion range 
(approximated by the difference between percentile 10 and 
percentile 90) stood at 0.7 pp - 1.1 pp, it grew to 2.9 pp in 2012 
and held above 1.5 pp in the last few years of the sample. Chart 1.2 
shows that there is also cross-bank heterogeneity in terms of their 
different individual characteristics (such as size, asset quality and 
efficiency). The analysis below seeks to determine the relationship 
between the variation in the two datasets. Specifically, a regression 
SOURCES: SNL Financial and Banco de España.
a Estimated using the Arellano-Bond method. The asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. Columns (1) and (2) present the results 
for banks in the 17 countries of the euro area; in (3) the sample is restriced to Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Ireland and Greece; in (4) 
the observations of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom are added to the sample in (1); in (5) the observations of the United Kingdom are added 
to the restricted sample in (3). The variables are defined in the notes to Chart 1 of this box. We use the Arellano-Bond method (1991) with between 2 and 4 lags 
of non-exogenous variables as instruments: (i) AB - dependent variable instrumented (only the first lag of the dependent variable is instrumented); (ii) AB –all the 
endogenous variables (all the explanatory variables at bank level are instrumented). Control of macroeconmic situation indicates whether the common time effect 
of macroeconomic variables is controlled. We present the p-values of the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests (1991) of the second to fourth-order autocorrelation.
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Table 1
DETERMINANTS OF THE RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) OF BANKS IN EUROPE (2005-2016) (a)
1  The United Kingdom and the Nordic countries with monetary autonomy 
are also considered to check the robustness of the results found in the 
main sample.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 111 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 2 THE CHALLENGES FACING THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR
is performed using the panel data methodology2 where ROA is 
explained based on banks’ individual characteristics, controlling 
for unobserved fixed effects of the banks, the effect of lagged 
ROA and aggregate conditions.3 Table 1 presents the results of the 
different specifications estimated.
First, a sample of euro area banks is studied using a model which 
only treats lagged ROA as an endogenous variable. The analysis 
shows that, during the period analysed, the largest banks, those 
with a lower NPL ratio, higher solvency, greater efficiency and a 
more significant weight of deposit-based funding, were the most 
profitable. In columns (2) to (5) all the explanatory variables at bank 
level are considered potentially endogenous in order to test the 
robustness of the result above. The qualitative findings of column 
(1) are maintained in column (2). Restricting the sample to the 
larger euro area countries – column (3) – does not alter the findings 
on the effect of size, solvency and asset quality, but the efficiency 
ratio does lose explanatory power. The sample is extended in 
columns (4) and (5) to include the United Kingdom and the other 
Nordic countries and the findings are robust once again, especially 
for the solvency ratio.
Charts 1.3-1.6 display the impact on the ROA ratio of the 
differences of Spanish banks with regard to the European 
average in the most significant variables of the estimation. For 
example, on average Spanish banks have maintained higher 
assets than other European banks during the period 2005-2016, 
and since this is a characteristic which is associated positively 
with profitability, the model implies a positive average contribution 
to ROA of 0.4 pp. The efficiency ratio is associated with higher 
profitability throughout the period but more clearly in 2005-2009. 
Conversely, the poorer relative positions of Spanish banks in 
terms of solvency and NPLs as from 2010 and 2012 are 
associated with negative contributions of up to -0.4  pp. The 
aggregate effect of these significant characteristics is positive 
until 2011 and turned negative again in 2012-2013 due to the 
contribution of the effect of the solvency ratio, and recovered 
slightly positive values after 2014.4
The positive significant relationship between profitability and asset 
quality implied by the NPL and solvency ratio coefficients indicate 
a possible advantage for the European banking sector of making 
progress in cleaning up its balance sheets. The positive asset size 
coefficient could also indicate that a greater concentration of 
European banks would have positive effects on their profitability.
In any event, the findings of this box need to be taken with caution 
insofar as they are based on the relationship between the variables 
analysed for a specific period (2005-2016) and they do not 
necessarily take into account the most recent changes in the 
structure of the sector and those which may arise in future.
BOX 2.2 ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF EUROPEAN BANKS’ INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS ON PROFITABILITY (cont’d)
2  The Arellano-Bond method is used. See M. Arellano and S. Bond (1991), 
“Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and 
an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic Studies, 
no. 58, pp. 277–297.
3  The estimates include the following as control variables: GDP growth 
(World Economic Outlook, IMF) and credit (BIS statistics), interest rate 
levels (EURIBOR) and concentration measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (ECB statistics for the euro area).
4  Note the caveat that the business models associated with higher 
profitability in the European sample analysed would not necessarily 
maintain their contribution to profitability in other periods and 
geographical areas.
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BOX 2.3 CORPORATE AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT OUTLOOK
To analyse the drivers of the change in private sector debt and to 
simulate its possible future trajectory, several error correction 
mechanism models1 have been estimated to characterise the 
performance of the real debt balance of households, on the one 
hand, and of corporates, on the other. In particular, in the case of 
households, the following explanatory variables have been 
included: real gross disposable income, the ex ante real cost of 
financing (calculated by subtracting a measure of long-term 
inflation expectations from nominal bank lending rates), housing 
wealth in real terms and, lastly, the population in the 30 to 54 age 
group (which is the population group holding the largest proportion 
of debt).2 For corporates, the balance of total financing is modelled 
as a function of private productive investment, residential 
investment, house prices (all variables in real terms) and an ex ante 
real synthetic cost of financing (proxied by subtracting a measure 
of long-term inflation expectations from the nominal cost).
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The nominal balance was deflated using the consumption deflator to calculate real growth.
b The nominal balance was deflated using the GDP deflator to calculate real growth.
c Real balances deflated using the GDP deflator.
 SCENARIO WITH HIGHER/LOWER POPULATION  SCENARIO WITH HIGHER/LOWER GDP AND LOWER/HIGHER RATES
 BETTER/WORSE OVERALL SCENARIO  BASELINE SCENARIO
1  The models were estimated with data up to 2017 Q4, from 1987 Q2 for 
households and from 1990 for corporates.
2  According to the latest edition of the EFF (2014), 79.7% of total 
household debt was held by households whose head was in the 
30-54 age group.
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BOX 2.3 CORPORATE AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT OUTLOOK (cont’d)
Based on these estimates and on various paths of the explanatory 
variables, a number of simulations of the change in private sector 
debt up to 2027 have been obtained. Thus, in the baseline scenario, 
all the developments in explanatory variables, up to 2020, are in 
line with the forecasts contained in the Banco de España’s latest 
macroeconomic projection exercise. Subsequently, up to 2027, the 
variables continue to evolve: in the case of the scale variables, in 
step with the potential growth of the economy; in the case of the 
cost of financing, in accordance with market expectations for 
EURIBOR; and in the case of the population variable, in keeping 
with the latest INE projections. From this baseline scenario another 
six scenarios have been drawn, presenting a possible reference 
range within which non-financial private sector debt could evolve in 
the future. Specifically, the first two scenarios consider that the 
population in the 30 to 54 age group increases/decreases by 1 pp 
more than in the baseline scenario; the next two assume that GDP 
grows at a rate that is 1  pp higher/lower than in the baseline 
scenario and that rates fall/rise by 100  bp compared with the 
projection in the baseline scenario; and the last two include both of 
the extreme scenarios described above.
As Charts 1.1 and 1.2 show, according to the results, all the explanatory 
variables considered made a positive contribution to the growth of real 
debt of households and non-financial corporations in the pre-crisis 
years. Following the onset of the crisis, the rate of growth of private 
sector debt corrected sharply, as the macroeconomic situation 
deteriorated, the real estate bubble burst and the real cost of financing 
rose. Additionally, in the case of households, from the latter part of 
2008 the positive contribution of the population variable began to 
decline. These patterns persisted, in the case of households until late 
2012, when debt fell by 7.3% year-on-year, and in the case of 
corporates until 2013 Q2, when real debt fell by 13.4% year-on-year. 
Subsequently, the gradual improvement in the macroeconomic 
scenario, which fuelled income and investment growth, together with 
the gradual recovery of the property market and, more recently, the 
favourable financing conditions, boosted by the ECB’s expansionary 
monetary policy, prompted a slowdown in the decline of non-financial 
private sector debt (down to 2.9% year-on-year for corporates and to 
2.6% for households at end-2017).
With all due caution,3 the simulations made for the 2017-27 
horizon show that, in the baseline scenario, real household debt 
would post positive growth rates in coming years, before returning 
to negative values from 2024, adversely affected in part by 
population ageing. By contrast, non-financial corporations’ debt 
would start to record positive growth in 2018 and would remain 
positive throughout the projection horizon, driven mainly by 
investment growth. Thus, according to these simulations, the level 
of debt of the non-financial private sector would increase very 
gradually in coming years, so that by the end of the projection 
horizon, total debt would amount to slightly more than 90% of the 
peak level recorded in 2009  Q2 (see Chart  1.3). The alternative 
scenarios considered point to a band of debt volume ranging from 
80% to 112% of that level by end-2027, in the latter case 
surpassing the 2009 peak, although the assumptions in this 
scenario are highly optimistic and, therefore, the likelihood of this 
occurring is limited.
Chart 1.4 shows the developments in the private sector debt ratio 
in the different scenarios. In the baseline scenario, the ratio climbs 
slightly in coming years, before falling back again also slightly, to 
reach 149% of GDP by end-2027, some 10 pp above the end-
2017 levels. The bands calculated for the various scenarios show 
that, in principle, the debt ratio would not head back to the peak 
levels of 2010, when it exceeded 200% of GDP, not even in the 
most optimistic scenarios.
Obviously, these results should be taken with due caution, not only 
in view of the customary uncertainty of estimates based on a 
specific period in the past, but also because of the need to make 
long-term projections of economic and population variables that 
are subject to a high degree of uncertainty.
3  In particular, these projections signal, in the near term, a recovery in 
credit that seems overoptimistic given the most recent developments. In 
this respect, the main value of the exercise is to proxy medium and long-
term credit trajectories, without attaching importance to the profile of the 
projections.

3  THE BUOYANCY OF INVESTMENT IN THE RECOVERY: DETERMINANTS  
AND CHALLENGES
Signboard for the 1st Annual Research Conference in the Cibeles building.
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3  THE BUOYANCY OF INVESTMENT IN THE RECOVERY: DETERMINANTS AND 
CHALLENGES
During the current upswing in the Spanish economy, investment in equipment and 
intangible assets has been markedly buoyant. This strength, in absolute terms and 
relative to the euro area, is explained by a number of macroeconomic and microeconomic 
factors. Notable among these are the easing of external financial conditions and the 
availability of own funds to finance investment, the reduction in uncertainty and the greater 
export orientation of the business sector, in addition to the usual effect of the improvement 
in domestic demand during economic recoveries.
In the short and medium term, business investment will benefit from the existence 
of certain favourable circumstances. Notable among these are the economic expansion, 
which is expected to continue over the coming years, and the ongoing favourable financial 
conditions. In addition, investment should be boosted by improvement in some of the pre-
existing imbalances (in particular, the lower indebtedness of the business sector and a 
distribution of credit among companies more favourable to growth), as well as the 
competitiveness gains built up in past years, against a background in which external 
markets are expected to remain buoyant.
But there also remain certain obstacles, which may influence developments in the 
short, medium and long term. Factors that may limit investment in equipment and 
intangibles in the short term include, notably, the risks associated with a possible increase 
in economic uncertainty, both at global level (as consequence of increased protectionism, 
Brexit and the possibility of further episodes of political uncertainty in Europe) and at 
national level (a highly fragmented parliament and political uncertainty in Catalonia). In the 
medium term, certain factors persist that limit the potential growth of business investment 
and its effectiveness, including some linked to aspects of the institutional framework (in 
the areas of regulation, competition and effectiveness of the judicial system), tax distortions 
and the possibility of continued low levels of public productive investment. In the longer 
term, there are a number of trends, of a global nature, that may put downward pressure on 
investment, including especially the tertiarisation of economies, globalisation, technological 
change and population ageing.
Business investment is a fundamental element of the cyclical behaviour of the 
economy and long-term economic growth. On the expenditure side, gross fixed capital 
formation currently accounts for around 20% of GDP in Spain. Of this, one half is investment 
in equipment, machinery and intangible assets, while the other half is linked to residential 
and non-residential construction. Investment decisions determine the economy’s capital 
stock and thus affect its long-term growth, by enabling installed capital to be renewed and 
technological advances incorporated therein, as well as the productive capacity of firms to 
be expanded. Also, investment in research and development, among other activities, 
directly boosts technical progress. In the short term, this component of aggregate demand 
is the most volatile, and consequently its fluctuations drive the cyclical swings in production 
and employment.
This chapter explores the determinants of the recent buoyancy of investment in 
equipment and intangibles in the Spanish economy. The next section characterises the 
behaviour of these components of investment during the current upswing and provides an 
international comparison. The third section discusses the determinants of this behaviour, 
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distinguishing between financing conditions, export orientation and the evolution of 
uncertainty. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the drivers and constraints 
that will govern the future behaviour of investment in the short, medium and long-term.
Non-construction investment1 has been very buoyant during the current upswing in 
the Spanish economy. Between 2013 and 2017, this aggregate, which includes investment 
in equipment, machinery and intangible assets, increased in real terms by around 27%, 
while GDP grew by 12%. As a result, in 2017 it exceeded its pre-crisis level, having fallen 
during the recession by more than output (-13%, as against -8%) (see Chart 3.1.1). This 
type of investment has thus risen as a proportion of GDP over the last decade by around 
1 percentage point (pp), to somewhat over 10% of GDP in 2017, its highest level for the 
last three decades, when it has been on average around 9.5% of GDP (see Chart 3.1.3).
The recent strength of investment has been broadly based across the components 
of investment in equipment and in intangible assets.2 Investment in intangible assets 
(which includes items such as computer software, databases and R&D&I) accounted for 
around 30% of non-construction investment in 2017, as compared with 18% at the 
beginning of the century, and its cyclical volatility is well below that of equipment investment 
(see Chart 3.1.2). The latter underwent a major adjustment during the crisis, but its 
buoyancy during the recovery means that the previous losses have been more than offset, 
so that its level in 2017 was 3% higher than in 2007.
2  The buoyancy of 
investment in the 
recovery 
1  Gross fixed capital formation, in real terms, excluding “Dwellings” and “Other buildings and structures”, 
according to the National Accounts.
2  Investment in equipment refers to the category “Machinery and equipment and weapons systems” of the 
National Accounts, while investment in intangible assets refers to that of “Intellectual property products”.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
DETERMINANTS AND CHALLENGES
THE BUOYANCY OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT (EXCLUDING CONSTRUCTION) FIGURE 3.1
DETERMINANTS OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Recovery in domestic 
demand 
Significant improvement  
in financial conditions 
Use of own funds
Reduction in uncertainty
Greater export orientation
FAVOURABLE CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN THE SHORT 
AND MEDIUM TERM
CONSTRAINTS/CHALLENGES
Ongoing favourable financial 
conditions
Stronger businesses due   
to correction of imbalances 
Favourable outlook for the 
Spanish economy
High capacity utilisation and 
capital obsolescence
Short/medium term:
Factors of global and national 
uncertainty
Institutional framework 
shortcomings
Tax distortions
Low public investment
Long-term challenges:
Tertiarisation
Population ageing
Globalisation
Technical progress
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 119 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 3. THE BUOYANCY OF INVESTMENT IN THE RECOVERY: DETERMINANTS AND CHALLENGES
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
100
150
200
250
300
350
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
NON-CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT
PRE-CRISIS LINEAR TREND
1  NON-CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT BUOYANT IN THE RECOVERY …
Non-construction investment. In real terms (1995 = 100)
100
150
200
250
300
350
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRODUCTS (INTANGIBLES)
2  ... ACROSS MAIN COMPONENTS
In real terms (1995 = 100)
INVESTMENT IN EQUIPMENT AND INTANGIBLES BUOYANT IN THE RECOVERY CHART 3.1
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
NON-CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT
HOUSING
OTHER BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES
3  WHILE CONSTRUCTION-RELATED INVESTMENT MORE SUBDUED …
% of GDP
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
OTHER BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES
HOUSING
NON-CONSTRUCTION INVESTMENT
4  ... MEANING INVESTMENT IN EQUIPMENT AND INTANGIBLES UP AS A 
PROPORTION OF TOTAL INVESTMENT
bp
100
150
200
250
300
350
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
5  EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT IN THE SECTORS MOST CLOSELY
CORRESPONDING TO PUBLIC-SECTOR ACTIVITY ALSO RECOVERED …
In real terms (1995 = 100)
100
150
200
250
300
350
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
In real terms (1995 = 100)
6  ... WHILE INTANGIBLES INVESTMENT SLOWED SOMEWHAT
The momentum has been broad-based in terms of components, both in the case of equipment and machinery and intangible assets, which continued 
to be accumulated, even during the crisis, at the trend growth rate of recent decades. The behaviour of costruction-related investment, on the other hand, 
was less favourable, and in 2017 it still stood at somewhat less than 50% of its pre-crisis level.
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The improvement in non-construction investment was also broadly based across the 
productive sectors.3 Thus, the ratio of investment to value added was in most industries 
higher in the two-year period 2014-2015 (the latest year for which a breakdown is available) 
than in the pre-crisis period. The industries recording the largest increase in the ratio of 
investment to value-added were varied, including mining and quarrying, energy, information 
and communication, and administrative and support service activities (see Chart 3.2).
By contrast, the behaviour of construction-related investment4 has been much less 
favourable during the recovery, and in 2017 stood at less than 50% of its pre-crisis 
level. This aggregate behaviour reflects, first, the adjustment in housing investment, 
which, despite its recent improvement, was down to around 5% of GDP in 2017  (in line 
with levels in other European countries) from 12% before the crisis, following the major 
expansion of the residential sector that occurred from the late 1990s (see Chart 3.1.3). As 
for the rest of construction, it has now been declining as a percentage of GDP for a decade. 
In 2017, this item accounted for somewhat more than 5% of GDP, having fallen by some 4 
pp of GDP since 2007. The behaviour of this component largely reflects the impact of 
fiscal consolidation, which has essentially been based on cuts in public sector construction 
investment, including investment in transport infrastructure.5
After its sharp contraction during the last downturn, investment in equipment and 
intangible assets of the sectors most closely corresponding to public-sector activity6 
3  Excluding that part of the real-estate services sector that measures imputed property income.
4  This item includes the categories “Dwellings” and “Other buildings and structures” of the National Accounts.
5  See J. J. Pérez and I. Solera (2017), “Developments in public investment during the crisis and the recovery”, 
Economic Bulletin 4/2017, Banco de España.
SOURCE: INE.
a Industries: (1) Agriculture, forestry and fishing; (2) Mining and quarrying; (3) Manufacturing; (4) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; (5) Water supply; 
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; (6) Construction (excluded); (7) Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
(8) Transportation and storage; (9) Accommodation and food service activities; (10) Information and communication; (11) Financial and insurance activities; (12) 
Real estate activities; (13) Professional, scientific and technical activities; (14) Administrative and support service activities; (15) Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security; (16) Education; (17) Human health and social work activities; (18) Arts, entertainment and recreation; (19) Other service activities.
The improvement in non-construction investment was broadly based across industries. The ratio of investment to value added was in most industries 
higher in 2014-2015 than before the crisis.
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contributed to the strength of the recovery, albeit to a lesser extent than that of the 
rest of the sectors. Between 2013 and 2015, the equipment investment of these sectors, 
which accounts for around 10% of the total, grew in line with that of the rest, recovering to 
somewhat more than 90% of its pre-crisis level (see Chart 3.1.5). Investment in intellectual-
property-related products by those sectors with a larger public-sector involvement (which 
accounts for somewhat more than 15% of the total) continued to display the slight 
downtrend that began in 2011, in contrast to the buoyancy observed in the rest of the 
sectors (see Chart 3.1.6).
The recent behaviour of equipment investment is similar to that seen at the same 
stage of the cycle in the 1990s, despite the major deleveraging by non-financial 
corporations in recent years.7 Unlike in the cycle of the 1990s, the crisis that began in 
2008 gave rise to two consecutive recessions, so that a comparison of the upturn that 
began in late 2013 with that which began in 1993 may be distorted by the fact that the 
initial position of the economy was not the same. Historical evidence suggests that 
recessions that are accompanied by severe business deleveraging usually have more 
persistent negative effects on investment,8 so that one would expect investment to behave 
less favourably in the latest cycle than in the 1990s. However, the growth of investment 
since 2013 has been higher than predicted by its historical relationship with economic 
activity, despite the major reduction in corporate debt that has taken place during much of 
the recovery (see Charts 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3).
Investment is behaving somewhat more favourably in Spain in the recovery than in 
the euro area as a whole. The dynamics of investment in the euro area as a whole, 
however, are markedly heterogeneous across countries. Of the four largest euro area 
countries, Italy has recorded the poorest relative performance by non-construction 
investment since end-2013 and France the most favourable (see Charts 3.3.4, 3.3.5 and 
3.3.6). The weakness of business investment at global level in the early years of the 
recovery has been analysed in a large number of recent studies.9 In the case of the euro 
area countries, however, the evidence available shows that, in most of them, business 
investment has moved in line with aggregate activity. The more favourable behaviour of 
non-construction investment relative to GDP in Spain has enabled the gap with the main 
euro area countries to be closed. As regards its composition, equipment investment as a 
proportion of total investment was, in 2017, higher in Spain (70%) than on average in 
Germany, France and Italy (60%), while the weight of intangibles investment in Spain was 
lower than in these countries.
From a more global perspective, investment has grown more moderately in the euro 
area than in the United States, which has a significantly higher investment-to-GDP 
ratio. Over the last two decades, the US economy has recorded more significant increases 
in business investment than the euro area, both in the case of equipment investment and 
6  Defined, in this case, as the sectors “Public administration and defence; compulsory social security”, “Education” 
and “Health and social services”, according to the INE. In the latter two sectors, however, although the majority 
of the activity is public, activity is also performed by privately owned and controlled firms. Likewise, in other 
sectors there is also a significant presence of firms that are mainly publicly owned firms (e.g. ADIF and AENA). 
Unfortunately, the official statistics do not allow a better separation of public and private activity.
7  There is no official information of the INE on investment in intellectual property assets for the period before 1995.
8  See, inter alia, Honkapohja and Koskela (1999), “The economic crisis of the 1990’s in Finland”, Economic Policy, 
14, pp. 401-436.
9  See M. Banbura et al. (2018), “Low investment in the EU”, Occasional Paper, ECB, forthcoming, or J. C. Berganza, 
S. Romero, T. Sastre, P. Burriel and M. Folch (2015), «La debilidad de la inversión empresarial en las economía 
desarrolladas”, Boletín Económico, July-August, Banco de España. 
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The recent behaviour of equipment investment has been similar to that in the cyclical episode in the 1990s, despite the heavy deleveraging by 
non-financial corporations. Also, investment has performed relatively more favourably in the recovery in Spain than in the euro area as a whole.
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in that of intangible assets (see Chart 3.4). Notwithstanding this, in recent years the euro 
area appears to have closed most of the gap in intangibles.10 Given how important the 
latter have become in the developed economies, Box 3.1 explores the definition and 
measurement of intangibles and the implications that a higher proportion of this type of 
assets entails for the economy’s technical progress and aggregate productivity.
The healthy growth of investment by Spanish firms, with respect to euro area firms, 
is explained by a number of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors. Notable 
among these have been the improvement in external financial conditions, the use of own 
funds to finance investment, the reduction in economic and political uncertainty, and the 
strengthening of the export orientation of Spanish firms in recent years. The easing of 
financial conditions since 2013 and an improved allocation of financial flows to the benefit 
of more productive firms appears to have had a more favourable impact on firms in Spain 
than in the euro area as a whole, given the less favourable initial position of Spanish 
companies on aggregate, in terms of greater credit constraints, the higher cost of accessing 
credit, and heavy business deleveraging.11 Also, the reduction in uncertainty, following the 
episodes of sovereign crisis in the euro area between 2010 and 2012, would have most 
favoured those economies, like the Spanish one, that showed greater vulnerability during 
this phase of the crisis. Moreover, the strength of investment in Spain in the most recent 
period has remained based on two fundamental supports that operated during the last 
downturn: the relatively high availability of own funds and the shift in the composition of 
demand since the start of the crisis from the domestic to the external component. The 
latter entailed a need for greater investment on aggregate, to maintain the momentum of 
strong growth in the Spanish economy’s export capacity. The contribution of these 
elements is analysed in detail below.
Internal sources of financing played a significant role in the behaviour of investment 
during the crisis and also in the subsequent recovery. In the early stages of the crisis 
the tensions in wholesale financial markets had a contractionary impact on the supply of 
bank credit. In these circumstances, financial institutions passed on the rise in the cost of 
financing their lending to businesses. In an economy as highly banked as the Spanish one, 
these developments led many firms to replace bank credit, at least partially, with alternative 
sources of financing, such as securities issuance, in the case of large firms and, more 
generally, greater use of own funds, through increases in the gross operating surplus, 
normally known as the “profit margin”.12 There is some evidence that this countercyclical 
behaviour by margins was not confined exclusively to Spain, but was also seen in other 
euro area countries subject to significant financial strains during the crisis (such as Portugal 
and Ireland),13 and in the United States.14 In the recovery sources of internal funding have 
continued to have a high weight, although the measures adopted by national and European 
authorities, including the expansionary monetary policy implemented in recent years by 
the ECB, have led to considerable improvement in the conditions of access to bank and 
non-bank financing (see Chart 3.5). Indeed, the use of own funds has been particularly 
important during the crisis and the recovery for financing investment in intangible assets, 
3  The recovery of 
investment: financing, 
uncertainty and export 
orientation 
3.1  THE FINANCING  
OF INVESTMENT
10  A structural explanation for this is to be found in R. Döttling, G. Gutiérrez and T. Philipon (2017), “Is there an 
investment gap in advanced economies? If so, why?”, ECB Forum of Central Banking, June.
11  Regarding the financing of investment in Spain, see Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
12  See Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España, or J. M. Montero and A. Urtasun (2014), “Price-cost 
mark-ups in the Spanish economy: a microeconomic perspective”, Working Paper 1407, Banco de España.
13  See Chapter 4, Annual Report 2014, Banco de España.
14  See S. Gilchrist, J. W. Sim and E. Zakrajšek (2014), Uncertainty, Financial Frictions, and Investment Dynamics, 
NBER Working Paper, No 20038, National Bureau of Economic Research, United States.
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From a global perspective, investment in the euro area has been more subdued than in the United States, which has a significantly higher 
investment/output ratio. Even so, the euro area appears to have closed a large part of the gap existing in the case of intangibles. In the case of Spain, 
the weight of intangibles investment is lower than on average in the main euro area countries.
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SOURCES: INE, Banco de España and ECB (SAFE).
a Cumulative four-quarter flows.
b Including statistical adjustments.
c Including loans from residents and non-residents.
d Gross saving plus net capital transfers.
e Net investment is understood to be the flow of (tangible and intangible) gross fixed capital formation net of capital consumption.
The internal sources of financing of investment not only played a significant role during the crisis, but also during the subsequent recovery. Also, aggregate 
deleveraging by the non-financial corporations sector in recent years has been compatible with a reallocation of flows of financing towards more 
productive firms.
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which may reflect the greater difficulty of accessing external financing to fund projects 
involving investment in this type of asset.15
Moreover, the aggregate deleveraging by the non-financial corporations sector in 
recent years has been compatible with a reallocation of flows of financing towards 
more productive firms. Against a background of more significant improvement in financial 
conditions in the Spanish economy than in the euro area as a whole, credit has generally 
flowed to those firms in a better economic and financial position, which has boosted 
investment, given that these firms are in a better situation to undertake new projects. The 
proportion of companies that have carried out investment in recent years has increased, as 
also has the average amount invested by each firm (see Charts 3.5.5 and 3.5.6). In addition, 
the allocation of credit is now more efficient than it was before the crisis, insofar as funds tend 
to flow to firms that are, on average, more productive and in a healthier financial position.16 
These developments contrast with the evidence existing for the pre-crisis period, which 
shows that investment was mainly earmarked for projects offering better collateral, which led 
to a concentration in less productive sectors and, within these, in less productive firms.17
Uncertainty has been significantly reduced in recent years, from the peak levels 
recorded in 2012.18 According to the available indicators, the reduction in uncertainty 
during the recovery was especially significant up to the end of 2015, after which it rose 
again, as a result of the political uncertainty linked to the high degree of parliamentary 
fragmentation that followed the elections held in December 2015 and June 2016 and, 
more recently, since mid-2017, owing to the tensions relating to the political situation in 
Catalonia (see Chart 3.6).
The evidence available for Spain shows that the moderation in uncertainty has 
had positive effects on firms’ investment decisions. One of the normal characteristics 
of investment processes is the timing mismatch between the costs of expanding 
productive capital, which firms incur in the short-term, and the income flows obtained 
from the investment, which only materialise over a much longer time horizon and cannot 
be precisely estimated ex ante. Consequently, a reduction in the level of uncertainty 
leads firms to embark on investment projects that they would otherwise have postponed 
until more information was available. In fact, according to the studies available for 
Spain, the effect of a reduction in uncertainty has significant positive effects on 
investment19 (see Chart 3.6.3). It is also important to distinguish between types of firm, 
3.2  THE REDUCTION  
IN UNCERTAINTY
15  See D. Dejuán, A. Menéndez and M. Mulino (2018), “Evolución de la inversión en el sector empresarial no 
financiero español”, Boletín Económico, Banco de España, forthcoming.
16  See Chapter 2, Annual Report 2016, Banco de España.
17  See Ó. Arce, J. M. Campa and A. Gavilán (2013), “Macroeconomic adjustment under loose financing conditions 
in the construction sector”, European Economic Review, 59, pp. 19-34; S. Basco, D. López Rodríguez and E. 
Moral-Benito (2017), Housing Bubbles and misallocation: evidence from Spain, Working Paper, Banco de 
España, forthcoming; Martín, Moral-Benito y Schmitz (2018), The Financial Transmission of Sectoral Shocks: 
Evidence from the Spanish Housing Bubble, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming, and G. Jiménez, 
E. Moral-Benito and R. Vegas (2018), Bank Lending Standards over the Cycle: The Role of Firms’ Productivity 
and Credit Risk, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
18  Measuring the degree of uncertainty is complicated, although diverse indicators may be constructed to enable 
it to be proxied. See M. Gil, J. J. Pérez and A. Urtasun (2017), “Macroeconomic uncertainty: measurement and 
impact on the Spanish economy”, Boletín Económico, 1/2017, Banco de España for a discussion of the 
literature and a proposal for indicators for the  Spanish economy.
19  Based on VAR-type (vector autoregressive) models, which incorporate indicators of uncertainty and equipment 
investment. The Spanish sovereign debt spread over Germany and a price index are also included as additional 
control variables, to take into account the possible effects of the financial and nominal variables on the different 
indicators of uncertainty. The analysis also takes into account the effect of uncertainty arising from the external 
environment, in particular the EU, so that the effects of national idiosyncratic shocks can be isolated.
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since the effect of uncertainty may vary according to their characteristics (see Chart 3.6.4). 
Specifically, the latest studies20 show that small and medium-sized firms are more 
vulnerable to shocks arising from economic uncertainty and react to such shocks more 
20  See D. Dejuán and C. Ghirelli (2018), Determinants of  firms’ investment in Spain: the role of policy uncertainty, 
Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming. This paper provides a detailed analysis of various determinants 
of investment using microdata of Spanish firms for the period 1997-2014 from the Banco de España’s Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office. The paper refers to the literature on these factors, emphasising the importance of 
determinants that are both internal and external to the firm.
SOURCES: INE, FUNCAS forecast panels, European Commission, CIS barometer, PRS Group, www.policyuncertainty.com and Banco de España.
a Synthetic indicator compiled by applying the principal components technique, using information from the indicators of assessment of the current political situation 
and of political expectations of the CIS, the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), the political risk indicator (PRS Group) and the degree of disagreement in 
budget deficit forecasts.
b The VAR model includes: as endogenous variables, uncertainty as measured by the synthetic indicators of financial markets, disagreement and economic policy 
uncertainty, investment, the Spanish sovereign debt spread over the German Bund and a price index; and as exogenous variables, EURO STOXX 50 volatility, the 
EPU for the EU as a whole and a synthetic indicator of European uncertainty (calculated in a similar manner to that used for Spain's synthetic indicators).    
    Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
c Synthetic indicator compiled by applying the principal components technique, using information from indicators of the volatility of the IBEX 35, the exchange rate, 
the oil price and the ten-year bond price.
d Synthetic indicator compiled by applying the principal components technique, using information from indicators of the disagreement in forecasts of GDP, private 
consumption and equipment investment, uncertainty about the outlook for unemployment over the next twelve months, uncertainty about industrial order books 
and uncertainty about industrial production expectations.
e. Ratio of business investment to capital, according to Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office.
Economic uncertainty has diminished significantly during the recent recovery in Spain, from the highs recorded in 2012. The evidence available, based 
on both aggregate and individual data, shows that a less uncertain environment is conducive to business investment.
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strongly. Also, responses are found to vary according to financial position, so that those 
with a high debt ratio are more severely affected by uncertainty.21
During the crisis and subsequent recovery, the export orientation of Spanish firms 
has increased, boosting investment. The significant increase in sales to the rest of the 
world in recent years has been based, on one hand, on the recovery of the competitiveness 
that the Spanish economy lost during the pre-crisis expansion; price and cost adjustment 
has generated a depreciation of the real exchange rate, which would appear to have 
contributed to the dynamism of exports during this period (see Chart 3.7.1). Also, Spanish 
firms increased their orientation towards external markets given the weakness of domestic 
3.3  GREATER EXPORT 
ORIENTATION
21  With debt ratio values above the median value of the distribution of this variable. This effect is directly related 
to the importance of financial frictions and the effect of uncertainty on the demand for and supply of credit. 
Having low levels of profitability, however, does not seem to explain the differing effects of the impact of 
uncertainty.
SOURCES: INE and Eurostat.
a Results of the Quarterly Model of the Banco de España (MTBE).
The export orientation of the Spanish economy has increased during the crisis and the recovery, boosting business investment. The favourable behaviour 
of exports has been partly based on the recovery of the price competitiveness that the Spanish economy lost during the upswing prior to the crisis. Also, 
given the weakness of domestic demand, Spanish firms have become more external-market oriented.
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demand, which would appear to have translated into an increase in the volume of exports 
and in the number of firms that are regular exporters. Specifically, among manufacturing 
firms, those with the largest presence in external markets were able to partly offset the fall 
in their domestic sales with increases in their exports, a process that was assisted by 
labour cost moderation. According to the estimates available, between 2009 and 2013, 
these firms on average replaced around one-third of their lost domestic sales with sales in 
foreign markets.22
The relevance of the increase in export orientation for investment is confirmed by an 
analysis of the individual decisions of firms based on recent data. The tendency for 
exporting firms to show high investment-to-capital ratios has increased during the recovery 
(see Chart  3.7.4).23 This has occurred through two channels. First, exporting firms are 
characterised by having higher investment-to-capital ratios, so that growth in the number 
of exporting firms (extensive margin) has boosted investment. Second, the recovery in the 
investment of exporting firms seems to have been somewhat stronger than the recovery in 
that of non-exporting firms, so that the increase in sales abroad by the former (intensive 
margin) has also been a factor favouring the dynamism of investment. The investment-to-
capital ratio of exporting firms began to increase in 2010, while that of non-exporting firms 
did not do so until 2013. This may partly be explained by the lower sensitivity among the 
former to increases in domestic uncertainty, as well as by the above-mentioned replacement 
of domestic demand by foreign demand. 
The increase in investment was higher than was to be expected from the behaviour 
of aggregate demand, which may indicate greater capacity utilisation among 
exporting firms. Insofar as firms that satisfy domestic demand and demand from the rest 
of the world are not the same, this reorientation of production towards export activity may 
have caused the aggregate behaviour of capacity utilisation to mask disparate behaviour 
at sectoral level. Thus, it is possible that during the recession exporting industries 
maintained approximately full capacity utilisation, which would help to explain why 
investment behaved more favourably during the recovery than was to be expected from 
the evolution of aggregate demand.24
The role of the determinants highlighted in the previous section is consistent with a 
structural interpretation of the recent behaviour of corporate investment in Spain.25 
Under the general equilibrium model estimated for the Spanish economy, the low growth 
of private productive investment26 in the period 2011-2012 is explained by the adverse 
effects of the financial factors and negative (private and public) demand shocks. These 
contractionary effects began to disappear in 2013 and to be replaced by a clearly positive 
impact arising from wage moderation, which generated an expansionary effect during 
3.4  THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
THE VARIOUS 
DETERMINANTS OF 
INVESTMENT IN A 
STRUCTURAL MODEL
22  See P. Antràs, M. Almunia, D. López Rodríguez and E. Morales (2018), Venting Out: Exports during a Domestic 
Slump, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming. See also P. Soares and E. Prades (2017), “Does export 
concentration matter in economic adjustment programs? Evidence from the euro-area”, Journal of Policy Modelling.
23  See D. Dejuán and C. Ghirelli (2018), op. cit.
24  See D. Posada, J. M. González Mínguez and A. Urtasun (2014), “Un análisis del comportamiento reciente de la 
inversión en equipo y de sus determinantes”, Boletín Económico, June, Banco de España.
25  See G. Almeida, S. Hurtado and O. Rachedi, JoSE: Joint Spain-Euro-Area Model, Working Paper, Banco de 
España, forthcoming.
26  The definition of investment in this model is slightly different to that discussed in the previous section. It is 
defined as total investment, excluding housing and general government. With respect to the concept of 
investment in equipment and intangibles used as reference, it therefore includes private construction. Also, 
although the general government sector is excluded, all the investment activity of the non-general government 
corporate public sector, responsible for most of the public infrastructure and other investment of this sector, is 
included (see J. J. Pérez and I. Solera (2017), “Developments in public investment during the crisis and the 
recovery”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España).
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subsequent years, especially through the export channel. From 2015, the recovery in 
private demand also began to have a positive influence. Likewise, the contribution of the 
financial factors to growth, which had become neutral in 2013, was clearly positive 
between 2014 and 2016. Thus, according to this model, the strong growth of investment 
in recent years is explained mainly by the re-emergence of positive domestic demand 
shocks, the expansionary effects of wage moderation (competitiveness) and the 
normalisation of financial conditions (see Chart 3.8).
The positive developments in financial conditions and in the availability of financing 
are expected to continue, which will provide ongoing support to the momentum of 
investment. As mentioned above, the measures adopted by the ECB have boosted access 
to funding through bank credit and the issuance of debt instruments, and have permitted a 
very low interest rate scenario. Looking ahead, monetary and financial conditions are 
expected to remain favourable to investment for a protracted period of time (see Chart 3.9.1). 
Similarly, the restructuring and reorganisation process of the credit institutions sector in 
Spain and progress in the area of the banking union within Europe should be conducive to 
the proper functioning of lending activity (see Chapter 2 of this report).
Progress in the correction of imbalances in the corporate sector, especially the debt 
overhang, should allow companies to undertake investment projects on a sounder 
footing. Higher corporate saving has facilitated internal financing, at the same time as the 
balance sheet restructuring of firms and the improved outlook for returns have made it easier for 
companies to tap external funds (see Chart 3.9.2). Accordingly, the available studies for the 
case of Spain, which are based on individual data, show that there is a non-linear relationship 
between debt levels and business investment, with the result that the adverse effect of the 
former on the latter, ceteris paribus, would be significant for high debt levels and its impact 
would be less relevant at present, following the sharp deleveraging that has taken place.27
4  Favourable 
circumstances and 
constraints for 
investment in the short 
and medium term
4.1  FAVOURABLE 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE 
MOMENTUM OF 
INVESTMENT
27  See, in particular, F. Herranz González and C. Martínez Carrascal (2017), The impact of firms’ financial position 
on fixed investment and employment. An analysis for Spain, Working Paper 1714, Banco de España.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Difference between GFCF and the aggregate of housing investment and public investment.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, the key role of financial conditions, internal financing, domestic and foreign demand would be consistent with a 
structural interpretation of recent developments in business investment in Spain.
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Likewise, the outlook for economic growth is also favourable for investment activity. 
The medium-term outlook for the Spanish economy remains positive: GDP growth of more 
than 2%28 – above the euro area average – is expected over the next few years (see 
Chart 3.9.3). Progress made in restoring macro-financial equilibria (especially the correction 
of the loss of competitiveness and high private indebtedness after the start of the crisis) is 
making for a strong and possibly more sustainable recovery than in other upturns.29
In a scenario of these characteristics, corporate investment could retain its 
momentum in step with the higher degree of capacity utilisation.  Although the ratio 
of investment in equipment to GDP is estimated to have stood at levels close to its trend 
28  Specifically, according to the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2018, Banco de 
España, real GDP is estimated to show increases of 2.7% in 2018, 2.3% in 2019 and 2.1% in 2020.
29  See Chapter 1 of this report.
SOURCES: INE, Banco de España, AMECO and IMF.
a IMF (WEO Report, October 2017).
b Difference between the ratio of equipment investment to GDP and the estimated trend of this ratio (unobserved components model). See D. Leiva, J. J. Pérez, G. 
Pérez Quirós and A. Urtasun (2018), An empirical model of the basic macroeconomic stylised facts of the Spanish economy, Working Papers, Banco de España, 
forthcoming.
A series of factors will favour protracted buoyant investment in the short and medium term including most notably, ongoing positive financial conditions, 
the correction of business sector imbalances and an outlook of a continued recovery in the Spanish economy.
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in 2017, there may be additional gains given the current firming of the recovery of the 
Spanish economy30 (see Chart 3.9.4). Accordingly, on one hand, capacity utilisation is at 
very high levels in certain sectors and to a greater extent in those related to exports31 (see 
Chart 3.10.1). On the other, during the last decade capital obsolescence has occurred with 
most investment earmarked for covering capital depreciation (see Chart 3.10.4). Finally, 
the price of investment goods relative to other goods 32 has fallen in Spain since 2005 
(when its peak of the last two decades was recorded) by slightly more than 11% (–1.7% in 
the euro area as a whole) and, thus that lower relative price could have a positive effect on 
investment decisions (see Chart 3.10.5).
The persistence of short-term risks could prompt heightened uncertainty, both 
globally and in Spain, curtailing investment projects. From a global standpoint, recently, 
several threats to the momentum of world trade have emerged, owing to protectionist 
trends in certain countries (especially, in the United States) and to Brexit (see Chart 3.11.1). 
At national level, the materialisation of a fresh scenario of heightened political uncertainty 
such as that observed during most of 2016 or in relation to the political situation in 
Catalonia (see Box 1.1. of Chapter 1 of this report) could negatively impact agents’ 
confidence and business investment.33
Also, current low levels of public investment could restrict business investment 
insofar as the former complements and acts as a catalyst for the latter. Public-sector 
investment has made a highly significant contribution to the recent budget deficit reduction 
process to the extent that all its components34 recorded their lowest levels of recent 
decades (for infrastructure, see Chart  3.11.2). In this setting, evidence shows that a 
positive relationship exists between aggregate productivity of the economy and so-called 
“productive public spending” with a significant impact on potential growth. Business 
investment is a particularly significant channel through which this impact materialises, 
both direct business investment (by state-owned or state-controlled companies) and 
indirect business investment (via the private sector). Although funds earmarked for public-
sector investment could represent the crowding out of private-sector activity in the short 
term,35 the aggregate impact of higher public-sector investment on private activity is 
generally positive in the long term, insofar as productive public capital expands, resulting 
in an improvement in the return on private factors (complementarity or crowding in 
4.2  POSSIBLE INVESTMENT 
CONSTRAINTS AND 
OBSTACLES IN THE SHORT 
AND MEDIUM TERM
30  See D. Leiva, J. J. Pérez, G. Pérez Quirós and A. Urtasun (2018), “An empirical model of the basic macroeconomic 
stylised facts of the Spanish economy”, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
31  Among others, noteworthy is the high capacity utilisation in the industries of manufacture of electrical 
equipment, manufacture of machinery and equipment, manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, 
and manufacture of other transport equipment.
32  Measured as the ratio between the investment deflator and the GDP deflator.
33  For an analysis of the potential effects of a scenario of a more abrupt and persistent increase in political 
uncertainty, see, for example, the box in the Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, November 2017, on 
the hypothetical scenarios triggered by the episode of political tension in Catalonia at the end of last year (see 
Box 1.1, “The economic impact of uncertainty arising from political tensions in Catalonia”, in the Financial 
Stability Report, November 2017, Banco de España). Specifically, this box simulates a hypothetical scenario 
assuming an increase in uncertainty in a given quarter which is equivalent to the uncertainty recorded in the 
most intense previous episode, and a subsequent linear decline until the uncertainty disappears after two 
years. In this case, the estimated negative effect on GDP is slightly more than 2.5 pp in cumulative terms over 
those two years.
34  See J. J. Pérez and I. Solera (2017), “Developments in public investment during the crisis and the recovery”, 
Economic Bulletin, 4/2017, Banco de España.
35  The available evidence for Spain tends to find positive effects in the short term. In particular, M. Alloza, P. 
Burriel and J. J. Pérez (2018), “Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: Revisiting the Size of Spillovers”, Working 
Papers, Banco de España, forthcoming, find that each euro spent on public investment would generate a 
cumulative increase after two years of nearly €2 in terms of GDP and between €0.5 and €1 in terms of private 
productive investment.
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In a scenario of continued recovery of the Spanish economy, business investment would remain buoyant in keeping with a higher degree of capacity 
utilisation.
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effects).36 From this standpoint, public spending on infrastructure and R&D&I activities is 
particularly important, these items would affect aggregate economic activity and private 
investment to a greater extent.37 Accordingly, note that public investment in R&D in Spain 
36  The final effect will depend, in any event, on the design of the investment plan (implementation period and 
duration, degree of distortion of the fiscal instrument used to finance it) or on other macroeconomic aspects 
such as the interest rate response to public investment stimulus or the degree of nominal rigidities present in 
the economy. For a review of the theoretical arguments and channels, see M. Baxter and R. King (1993), “Fiscal 
Policy in General Equilibrium”, American Economic Review, or E. Leeper, T. Walker and Yang (2010), 
“Government investment and fiscal stimulus”, Journal of Monetary Economics.
37  See, for example, Bom and Ligthart (2014), “What have we learned from three decades of research on the 
productivity of public capital?”, Journal of Economic Surveys, and Comín, Licht, Pellens and Schubert (2018), 
“Do Companies Benefit from Public Research Organizations? The Impact of the Fraunhofer Society in Germany”, 
Centre for Innovation, Research and Competence in the Learning Economy.
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There is a series of factors which could curb the momentum of investment in the short and medium term, if suitable policies are not implemented. These 
factors include, most notably, global and national risks which could increase uncertainty, low public investment, the shortcomings of the institutional 
framework and distortions arising from the corporate income tax system.
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amounted to 0.50% of GDP in 2015 compared with the EU aggregate of 0.62% (Germany: 
0.81%; France: 0.79%; and Italy: 0.51%).38
The weight of public investment in R&D is smaller, furthermore, in a setting of 
significantly lower private investment in this area than in benchmark countries. 
According to the OECD, investment in R&D in Spain’s total economy (public and private) 
stood at 1.2% of GDP in 2015, which is lower than the EU aggregate of 2% and much 
smaller than the figures for Germany and France (2.9% and 2.3%, respectively).39 More 
generally, the weight of investment in intangible assets in Spain remains low, in relative 
terms, despite the rising trend of recent decades. Compared to other European countries, 
in 2016 the Spanish economy’s investment drive in intangible assets (measured as its 
weight in GDP) was 1.2 pp of GDP lower than the euro area aggregate (see Chart 2 of Box 
3.1). From this standpoint, it is important for the recent vigour in investment in intangible 
assets to continue so that this gap closes, given their increasing significance in production 
processes and their impact on productivity gains. 
As for other structural conditioning factors, certain shortcomings in institutional 
arrangements, including several regulatory factors, are not conducive to business 
dynamism. The available empirical evidence points to tighter regulations tending to be 
associated with lower business investment.40 Notwithstanding the improvements made 
during the crisis, Spain’s regulatory framework continues to entail certain constraints, 
since it is generally more restrictive than that of benchmark European economies such as 
Germany and the United Kingdom, according to the habitually used indicators such as 
those of the OECD’s Product Market Regulation, the World Bank’s Doing Business report 
or the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom indicators (see Chart 3.11.3).41
Reforms aimed at improving the use and quality of productive factors and the 
efficient operation of product markets and factors are essential for boosting 
productive investment and economic growth in the medium and long term. The 
effects of these reforms could be particularly positive during the present boom since 
the adjustment costs they entail can be met to a greater degree.42 Similarly, in a 
monetary union, the application of structural reforms aimed at reducing barriers to 
competition may stimulate business investment significantly, even in the short term and 
in situations in which the additional accommodative capacity of monetary policy is 
constrained (see Box 3.4).43
A stable framework of relationships between firms needs arrangements which 
ensure that rules and agreements are enforced. An inefficient agreement enforcement 
system generates greater legal uncertainty, adversely affecting investment and 
productivity. This adverse impact is, furthermore, greater in the case of intangible assets 
38  See OECD (2017), “Main Science and Technology Indicators”, Vol. 2017, 2.
39  See again, OECD (2017), op. cit.
40  See European Central Bank (2016), “Business investment developments in the euro area since the crisis”, 
October and G. Palumbo, G. Giupponi, L. Nunziata and J. S. Mora-Sanguinetti (2013), “The Economics of Civil 
Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 1060.
41  For example, the OECD points out that administrative burdens on start-ups are generally greater in Spain. 
Registering a sole proprietorship takes more time in Spain than in Germany and in the United Kingdom. It is also 
necessary to contact a larger number of public bodies to register a public limited company.  
42  The “Report on Structural Policies in the euro area”, a forthcoming Occasional Paper of the ECB, contains a 
detailed discussion on the relationship between cyclical position and the costs of reforms.
43  See Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2016), “Policy Spillovers and Synergies in a Monetary Union”, 
International Journal of Central Banking, and OECD (2012), “Reducing income inequality while boosting 
economic growth: can it be done?”, Economic Policy Reforms.
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(such as copyright and patents), which are more complex to protect. In the case of 
Spain, there is evidence of the link between the effectiveness of the legal system and 
investment, as well as between the former and the entry of new firms into markets and 
their subsequent growth.44
Taxation also influences firms’ investment decisions. Economic research has underlined 
the potential for taxation on the purchase of productive assets and on the related returns 
to affect an economy’s accumulation of capital through its impact on investment decisions 
and, in particular, on an economy’s capacity to attract foreign direct investment.45 In this 
regard, Spain stands out for having a tax structure that has persistently taxed business 
investment returns at a level above the euro area average, even though it has decreased 
in recent years (see Chart 3.11.4).46
The main obstacles to investment, according to Spanish firms, are uncertainty, frictions 
caused by business and fiscal regulations and possible limited demand for products 
and services. According to the 2017 Survey of the European Investment Bank, in addition to 
these factors, Spanish firms mention other relevant factors such as energy costs, labour 
market regulations, the availability of staff with the right skills, the availability of internal and 
external financing and adequate transport infrastructure and access to digital infrastructure. 
In the EU as a whole, the various factors are ranked in a similar order, except for the availability 
of staff with the right skills which is attributed more importance (see Box 3.2).
The growing importance of services in advanced economies has meant that investment 
has been restructured slightly towards sectors with lower investment ratios in relative 
terms. The services industries generally have lower gross fixed capital formation to GDP 
ratios than the industrial sectors which are the traditional drivers of investment (see 
Chart 3.12.2). Accordingly, when the residential construction and general government sectors 
are excluded, investment as a percentage of value added shows a declining profile in the 
advanced economy which could be related to the process of tertiarisation.
In tandem, the investment ratio in most sectors has decreased. This has been the 
case in particular in the services sectors. Indeed, when the change in the non-residential 
4.3  GLOBAL TRENDS 
IMPACTING INVESTMENT 
LEVELS
44  See D. Dejuán, C. Ghirelli and J. S. Mora-Sanguinetti (2018), “Quality of enforcement and investment decisions. 
Firm-level evidence from Spain”, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming; M. García-Posada and J. S. 
Mora-Sanguinetti (2014), “Entrepreneurship and Enforcement Institutions: Disaggregated Evidence for Spain”, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 40, pp. 49-74; and M. García-Posada and J. S. Mora-Sanguinetti 
(2015), “Does (average) size matter? Court enforcement, business demography and firm growth”, Small 
Business Economics, 44, pp. 639-669.
45  The empirical evidence for the case of Spain indicates that higher taxation on companies triggers lower 
investment in the short term, based on both aggregate data (see P. Gil, F. Martí, R. Morris, J. J. Pérez and 
R. Ramos, (2018) “The Output Effects of Tax Changes: Narrative Evidence for Spain”, SERIES-Journal of the 
Spanish Economic Association) and individual data (see D. Dejuán and C. Ghirelli (2018), op. cit.).
46  The actual taxation of business investment is obtained from the data published by Eurostat which are 
calculated using the influential methodology proposed in M. P. Devereux and R. Griffith (1998), “Taxes and the 
Location of Production: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Multinationals”, Journal of Public Economics, 68, pp. 
335-367 and M. P. Devereux and R. Griffith (2003), “Evaluating tax policy for location decisions”, International 
Tax and Public Finance, 10, pp. 107-126. According to this methodology, estimated taxation as a percentage 
of business investment should consider the cost for firms of the taxes, as a whole, on the purchase of 
productive assets and on the related earnings. A particularly relevant component of this calculation is the cost 
for a company of applying a tax depreciation rate to assets for corporate income tax purposes which is lower 
than the economic depreciation rate of these assets (estimated by the OECD). For a more detailed discussion, 
see D. López Rodríguez (2018), “La recaudación del impuesto sobre sociedades en España: evolución y 
limitaciones en el contexto internacional”, Boletín Económico, Banco de España, forthcoming, European 
Commission (2017), “Taxation Trends in the European Union”, Eurostat Statistical Books; and ZEW (2016), 
“Effective Tax Levels Using the Devereux-Griffith Methodology: 2016 Report”, Project for European 
Commission TAXUD 2013/CC/120.
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investment to GDP ratio in various countries is broken down into the effect of the change 
of sectoral structure, on one hand, and the effect of changes within each sector, on the 
other, the latter appears as the most relevant explanation of the changes in this variable in 
the last two decades (see Chart 3.11.3).47
Part of these developments could be explained by the interplay between sectoral 
variations and the change in relative price of investment goods with respect to 
other goods. Technological progress and notably less expensive intangible assets have 
boosted the acquisition of this type of goods in the services sectors which are 
increasingly important in terms of domestic output, such as business and financial 
services. These intangible assets generally require lower upfront outlays than tangible 
assets,48 which could explain the reduction in investment to GDP ratios in developed 
economies, without forgetting the problems associated with measuring investment in 
intangible assets. Based on the available evidence, the accumulation of intangible 
assets could have positive effects on productivity,49 as well as other implications, in 
terms of firms’ financial structures, since the characteristics of intangible assets make 
them less suitable for use as collateral or as a guarantee to obtain borrowed funds,50 
compared with tangible assets. Similarly, stronger intangibles investment has 
implications for the labour market and demand for labour since these investments 
usually require more highly skilled workers.
Noteworthy among the factors which could reduce the strength of investment in the 
developed economies are that a large number of emerging economies are now 
integrated into the world economy and that firms are increasingly international. 
Globalisation has contributed to boosting the development of global production chains, 
with a notable increase in the cross-border services trade and, in general, the 
internationalisation process of all real and financial economic activity. The outcome of this 
process has been that a growing proportion of production and world investment is located 
in emerging economies which have booming markets and lower production costs. Capital 
flows in the form of direct investment at global level reflect this shift. The available studies, 
however, show that foreign direct investment by developed economies in the last two 
decades does not appear to have been detrimental, in general, to domestic investment. 
Only in those sectors where investment is stronger in assets relating to intellectual property 
(information and communication, financial services, professional and technical activities 
and manufacturing), could foreign investment have significantly replaced domestic 
investment in recent years (see Box 3.3).
From a long-term perspective, population ageing will affect the advanced economies’ 
investment potential. Specifically, investment could suffer insofar as adverse demographic 
trends impact potential growth expectations and productivity, although the relatively 
47  The same conclusion is drawn in European Commission (2017), “Investment in the EU Member States”, 
Institutional Paper 062, October. 
48  See R. Döttling, T. Ladika and E. Perotti (2016), “The (Self-)Funding of Intangibles”, Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Papers 16-093/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
49  For example, C. Corrado, J. Haskel and C. Jona-Lasinio (2013), “Knowledge Spillovers, ICT and Productivity 
Growth”, Discussion Paper, IZA 8274.
50  However, in certain countries, such as the United States, a growing trend can be seen towards using intangible 
assets as collateral to obtain borrowed funds, especially in those sectors where the proportion of this type of 
assets is very high. See S. C. Lim, A. J. Macias and T. Moeller (2016), “Intangible Assets and Capital Structure”, 
Paris December Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI; and M. Loumioti (2012), The use of intangible assets as 
loan collateral, SSRN Paper 1748675.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 139 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 3. THE BUOYANCY OF INVESTMENT IN THE RECOVERY: DETERMINANTS AND CHALLENGES
higher supply of savings will tend to bring about lower interest rates.51 The available 
research has also underlined the fact that innovation in an ageing population could be 
lower, which would reduce the marginal productivity of capital and, consequently, 
investment.52 By contrast, however, some authors have noted that ageing and technological 
progress could lead to an increase in capital intensity per employee, that will require higher 
investment levels, also as a result of the relative change in the price of productive factors, 
in a setting of tighter labour market conditions, with the result that the price of capital 
could fall in relative terms.53
51  See L. H. Summers (2014), “US economic prospects: Secular stagnation, hysteresis, and the zero lower 
bound”, Business Economics, 49, pp. 65-73.
52  Y. Aksoy, H. Basso, R. P. Smith and T. Grasl (2018), “Demographic structure and macroeconomic trends”, 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
53  See P. Butzen, S. Cheliout, E. De Prest, S. Ide and W. Melyn (2016), “Why is investment in the euro area 
continuing to show only weak recovery?”, Economic Review, National Bank of Belgium, pp. 81-98; and C. 
Goodhart and M. Pradhan (2017), Demographics Will Reverse Three Multi-Decade Global Trends, BIS Working 
Paper 656.
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BOX 3.1 INTANGIBLES INVESTMENT
The knowledge-based economy, linked to the development of 
intangible assets, has become increasingly important in 
determining the competitive advantages of firms. Specifically, 
the progress of knowledge-based activities can be divided into 
two stages: the first, focused on the development of information 
and communications technologies (ICT) (software, hardware and 
communications), has been followed by a new stage 
characterised by the investment drive in intangible assets. The 
trend towards the “tertiarisation” (a shift to services) of developed 
economies, combined with the process of technological change, 
may have significant implications for the type of capital goods in 
which firms invest, driving investment in intangible assets, linked 
to creativity and knowledge. 
The definition of intangible assets encompasses ICT, research and 
development (R&D), innovation, design, creativity, image and 
brand, organisation and specific human capital formation. 
Measurement of these concepts is not straightforward, and their 
conceptual definition has gradually broadened. In the past, the 
accounting rules treated spending on intangible assets as 
intermediate consumption expenses. However, the new system of 
accounts, ESA 2010, considers intangible assets to be 
investments. Until recently, of the three large categories of this 
type of asset,1 the national accounts only considered the 
acquisition of computer software to be investment, although the 
ESA 2010 has also incorporated spending on research and 
development. The current national accounts systems include the 
following range of specific intangible assets in the “intellectual 
property assets” category: a) computerised systems (software and 
databases) and b)  R&D, mineral exploration and entertainment, 
literary or artistic originals. However, measurement of and 
accounting for this type of asset continues to be subject to debate, 
and some authors (Corrado, Hulten and Sichel, 2006) have already 
identified a broader range of assets considered intangible. 
There are marked differences across countries regarding the 
relative significance of intangibles investment. In euro area 
countries, the rate of investment in this type of asset is less than in 
other EU economies, such as the Nordic countries or the United 
Kingdom. In the United States, investment in intangible assets is 
estimated to have even exceeded traditional investment in tangible 
assets. During the latest crisis, investment in intangible assets 
proved very resilient in most of the developed economies and, in a 
good number of them, the ratio of the assets included in the 
national accounts to GDP continued to increase. 
In the case of Spain, based on national accounts data, intangible 
assets have grown significantly, both in terms of volume and as a 
proportion of total gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). 
Specifically, these assets have risen from 7% of total GFCF in 
2008 to 14% in the last ten years (compared with tangible asset 
investment (excluding residential investment) which accounts for 
60%). Therefore, the cyclical behaviour seen in other assets has 
not been observed in intangible assets, which have grown steadily 
since 1995 at an average yearly rate of 5%.
In comparison with other countries, on average, in 1995-2016, the 
investment drive in intangible assets in Spain was lower than that 
of most other European Union countries and similar to that of 
Portugal and Italy, and behind the Nordic countries (such as 
Finland and Sweden), the United Kingdom and France (see Charts 
1 and  2). Moreover, a rising trend in investment was observed, 
most notably in Belgium, Austria, Netherlands and France, whose 
investment in intangible assets rose by around one percentage 
point in terms of GDP. In Spain, investment in this type of assets 
was 3% of GDP in 2016, compared with 1.5% in 1995.
However, as mentioned earlier, the definition of intangible assets in 
the ESA 2010 is incomplete, and it is therefore necessary to use 
databases which include other intangible assets (see Charts 3 and 4) 
in order to accurately describe their economic relevance. The 
Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE, by its Spanish 
abbreviation)2 provides an estimate for a broader range of assets. 
ICTs are wide-reaching technologies that impact on all sectors, 
but only if they are accompanied by further innovations. In this 
respect, some intangible assets not included in the ESA 2010, 
relating to organisation and the people using ICT, enable the latter 
to make a greater contribution to economic growth. The assets not 
included in the ESA 2010 account for a larger share of GDP than 
the intangible assets that are included. This discrepancy has been 
reduced over time, owing to the broader inclusion of such assets 
in the national accounts.
Thus, in 2014, the intangible assets included in the ESA 2010 
represented 3% of GDP, while those that were not, represented 
3.5%. As regards the composition of intangible asset 
investment (according to the IVIE’s broad definition), the most 
significant component is that relating to economic competencies 
(around 40% of total intangible asset investment), closely 
followed by investment in innovative property. The two most 
noteworthy subcomponents are R&D investment and 
investments to improve the organisational structure of firms 
1  Investment in intangible assets is usually classified under three 
categories: a)  computer software and databases; b)  research and 
development or other activities that may give rise to intellectual property 
rights of a scientific or artistic nature, and c) economic competencies, 
such as improvements in employee skills, in organisational structure or 
brand reputation development. 
2  See M. Mas and J. Quesada (dirs.) (2014), Activos intangibles: Una 
inversión necesaria para el crecimiento económico en España (Intangible 
assets. A necessary investment for economic growth in Spain) Ariel and 
Fundación Telefónica, Barcelona 
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BOX 3.1 INTANGIBLES INVESTMENT (cont’d)
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BOX 3.1 INTANGIBLES INVESTMENT (cont’d)
(18% and 15.5% of total investment in intangible assets, 
respectively). Lastly, some heterogeneity was observed in the 
changes affecting the subcomponents over time. Particularly 
noteworthy was the considerable rise in investments in software 
and databases and innovative property, with cumulative 
increases of 187% and 147% between 1995 and 2014, 
respectively, while investments in advertising and market 
research decreased as a proportion of total investment in 
intangible assets during the same period.
Finally, the relative significance of the determinants of investment is 
of particular interest when exploring the ratio of tangible to intangible 
investment. Some authors3 have found evidence pointing to the role 
played by firm size and product and labour market regulation as the 
main drivers of investment in intangible assets. In addition, this type 
of investment seems to be less dependent on the economic cycle 
and the financial position of firms than tangible asset investment, 
with internal financing playing a relatively more significant role4.
3  C. Corrado, J. Haskel, C. Jona-Lasino and M. Iomni (2016), “Intangible 
investment in the EU and US before and since the Great Reccesion and 
its contribution to productivity growth” Working Paper No 2016/08, 
European Investment Bank.
4  European Investment Bank (2017), “From recovery to sustainable 
growth”. Investment Report No 2017/2018, European Investment Bank.
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In 2016, in order to better understand the investment decisions 
of European companies, the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
began to prepare annually the EIB Group Survey on Investment 
and Investment Finance (EIBIS). This survey includes interviews 
of around 12,500 firms from the 28 EU Member States,1 
approximately 500 of which are Spanish. The firms are of all 
sizes, are from the main sectors and offer qualitative and 
quantitative information2 on their investment activities, finance 
needs and the difficulties they face. The results from the first two 
waves of this survey (2016 and 2017) are currently available. This 
box analyses Spanish firms’ responses to the questions in the 
questionnaire relating to the obstacles they perceive and to the 
investment gap (relationship between the investment level and 
the investment that ensures the success of their business going 
forward). These results are compared with those of the EU 
companies surveyed, as a whole.
Uncertainty about the future and, next in order, business 
regulations (licences, permits, etc.) and taxation, and demand for 
products and services, are the obstacles indicated by a higher 
proportion of Spanish firms both in the 2016 and 2017 waves3 (see 
Chart 1). Next are energy costs, labour market regulations and the 
availability of staff with the rights skills. The perception of the 
availability of finance, which includes both internal and external 
financing, is in seventh position. Lastly, the factors mentioned by a 
smaller number of companies are availability of adequate transport 
infrastructure and access to digital infrastructure.
In the EU as a whole, the order of the different factors is observed 
to be very similar, the main exception being the availability of staff 
with the right skills, an obstacle which is of relatively greater 
importance in the EU. These differences are consistent with the 
higher unemployment rate in Spain, which means that, in principle, 
it has a greater surplus of available labour.
The results for Spain show a higher proportion of firms reporting 
each obstacle, except for the availability of staff with the right 
skills, where the level is similar. Given that the perceptions about 
the obstacles are subjective, it is possible that, since the economic 
and financial crisis was relatively more severe in Spain, Spanish 
companies may tend to perceive that each obstacle represents a 
barrier to investment. Certain cultural aspects could also play a 
significant role in explaining these differences. Thus, for example 
in the case of the availability of finance, the available objective 
indicators approximating this concept, such as the proportion of 
firms whose access to bank finance is restricted4 show similar 
results in the two areas (around 6%). That seems to suggest that 
Spanish companies are more inclined to report obstacles than 
other European companies.
If the results of the two available waves are compared, the 
proportion of companies reporting obstacles in the two areas is 
seen to decrease in the 2017 wave compared with the previous 
wave. However, this is more pronounced in Spain which could be 
linked to cyclical factors and, in particular, to the stronger 
economic recovery in Spain.
Using a linear probability model which controls for characteristics 
at firm level,5 such as size, age of the firm, access barriers to 
external bank finance, productivity, sector and balance sheet 
situation (profit ratios, leverage and liquidity), generally, those 
firms with a worse economic and net worth position which are 
less productive are observed to have a greater likelihood of 
reporting obstacles to investment. This effect is more significant 
for obstacles relating to the availability of finance, access to 
digital infrastructure and energy costs in the case of Spain and for 
obstacles relating to the availability of finance, business 
regulations, energy costs and the availability of staff with the right 
skills, in the case of Europe. Thus, for example, in the case of the 
availability of finance, an increase of 10 pp in the indebtedness 
ratio means an increase of 2.7 pp in the probability of reporting 
that obstacle for Spain (1.5 pp for the EU). Financially constrained 
firms have a higher probability of reporting any obstacle, 
especially in the case of the availability of finance, for which the 
probability of reporting this obstacle increases to 18  pp for 
Spanish firms (22  pp for European firms). Generally, SMEs and 
younger companies (approximated as those which have been in 
business for less than ten years) do not have a greater probability 
of encountering a given obstacle than other firms. Some barriers, 
such as those relating to labour market and business regulations 
are more likely to be reported by infrastructure firms and those in 
the construction sector.
Another aspect covered by the EIBIS is the investment gap 
perceived by firms, that is, the fact that they consider that the 
investment made in the last three years has been too little to 
ensure the success of their business going forward. The 
1  The methodology of the EIBIS is available at http://www.eib.org/
attachments/eibis_methodology_report_2017_en.pdf.
2  The questionnaire used in 2016 is available at http://www.eib.org/
attachments/eibis_general_module_questionnaire_2016_en.pdf. Small 
changes were made to it in the 2017 wave, but the structure remains 
the same.
3  The proportion of firms reporting each obstacle is constructed as 
follows: if an obstacle is reported as a major obstacle, it is given a 
weighting equal to unity, whereas if it is reported as a minor obstacle, its 
weight is 0.5.
4  Firms in any of the following situations are considered financially 
constrained: their loan applications have been rejected, they have only 
been granted a portion of the funds requested, the loan was extended 
but at a cost they consider to be very high and those companies which 
did not apply for external finance because they thought they would be 
turned down.
5  Some of these variables are available in the survey itself and others 
were obtained by matching the survey with the database of Amadeus.
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¥Profitability  ratiot–1 -0.283*** -0.291*** -0.287*** -0.290*** -0.289*** -0.293*** -0.279*** -0.290*** -0.291*** -0.273***
¥Indebtedness ratiot–1 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.047**
¥Liquidity ratiot–1 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0,010 -0.032 -0.032 -0.016
¥Total factor productivityit -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.023***
Financially constrained (c) 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.187*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.182***
§SME 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.018 0,020 0.013 0.021 0.019 0.012
§Young firm (<10 years old) -0.024 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.030* -0.025 -0.025 -0.029*
§Construction sector -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0,000 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.010
§Services sector -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017
§Infrastructure sector -0.045** -0.046** -0.044** -0.045** -0.046** -0.043** -0.046** -0.046** -0.046** -0.045**
Minor 0.024* 0.019
Major 0.074*** 0.054**
Minor 0.018** 0.004
Major 0.042*** 0.008
910.0-100.0roniM
600.0-**330.0rojaM
710.0-700.0roniM
900.0-820.0rojaM
500.0510.0roniM
**720.0***050.0rojaM
810.0*420.0roniM
610.0***530.0rojaM
***940.0***940.0roniM
***421.0***031.0rojaM
Minor 0.008 -0.017*
Major 0.009 -0.031*
Minor 0.014* -0.009
Major 0,010 -0.032
Fixed effects country /year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
932,8552,8452,8152,8452,8452,8452,8552,8652,8052,8snoitavresbO
770.0560.0370.0950.0160.0260.060.060.0160.060.0derauqs-R
§Avail. of staff with right skills
§Availability of finance
§Transport infrastructure
§Digital infrastructure
§Uncertainty
§Business regulations
§Demand
§Energy costs
§Labour market regulations
Table 1
RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF A MODEL OF THE PROBABILITY THAT A FIRM WILLL REPORT AN INVSTEMENT GAP.
SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN FIRMS (a) (b) (c) (d)
SOURCES: 2016 and 2017 EIBIS.
a The regression is based on EIBIS and ORBIS information for the period 2016-2017. The coefficients are obtained from a linear probability model with country and 
year fixed effects. The standard errors are corrected and clustered at country level. *, ** and *** indicate significance for confidence levels of 90%, 95% and 99%, 
respectively.
b The variables with the ¥ symbol are defined as follows: profitability ratio as profit before interest and taxes to total assets; indebtedness ratio as interest-bearing 
debt to total assets; liquidity ratio as cash and cash equivalents to total assets; total factor productivity as logarithmic variable based on the firm's value added 
and the factors of production used.
c Financially constrained is a binary variable which takes a value of one for those firms in any of the following situations: their loan applications were rejected, they 
have only been granted a portion of the funds requested, the loan was extended to the companies but at a cost they consider to be very high and those 
companies which did not apply for external finance because they thought they would be turned down.
d The variables with the § symbol are dichotomic and take the value of one if the firm belongs to the group with the corresponding characteristic or if the firm reports 
that obstacle and to what degree. Otherwise, the variable takes the value of zero.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 145 ANNUAL REPORT, 2017 3. THE BUOYANCY OF INVESTMENT IN THE RECOVERY: DETERMINANTS AND CHALLENGES
BOX 3.2
 
THE BARRIERS TO LONG-TERM INVESTMENT PERCEIVED BY SPANISH AND EUROPEAN FIRMS (cont’d)
proportion of Spanish firms that stated in the 2017 wave that 
they suffered from an investment gap stands at around 20%, this 
percentage being higher among firms in the construction and 
infrastructure sector and at large corporations (see Panel 2 of 
Chart 1). In 2016, this percentage was slightly lower for Spanish 
firms, as a whole. Compared with European firms, the proportion 
of Spanish companies which reported having an investment gap 
is around 4 pp higher, that difference is more pronounced in the 
construction and infrastructure sector, although also among 
large corporations and mature firms (doing business for more 
than ten years).
Table 1 shows the results, for the overall sample of EU firms, of a 
linear probability model’s estimation that a European firm will state 
that it has an investment gap. The same explanatory variables of 
the model above are included as well as a dichotomic variable 
which takes unit value if the company report a particular obstacle. 
First, the results show that less profitable, more indebted, less 
productive firms belonging to the infrastructure sector have a 
higher probability of reporting an investment gap than others, 
these differences being statistically significant. The probability of 
financially constrained firms reporting an investment gap is 14 pp 
higher than for other companies. 
The results indicate that reporting any of the obstacles included in 
the survey increase the probability of having an investment gap. 
Furthermore, this effect is amplified when the obstacle is perceived 
as a major one, irrespective of the obstacle in question. Those with 
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Chart 1
OBSTACLES TO LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND THE PERCEIVED INVESTMENT GAP
SOURCE: 2016 and 2017 EIBIS.
a The proportion of firms reporting each obstacle is constructed as follows: if an obstacle is reported as a major obstacle it is given a weight of one, whereas if it 
is reported as a minor obstacle, its weight is 0.5.
b Percentage of firms stating that they have invested too little in the last three years to ensure the success of their business going forward.
 EU 2017  SPAIN 2016 SPAIN 2017 EU 2016
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a stronger impact are: the availability of finance6 (reporting this 
obstacle as major increases the probability of having an investment 
gap by 13 pp), followed by uncertainty (the effect is 7 pp) and, to a 
lesser degree, labour market and business regulations (4 pp-5 pp). 
These results are in line with the main determinants of investment 
indicated by the economic literature.
The qualitative findings obtained for the sub-sample of Spanish firms is 
generally in line with the findings for the whole sample. In Spain the 
obstacle with the most important effects on the investment gap is 
uncertainty which represents an increase of 11 pp in the probability of 
reporting an investment gap, compared with 7  pp for the overall 
sample. The other obstacles do not have statistically significant effects, 
although it should be noted that in this case the coefficients are 
estimated more imprecisely given the small sample size. In Spain firms 
belonging to the construction sector present a higher probability of 
reporting an investment gap, whereas in the EU no difference in 
probability is found between firms belonging to this sector and those in 
the services and manufacturing sector. These differences are consistent 
with the greater severity of the crisis in the construction sector in Spain.
6  In Table 1, the “obstacle to finance” variable is defined as those firms 
that are not finance-constrained but which state that the availability 
of finance is an obstacle to investment; in order to avoid the 
correlation between these two variables and to measure the effect of 
the “availability of finance” obstacle for those firms which are not 
finance-constrained.
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The last two decades have seen the growing internationalisation of 
firms, while a large number of emerging countries have become 
part of the global value chain. Both processes have been driven by 
technological developments in the area of communication 
networks and information (since these developments have 
substantially reduced costs), by the liberalisation of capital 
movements in various regions and by the signing of a number of 
trade and economic integration agreements (such as the creation 
of the euro area and the European Union, and their enlargement to 
Eastern European countries, or China joining the World Trade 
Organization). All of these factors have contributed to boosting the 
development of global production chains, a notable increase in the 
cross-border services trade and, in general, to the globalisation of 
all economic activity. As a result of this process a growing 
proportion of world production and investment has been located 
in emerging economies, with expanding markets and lower 
production costs.
The impact on investment in the developed economies of this shift 
in capital flows towards the new emerging markets depends on 
whether that foreign investment is a substitute for domestic 
investment (negative correlation) or if the relationship between the 
two is complementary (positive correlation). In principle, since 
both compete for financial resources that have a rising cost, a 
substitutionary relationship can be expected between domestic 
investment and foreign investment. This hypothesis was supported 
by the first empirical studies on this relationship, based on OECD 
country data, and by more recent studies on Japanese firms or 
SOURCES: OECD, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Intellectual property investment as a proportion of total investment.
b A: agriculture; B: mining; C: manufacturing industry; F: construction; G: retail H: transport; I: hotels, restaurants; J: information, communication; K: financial services; 
M: professional services; N: administrative activities.
c Assessed as the median intangible intensity for each sector.
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developing economies.1 However, firms operating in several 
countries can access financial resources in different local markets 
and redistribute them among the group companies according to 
their objectives. In these circumstances, the interaction between 
domestic investment and foreign investment is chiefly determined 
by factors relating to the characteristics of the productive process.
The international expansion of firms may adopt various forms 
which combine two stylised alternatives of the type of integration 
of the productive process (vertical or horizontal) to a greater or 
lesser degree. Where production is fragmented into stages 
distributed across different geographical areas (vertical 
integration), occasionally structured in the form of value chains, 
the investment made in the different areas will be complementary, 
either as a simultaneous response to changes in the determinants 
of the firm’s global investment or because production abroad 
requires inputs produced by the parents or vice versa. Conversely, 
if the internationalisation is based on plants in different 
geographical locations which replicate the same type of productive 
process (horizontal integration), —possibly as a result of a decision 
to replace exports to these markets with localised production, in 
order to save on transport costs, benefit from potential labour cost 
advantages, remove the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers—, 
foreign investment would replace domestic investment. In the last 
two decades, the internationalisation of production has evolved 
along both lines, through the strong growth of global value chains 
(vertical integration) and also through the delocalisation of 
domestic production, generally that with lower added value. The 
foreign plants of firms with a more horizontal structure tend to use 
certain intermediate inputs simultaneously —for example, 
activities with a technological content linked to creativity and 
knowledge— which are usually “non-rival” (they may be used 
simultaneously at several plants), unlike many of the intermediate 
inputs in the value chains.
Both forms of integration are likely to coexist within a firm or sector 
of activity, although the technological characteristics of the 
productive process are a major factor determining the type of 
integration. To examine what type of relationship is prevalent 
between domestic investment in the developed economies and 
their foreign direct investment, an equation for sectoral gross 
capital formation has been estimated, including industrial and 
services sectors. The data correspond to 19 productive sectors 
(ISIC 4, highest level) in 19 advanced economies in 1995-2014. 
Under the neoclassical theoretical framework, each sector’s 
investment depends on the demand outlook, reflected by the level 
of activity or added value, and the user cost of capital,2 in addition 
to the foreign direct investment of that sector to capture the 
possible ef fects of complementarity/substitution mentioned 
above. Moreover, the equation includes a horizontal integration 
indicator (the proportion of investment made by each sector in 
intellectual property assets) to capture the characteristics of the 
productive process of each sector (see Chart 1). The idea behind 
this indicator is that the intensity of investment in intangible assets, 
which are intermediate inputs that may be used on a non-rival 
basis by several plants, is indicative of the degree of horizontal 
integration in each sector.3 This variable interacts with foreign 
direct investment to capture its differential effect on domestic 
investment in the sectors with the highest proportion of intangible 
assets (higher degree of horizontal integration).
The results of these estimates indicate that a positive relationship 
(complementary) between sectoral gross capital formation and 
foreign direct investment (see Chart 2) predominates in the 
developed economies, and is consistent with the growth of 
global production chains based mainly on the complementarity 
of the productive process.4 However, in the sectors with a higher 
proportion of intangible assets, for example, information and 
communication (J), financial services (K) and professional and 
technical activities (M), the complementary relationship is less 
clear and can even become substitutive (based on analysis of 
the median sector). In the case of Spain, which does not differ 
substantially from the characteristics identified in the median of 
the sectors, the impact of foreign investment on domestic 
investment would be similar to that shown in Chart 2, clarifying 
that the extractive, manufacturing and retail sectors are less 
intensive in their use of intangible assets, and their impact on 
domestic investment would therefore be more positive than that 
reflected by the median of these sectors. Consequently, foreign 
direct investment by developed economies in the last two 
decades does not in principle appear to have been detrimental 
for domestic investment. Only in sectors with a high intensity of 
investment in intellectual property assets —whose weight in 
total investment varies across countries—, can foreign 
investment contribute to explaining the weak growth of 
investment in recent years.
1  See M.S. Feldstein (1995), “The Effects of Outbound Foreign Direct 
Investment on the Domestic Capital Stock” in M. Feldstein and G. 
Hubbard eds. The effect of taxation on multinational corporations, 
University of Chicago Press, 43-66; R. Belderbos, K. Fukao, K. Ito and W. 
Letterie. (2013), “Global Fixed Capital Investment by Multinational Firms”, 
Economica, 80, 274-299, London School of Economics and A. Al-Sadig 
(2013), “Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Investment: 
the Case of Developing Countries”, IMF Working Paper 13/52.
2  User cost of capital is the result of the price of investment goods relative 
to the production price in each sector and the long-term real interest rate 
less the depreciation rate of capital.
3  P. Braunerhjelm, L. Oxelheim and P. Thulin (2005), “The relationship 
between domestic and outward foreign direct investment: The role of 
industry-specific effects”, International Business Review 14, 677-694, 
use this indicator to conduct a similar exercise for Swedish industrial 
sectors.
4  M. A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley and J. R. Hines Jr. (2005), “Foreign Direct 
Investment and the Domestic Capital Stock”, American Economic 
Activity Papers and Proceedings, May, 33-38, also finds a complementary 
relationship in the case of US multinationals.
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STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND INVESTMENT
Structural reform in product markets, aimed at increasing 
competition and reducing business mark-ups, raise the level of 
activity in the economy in the medium and long term. By reducing 
the inefficiencies deriving from the excessive market power of 
firms, these reforms enhance the economy’s efficiency in the long 
term, and, therefore, the expectation of increased activity in the 
future may stimulate consumption and, above all, investment, 
when structural reforms are announced,1 even in a context of 
deleveraging by households and businesses, such as that faced 
by the Spanish economy in recent years.2
This box analyses whether these arguments are applicable to 
Spain, using a macroeconomic model for this purpose.3 
Specifically, a model of a monetary union comprising two regions 
of different sizes is used, calibrated in this case to represent 
Spain and the rest of the euro area.4 In this model, the households 
and firms of each country have long-term debt, and their 
borrowing capacity is constrained by the value of their assets, 
which serve as guarantees or collateral. On this basis, a structural 
reform consisting of a permanent reduction of firms’ unit margins 
is simulated. In addition to the “normal times” scenario, two 
further setups are considered: one in which there is a parallel 
process of private-sector deleveraging and another in which, in 
addition to the foregoing, monetary policy is constrained by the 
lower bound of interest rates.
Charts 1 and 2 show the marginal effect of this reform on GDP and 
investment under each of the three scenarios. The model 
simulations confirm, first of all, that these reforms are clearly 
expansionary in normal times (blue lines in the charts), both for 
GDP and investment, for the reasons discussed above.
Secondly, the results in a context of private-sector deleveraging 
(red lines in the charts) show that, although a situation of severe 
financial constraints may indeed diminish the effectiveness of 
these structural reforms in the short run, their immediate effect 
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IN NORMAL TIMES WITH DELEVERAGING WITH DELEVERAGING AND LOWER BOUND TO INTEREST RATES
1  See M. Draghi (2017), Introductory remarks at the European Central 
Bank Conference “Structural reforms in the euro area”, Frankfurt am 
Main, 18 October 2017. However, part of the literature of recent years 
has underscored that, in certain situations, there may be adverse effects 
in the short run. In particular, in a seminal article by Eggertsson et al. 
(2014) [See G. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero and A. Raffo (2014), “Can 
structural reforms help Europe?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 61, 
pp. 2-22] the authors argue that these structural reforms may have a 
negative impact in the short and medium term if monetary policy is 
constrained by the lower bound of interest rates and does not have the 
capacity to accommodate the deflationary effects of lower margins in 
product markets, resulting in higher real interest rates, the contractionary 
effect of which could outweigh the positive effects of the reforms 
themselves, at least in the short run.
2  Moreover, it could be argued that, in an economy facing severe financial 
constraints and undergoing a process of deleveraging of the private 
sector, the difficulties in gaining access to financing to undertake new 
consumption and investment plans could reduce agents’ capacity to 
materialise in the present some of the future positive effects of the 
reform, so that the effects in the short run would be limited despite the 
expectation of activity growth in the future.
3  Véase Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2016), ”Policy Spillovers and 
Synergies in a Monetary Union”, International Journal of Central 
Banking, 12, pp. 219-277.
4  This structure based on several countries is essential for the simulation 
exercises in this box: the results of the Arce at al. model would be similar 
to those of Eggertsson et al (2014) if the simulated structural reforms 
were applied to the euro area as a whole and not only to part of it. The 
forthcoming publication by J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and S. Hurtado (2018), 
“Internal Devaluations in a Monetary Union: Labour vs Product Market 
Reforms”, Working Paper, Banco de España, analyses in greater depth 
the effect of the size of the area implementing the reform, and concludes 
that, in a situation of interest rates constrained by their lower bound, the 
short-term impact of increased competition in product markets is 
positive as long as the area implementing the reforms accounts for less 
than 60% of the monetary union.
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continues to be clearly positive, both on GDP and on investment. 
An important channel for achieving this is the incentive to invest 
generated by the reform, which favours the revaluation of assets 
and leads to increases in the net worth of indebted households 
and firms, thus allowing for the intensity, duration and 
contractionary effects of the deleveraging process to be reduced.5
Lastly, if, in addition to a deleveraging process in Spain, the 
monetary union as a whole is constrained by the lower bound of 
interest rates (yellow lines in the charts), the results of the model 
show that the short-term effectiveness of these reforms in 
stimulating activity is further reduced, although the reform still 
maintains a clearly positive effect on investment and economic 
activity both in the short and long term. The reform is deflationary, 
and since monetary policy cannot accommodate such a shock by 
further reducing interest rates, there is an increase in real interest 
rates, whose contractionary effects, however, do not manage to 
outweigh the positive effects of the reform itself.
In short, the exercises in this box highlight the positive effects on 
GDP that the reforms aimed at increasing competition in the 
product markets may give rise to. The upturn in investment 
following implementation of such a reform is the channel through 
which entrepreneurs reflect the short-term expectation of a 
permanently more efficient and dynamic economy. Furthermore, 
this type of policy has robust expansionary effects, even in a 
complex macroeconomic context in which agents are faced with 
the need to reduce their debt and monetary policy has little room 
for further interest rate cuts.
5  For a detailed analysis of the mechanism whereby the product market 
reforms shorten the process of private-sector deleveraging, see J. 
Andrés, Ó. Arce, and C. Thomas (2017), “Structural Reforms in a Debt 
Overhang”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 88, pp. 15-34.
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p. 18 Chamfered corner of Cibeles. Photographer: Vis-Tek. © Banco de España
p. 20 Screen, 1st Annual Research Conference. Photographer: Daniel Santamaría. © Banco de España
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS
The Banco de España publishes various types of documents providing information on its 
activity (economic reports, statistics, research papers, etc.). The full list of Banco de España 
publications can be found on its website at http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publica-
ciones/Relacionados/Fic/Catalogopublicaciones.pdf.
Most of these documents are available in pdf format and can be downloaded free of charge 
from the Banco de España website at http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/informes/. 
Requests for others should be addressed to publicaciones@bde.es.
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COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using 
the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
ABS Asset-backed securities
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
BRICs Brazil, Russia, India and China
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MIP Macroeconomic imbalance procedure
MMFs Money market funds
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAIRU Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NPBs National Productivity Boards
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OJ L Official Journal of the European Union (Legislation)
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SPEE National Public Employment Service
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
